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Scientic and engineering communities (e.g., chemistry, bioinformatics and engineering
manufacturing) have presented unprecedented requirements for knowing the provenance
of their data products, i.e., where they originated from, how they were produced and
what has happened to them since creation. Without such important knowledge, scien-
tists and engineers cannot reproduce, analyse or validate experiments and processes.
Previous work has conceived a computer-based representation of a past process for de-
termining provenance, termed process documentation. However, current provenance sys-
tems do not adequately address the problem of reliably recording process documentation
in large scale environments like Service Oriented Architectures. For example, a service
may not be available and network connection may be broken. In this context, reliably
recording process documentation becomes challenging, given that the documentation
produced in a process can be spread over multiple provenance repositories across the
world.
The presence of failures (specically, the crash of provenance repositories and commu-
nication failures) may prevent process documentation from being recorded, losing the
evidence that a process occurred. This would have disastrous consequences and hence
is not acceptable in the domains that rely on process documentation to determine the
provenance of their data products.
In this thesis, we systematically analyse all situations that may occur during captur-
ing process documentation in the event of assumed failures. We then present a novel
coordinator-based protocol that is formally proved to record complete process docu-
mentation. In addition, we use graphs to intuitively represent the topology of process
documentation recorded in multiple interlinked provenance repositories, which helps us
to investigate the entire retrievability of distributed process documentation. Finally, we
evaluate a system architecture that employs the protocol and supports practical issues
such as communication, storage and performance. The results show that the system can
record complete and retrievable process documentation while maintaining acceptable
performance.Contents
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Introduction
1.1 Provenance
The Oxford English Dictionary denes provenance as (i) the fact of coming from some
particular source or quarter; origin, derivation. (ii) the history or pedigree of a work
of art, manuscript, rare book, etc.; concretely, a record of the ultimate derivation and
passage of an item through its various owners.
In the eld of ne art, provenance has been well studied as the trusted and documented
history of an art object [60]. For example, after a painting has been drawn, people who
study it many years later would want to know who drew it, where and when it was
produced, what materials and techniques were used to draw it, and who has owned it
since it was created. These questions can be answered through a record that accurately
documents all the information relevant to this painting.
In scientic and engineering communities, provenance explains the history of data prod-
ucts, e.g., where they originated from and what has happened to them since creation.
With such information, people can interpret and judge the quality of data, and con-
sequently derive trust in results produced by applications. In chemistry experiments,
provenance can be used to detail the procedure by which a material is generated, al-
lowing the material to be patented [132]. In healthcare applications, in order to audit
if proper decisions were made for a patient, there is a need to trace back the origins of
these decisions [11]. In engineering manufacturing, engineers choose materials for the
design of critical components, such as for an airplane, based on their statistical analysis
and it is essential to establish the history of this data to prevent system failures and for
audit [146]. In nance business, the provenance of some data item establishes the origin
and authenticity of the data item (e.g., a trade execution) produced by nancial transac-
tions, enabling reviewers and auditors to verify if these transactions are compliant with
specic nancial regulations [91].
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Traditionally, people typically use a log book to record provenance information of their
work. For example, scientists manually record every step, operation and intermediate
result of their experiment in a log book as the experiment is being executed. Therefore,
they can determine the provenance of experimental results by going back through their
log book. However, if the experiment is entirely in silico1, scientists are not able to
track their work since there are no physical records as there would be with a log book
in those lab-based experiments.
To address this problem, much research has been seen to collect provenance information
in computer systems (e.g., [63, 130, 131, 175, 54, 155, 10, 151]). The drawback of these
provenance systems is that they are tightly coupled with specic application domains or
technologies. This means that application developers have to re-implement components
for recording or using provenance in dierent execution contexts. In addition, it becomes
dicult to integrate provenance derived from dierent systems and represented using
dierent models. One direction currently being investigated is the standardisation of
representing provenance [41].
To achieve this goal, Groth et al. [77, 82, 80] designed and implemented a domain
and technology independent infrastructure, PASOA, to provide interoperable means for
recording and using provenance. It supports requirements from very dierent application
areas [117], such as biology, chemistry, physics and computer science, and has been
evaluated in a number of applications [44, 11, 157, 169, 158, 9, 96, 167, 140, 118].
PASOA denes several terms related to provenance. The provenance of a piece of data
is redened as the process that led to that piece of data. The term process documen-
tation refers to the documentation of the process that led to the data item. PASOA
distinguishes the two terms in that provenance is determined by performing a query over
process documentation2. Process documentation is recorded in a dedicated repository,
the provenance store. The role of a provenance store is to provide a long-term reliable
and accessible storage of process documentation.
The lifecycle of process documentation consists of four phases: creating, recording,
querying and managing, as shown in Figure 1.1. While executing and producing elec-
tronic data, provenance-aware applications create process documentation and store it
in one or several provenance stores. After being recorded, process documentation is
ready to be retrieved and reasoned over to derive the provenance of some data item.
Also, process documentation stored in provenance stores can be managed, maintained
or curated by administrators.
1An in silico experiment is a procedure that uses computer-based information repositories and com-
putational analysis to test a hypothesis, derive a summary, search for patterns, or demonstrate a known
fact [73] as in a wide range of areas, e.g., computational chemistry [66], bioinformatics [73], and drug
discovery [93]
2To be compatible with current literature, the terms provenance information and process documen-
tation are used interchangeably in this thesis.Chapter 1 Introduction 3
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Figure 1.1: The lifecycle of process documentation [126]
1.2 Scalable Recording of Process Documentation
Large scale, open distributed systems are typically designed using a service-oriented ap-
proach [152], usually referred to as service-oriented architectural style [28]. As opposed
to conventional distributed environments, one obvious and common challenge faced by
SOAs is managing and sharing heterogeneous services across dynamic distributed or-
ganisations with dierent security policies. A representative example is the Grid, where
computing and data resources are geographically dispersed in dierent administrative
domains, and computing resources are highly heterogeneous, ranging from single PCs
and workstations, clusters of workstations, to supercomputers [55].
The Grid has been used in a variety of domains including drug discovery [93], bioinfor-
matics [73], earthquake engineering [136], weather forecasting [138], astronomy [154] and
high energy physics [74]. Many of these experiments require large-scale resources with
thousands of scientists, tens of thousands of computers, and trillions of petabytes of stor-
age across continents in the world 345. SF-Express is a distributed interactive simulation
application that harnesses multiple supercomputers across nine organisations to meet
the computational demands of large-scale network-based simulation environments [24].
In the drug discovery research, 1700 computers were simultaneously used in 15 countries
around the world to tackle the scientic challenge. The EGEE project assembles over
250 sites around the world organised in 12 partner regions across 40 countries (Figure
1.2). Several communities in EGEE participated in a project Biomedical Grids to cope
with the ood of bioinformatics and healthcare data [67].
When recording process documentation in such distributed and heterogeneous environ-
ments, it is impractical for a single provenance store to retain all provenance information
3EGEE, http://www.eu-egee.org/
4OSG, http://www.opensciencegrid.org/
5TeraGrid, http://www.teragrid.org/Chapter 1 Introduction 4
Figure 1.2: EGEE Project Participants [67]
of a distributed application. Thus, multiple provenance stores should be used to sup-
port scalable recording of process documentation for several advantages. One advantage
is that the use of multiple repositories eliminates a central point of failure and perfor-
mance bottlenecks. With multiple provenance stores, an organisation can record process
documentation into a nearby store with short recording latencies.
Using multiple provenance repositories results in process documentation recorded in
many locations. Hence there must be some mechanism to connect these stores in order to
retrieve distributed process documentation. PASOA introduces a mechanism to interlink
provenance stores. Links are recorded along with process documentation in stores, which
form a pointer chain connecting all the provenance stores hosting the documentation of
a process (Figure 1.3). Using the pointer chain, distributed documentation can be
retrieved from one store to another. Section 2.3.4 will detail the linking mechanism.
1.3 Recording Process Documentation in the Presence of
Failures
Distributed systems are susceptible to failures [37]. Failures, due to various reasons like
server crash, hardware deciencies, network partition, broken communication, power
outage, and other sources of failures (e.g., machine rebooted by the owner, network
congestion, excessive CPU load, etc) [90] are a signicant cause for concern.
Since large-scale SOA-based applications usually involve heterogenous services provided
and controlled by other organisations, another challenge of SOAs is the face of failures
that would aect the reliability and availability of services.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
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Figure 1.3: An Example of Interlinked Provenance Stores
The Grid6 community has reported many results regarding failures. The weather forecast
experiments on TeraGrid saw a signicant portion of its workows (60%) encountering
software and/or hardware problems [23]. Grid2003 (now Open Science Grid) observed a
30% job submission failure rate with 90% of the failures caused by problems such as disk
lling errors, site overloading and crashes, and network interruptions [57]. The FlexX
and Autodock data challenges of the WISDOM project7, conducted in 2005, showed
that only 32% and 57% of the jobs completed successfully, respectively [173].
It is not surprising to nd that failures are common in the Grid. This is because the
Grid is geographically dispersed, involving a large number of components (e.g., instru-
ments, display, computational and informational resource, and people) across multiple
autonomous administrative domains.
When recording provenance in a distributed environment like the Grid, it is unavoid-
able that the communication with a provenance store (which can be deployed as a Grid
service) or the provenance store itself can fail. Some of the current provenance systems,
although able to reliably record process documentation [130, 47, 142, 62], do not support
multiple provenance stores, whilst others tend to assume a failure-free execution envi-
ronment or do not discuss this issue [175, 10, 150, 58, 35]. Such a limitation, assumption
or omission will hinder the eventual utilisation of provenance. We now take the example
of PASOA since it is a general provenance system and also supports interlinked multiple
provenance stores.
A scientic application, to be described in Chapter 6, used PASOA to record process
documentation in the presence of simulated failures. By analysing the contents of prove-
6Cloud Computing receives more and more attention nowadays. Although having its unique charac-
teristics, it is evolved out of Grid Computing and relies on the Grid as its backbone and infrastructure
support[59]. We will discuss Cloud Computing and its relationship with provenance in Chapter 7.
7WISDOM, http://wisdom.eu-egee.fr/Chapter 1 Introduction 6
nance stores after the application completes, we nd that the quality of the recorded
documentation is poor in the presence of failures8, as demonstrated in Figures 1.4 and
1.5. In Figure 1.4, as failure rate increases, a large proportion of process documentation
fails to be recorded. Figure 1.5 reveals the increase in the number of dangling links,
i.e., pointers to other provenance stores that were supposed to record part of process
documentation but did not, and in the number of isolated documentation islands. In
the example of Figure 1.6, distributed process documentation recorded in multiple stores
are disconnected to several islands due to the breakage of the pointer chain.
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Process documentation of poor quality, i.e., incomplete and disconnected, is not accept-
able in those domains that rely on process documentation to determine the provenance
of their data products. For example, U.S. Food and Drug Administration requires drug
companies to keep a complete record of drug manufacture and distribution as long as
the drug is in use9. A number of SOA-based applications have used PASOA to derive
provenance of their data products, including healthcare application [44], organ trans-
plant management [11], aerospace engineering [96], RSS feeds [111], trust calculations
[140], fault tolerance in the Grid and SOAs [157, 169, 158], biodiversity [167], and au-
diting of private data use [9]. Due to poor quality, entire process documentation cannot
be obtained and hence those applications cannot verify the provenance of their data
products.
In addition to recording poor quality process documentation, provenance systems with-
out consideration of failures can also aect the execution of the corresponding provenance-
aware application. For example, outstanding documentation which fails to be trans-
ported to a crashed provenance store may exhaust the application's memory if no ow
control mechanism is implemented, leading to the crash of the application, or it may
suspend the execution of the application if the application has ow control mechanisms.
Current Grid applications often perform long running tasks that require several or more
8We considered the failures of provenance stores and communication links.
9Section 600.12, Code of Federal Regulations, Food and Drug Administration.
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=600.12Chapter 1 Introduction 7
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Figure 1.6: Broken Pointer Chain
days of computation [114, 55]. Although fault-tolerant mechanisms have been avail-
able for Grid applications to tolerate failures, the interruption due to recording process
documentation would still cause great troubles to those applications.
1.4 Thesis Statement and Contributions
When recording provenance information in SOAs, the large-scale and heterogenous na-
tures of SOAs require the need for multiple provenance stores and the consideration
of failures. Our work aims to address these concerns by designing a generic recording
protocol that deals with failures and still ensures the connectivity of distributed process
documentation recorded in numerous linked stores.
We state the thesis of our research as follows:
In SOA-based applications, the problem of recording process documentation in the pres-
ence of failures (provenance store crashes and communication failures10) while still en-
suring its entire retrievability is solved via a generic and ecient coordinator-based proto-
col to guarantee successful recording of complete documentation and to preserve accurate
links that connect multiple provenance stores.
To establish this thesis, we rstly present F-PReP, a protocol to record documentation in
the presence of failures. Then we formalise the protocol and prove that it guarantees the
recording of complete documentation and maintains accurate links. In order to establish
the entire retrievability, we analyse the topology of distributed process documentation
after being recorded in provenance stores using F-PReP. Finally, we introduce the im-
plementation of F-PReP and conduct evaluations to show that F-PReP is ecient and
introduces acceptable recording overhead.
10Failure assumptions will be further justied in Chapter 3.Chapter 1 Introduction 8
Given that PASOA is a domain and technology independent infrastructure and provides
a mechanism to interlink provenance stores, our work extends PASOA with the following
original contributions.
 We present and formalise a generic coordinator-based recording protocol F-PReP,
which provides remedial actions to cope with failures. The coordinator plays a
crucial role in maintaining accurate links to connect multiple stores. Four require-
ments are identied for the protocol to record complete and retrievable distributed
process documentation in the presence of failures. The protocol's correctness is
formally proved using mathematical induction.
 We graphically represent the topology of distributed process documentation recorded
in interlinked provenance stores. We perform an exhaustive analysis on the forms
of graphs, considering all possible topologies after documentation was recorded by
using F-PReP in the presence of failures. We also identify a number of graph prop-
erties to help us demonstrate the entire retrievability of process documentation.
 A system architecture F-PReServ is described, which employs F-PReP and sup-
ports practical issues such as communication, storage and performance. Its fea-
tures include a novel way of creating process documentation, a new retrieval func-
tion, and implementation strategies for achieving good recording performance in
the presence of failures.
 An extensive evaluation of F-PReServ is performed, which reveals that it intro-
duces acceptable recording overhead to a provenance-aware application's execu-
tion. The evaluation is conducted at several levels. First of all, we measure the
throughput of the provenance store and coordinator. We demonstrate that a sin-
gle coordinator does not result in performance bottleneck. Then, we benchmark
the recording performance of F-PReServ and show that remedial actions intro-
duce small overhead (below 10%). In addition, we investigate the performance
impact on the execution time of a scientic application. Lessons are learned and
recommendations are given on achieving good performance in the case of failures.
1.5 Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 provides background information on our work. It surveys the state of the
art research for determining provenance in computational systems and reviews fault
tolerance mechanisms for distributed systems. From this survey, we position our work
and discuss various approaches to reliably recording process documentation.Chapter 1 Introduction 9
Chapter 3 states failure assumptions and identies requirements that F-PReP supports.
Then it analyses the problems that may occur in the presence of failures and outlines
the protocol's design philosophy. After that, we dene protocol messages and detail
F-PReP's behaviour. Finally, we formalise F-PReP using an Abstract State Machine
approach.
Chapter 4 proves the protocol's correctness by following a systematic procedure based on
mathematical induction. A number of properties are established showing that the pro-
tocol guarantees successful recording of complete documentation and maintains correct
links when failures occur.
Chapter 5 graphically represents contents of interlinked provenance stores hosting dis-
tributed process documentation. We establish graph properties and present an exhaus-
tive analysis on graph topologies, which facilitates us to demonstrate the entire retriev-
ability of distributed documentation.
Chapter 6 rstly details the design and implementation of F-PReServ. Then it outlines
our evaluation environment and methodology, followed by a series of performance ex-
periments in controlled environments and in a scientic application. Based on lessons
learned from the experimental results, several recommendations are given regarding fur-
ther improvements of the system.
Chapter 7 discusses future work and concludes this dissertation.
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Related Work
In this chapter, we review research on provenance and provide background information
on failures and fault tolerance mechanisms. We also position our work and discuss
various alternative approaches to addressing our problem.
In the rst part of this chapter, we introduce Service-Oriented Architectures and work-
ows, and then review the state of the art research about provenance. The provenance
community has been growing in recent years and many systems have been seen to sup-
port provenance in many research areas. Through a comprehensive comparison of ma-
jor provenance-related systems, PASOA has several advantages over the other systems,
which have been demonstrated in a wide range of applications.
Then we highlight key aspects of PASOA, such as the modelling and recording of process
documentation, and the linking mechanism that is used to connect multiple provenance
stores.
In the second part, we introduce failure models in distributed systems and survey major
fault-tolerant techniques. We also highlight the importance of formal methods to the
design of distributed protocol and review formal approaches to modelling fault-tolerant
applications.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Service-Oriented Architectures
Large scale, open distributed systems are typically designed using a service-oriented
approach [152], usually referred to as service-oriented architectural style [28]. A Service-
Oriented Architecture (SOA) consists of loosely coupled services communicating via a
common transport. Typically, a service is only available through an interface represented
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in some standard format. The main advantage of SOAs is that they hide implementation
behind an interface allowing implementation details to change without aecting the user
of the service.
One of the main ways to implement SOAs is to build cross-platform, interoperable
applications out of Web Services [7, 134]. Using Web service technologies, a service's
interface can be expressed in the Web Services Denition Language (WSDL) and it can
communicate using the common transport protocol SOAP. Because of these properties,
SOAs are particularly good for building large scale distributed systems, such as the Grid.
The Grid is a complex computing infrastructure designed to support the sharing of
heterogeneous computational and data resource across dynamic and geographically dis-
tributed organisations [55]. In this context, a fundamental problem is how to provide
an interoperable access model to all types of resources. This issue has been addressed
by the Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) [55], where a SOA style of resource
access is adopted. Due to the benets of SOAs and Web Services, Grid middleware,
e.g., Globus Toolkit 4 [56], gLite [67] and UNICORE [116], has moved towards these
technologies. Hence, Grid resources have been modelled as Web Services to facilitate
resource sharing in heterogeneous environments.
The same trend has been seen in scientic and engineering communities. When inte-
grated with the Grid, domain-specic services have also been modelled as Web Services
in a wide range of applications, such as scientic data simulation [87], astronomy [154],
biology [95], and environmental science [50, 138].
In order to tie services together, one technique that is often used is workow.
2.1.2 Workows
A workow species the operational aspect of a work procedure: how tasks are struc-
tured, who performs them, what their relative order is, how information ows to support
the tasks and how tasks are being tracked [52].
Workows can be divided into two types, abstract and concrete. Abstract workows
are those in which the task dependencies are dened but are not bound directly to a
particular service. In contrast, concrete workows are those where the tasks are bound
to services. Software such as Pegasus [43] takes abstract workows and generates con-
crete workows taking advantage of available resources. Users can also create concrete
workows directly, either by hand or by workow editing software such as Taverna [89].
Workows are typically executed using a workow enactment engine like Taverna and
Condor [65], which invokes various services on the user's local machine, or remotely such
as the Grid, taking advantage of heterogeneous resources [53].Chapter 2 Related Work 12
As workows become more generic and reusable, they are beginning to be exposed as
services themselves [172]. Essentially, in the context of SOAs, workows that centrally
coordinate services are moving towards multi-level nested workows, which means ser-
vices of a workow may invoke other services [40].
Due to increasingly complex sets of computations and data analyses, workows have
emerged as a paradigm for representing and managing complex in-silico experiments
[98]. In order to enable workow re-execution and the reproducibility of results in these
experiments, scientic workow communities have identied that provenance informa-
tion must be generated and captured during the course of workow execution [72].
One of the challenges that workow communities face is scalability [72]. Large scale
workows may involve thousands of steps and perhaps millions of tasks, where each
step may integrate diverse models and data sources dened and developed by dierent
organisations. The applications and data may be also distributed in the execution
environment and many participants may dene the workow, managing its execution,
and interpreting results. To record provenance information in large scale workows, the
need to connect multiple provenance repositories is obvious.
2.2 Provenance Research
In this section, we briey overview provenance research in dierent domains. Through
this review, we demonstrate that PASOA is a general approach to modelling and record-
ing process documentation. We also notice that none of the current systems, which use
multiple provenance repositories, has adequately addressed the failures that could occur
during the recording of provenance information.
2.2.1 Overview
This section surveys literature on provenance related research. Prior research has used
the term lineage [105] to refer to provenance. We use the two terms interchangeably in
this section. The aim of this section is to show that provenance has attracted attention
in many areas.
There are two important surveys regarding provenance research. One [19] is about
lineage retrieval systems, workow systems, and collaborative environments. Another
one [149] surveys several systems based on taxonomy of provenance techniques.
Lanter conducted pioneering research in provenance in the early 1990's. He studied
the lineage problem in geographic information systems (GIS) [19]. Provenance can help
indicate the quality of derived map products in GIS applications. This is useful for GIS
users to determine the tness of the use of map in their application.Chapter 2 Related Work 13
The database community focuses on data lineage problem since the late 1990's. This
problem can be summarised as given a data product, determine the source data used to
produce that item. A data product in a relational database can be a view, a table, a
tuple, an attribute. It can also be a pointer to an external data resource such as a le.
There are three approaches to data lineage problems in database community. The rst
one uses annotations on attributes in databases [34]. Lineage annotations encode infor-
mation about the data source and the query that created them. Databases can also use
query inversion and function inversion techniques to trace the lineage from a data item
back to its source [27, 166, 164]. These two approaches typically focus on situations in
which all of the interactions with data take place in a single database, whilst the third ap-
proach proposed by P.Buneman recently is to track and manage the provenance of data
that moves among multiple databases [26]. He proposes a copy-paste model describing
user actions in assimilating external data sources into curated database records.
Low-level provenance recording has been studied at the levels of program execution
and operating systems. Provenance-Aware Storage System (PASS) is proposed to au-
tomatically collect provenance at the operating system level [129, 153]. It observes all
processes that run on a PASS-enabled operating system, and generates provenance data
about low-level details like the loaded kernel modules, installed libraries and process
environment. Provenance information is then maintained in a le store for later query
by users. The Earth System Science Server (ES3) project is developing a local infras-
tructure for managing Earth science data products derived from satellite remote sensing
[64]. Similarly to PASS, ES3 extracts provenance information automatically from ar-
bitrary applications by monitoring their interactions (arguments, le I/O, system calls,
etc) with their execution environment. Provenance information is then logged to the
ES3 database.
Provenance is a relatively new research area in SOA-based applications, which are usually
represented in the form of workows. The provenance of a data result of an experiment
is determined by provenance information (e.g., input and output data to each service)
recorded during the execution of the workow. Many provenance systems have been
developed, such as myGrid, CMCS, PAC, gLite, Kepler, VisTrail, Karma, VDS and
PASOA. We will detail and compare these systems in Section 2.2.2.
The provenance community has been growing in recent years. Five international work-
shops related to provenance were held: two workshops on Data Provenance and Annota-
tion (DPAW'02, DPAW'03), two International Provenance and Annotation Workshops
(IPAW'06, IPAW'08) [124, 20, 61], and a workshop on the Theory and Practice of Prove-
nance (TaPP'09) [33]. Three provenance challenges1, a community eort to understand
and compare systems addressing provenance, have been organised in 2006, 2007 and
2009, attracting more than 20 institutions to participate. The rst challenge estab-
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lishes an understanding of the similarities, dierences and common issues among avail-
able provenance-related systems with the focus on documenting processes and answering
provenance-related queries [127]. It also identies that interoperability between dierent
systems as a key issue, which is the focus of the second challenge. The second challenge
deals with integrating provenance information derived from dierent provenance systems
and represented using dierent models, which all contribute to the provenance of a data
product. It concludes that a common data model is required to achieve interoperabil-
ity among the existing provenance systems. This has led to a proposed specication
of a provenance data model, the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [125]. After a review
period, a third Provenance Challenge was organised to evaluate this model in June 2009.
2.2.2 Major Provenance Systems
In this section, we review and compare several systems supporting provenance collec-
tion for SOA applications. Nine representative systems are chosen based on ve prove-
nance related international workshops (DPAW'02, DPAW'03, IPAW'06, IPAW'08 and
TaPP'09). Such a survey serves two aims: rst, the reason why our work is built on
PASOA; second, how these systems deal with failures when recording provenance infor-
mation.
Table 2.1 compares the nine systems against several criteria, which are essential require-
ments that a provenance system should support in a wide range of application domains
[117, 76]. We rst introduce each system in Section 2.2.2.1 and then discuss this table
in Section 2.2.2.2.
myGrid CMCS PAC gLite Kepler VisTrail Karma VDS PASOA
Domain No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Independent?
Technology No No No No No No No No Yes
Independent?
Type of Data Data Job Job Data Data, Data Data Open
Provenance Workow
Multi-Site No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Recording?
Multiple No No No No No No No Yes Yes
P-Stores?
Reliable No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No
Recording?
Table 2.1: Comparison of Provenance-related SystemsChapter 2 Related Work 15
2.2.2.1 Overview of Candidate Systems
The myGrid project provides web service-based middleware in support of in-silico ex-
periments in bioinformatics [175]. The Taverna workow enactment engine has been
modied to generate provenance information based on semantic web technologies, such
as Resource Description Framework (RDF) [115], and Life Science Identiers (LSIDs)
[174]. Provenance information documents the invoked services, their inputs/outputs,
performed functions and any other metadata that might be of interest to scientists.
Provenance information is then gathered by Taverna during workow execution and
stored in a centralised MySQL database.
The CMCS project provides informatics tools to support multi-scale data management
and provenance tracking across web service-based chemical experiments [130, 131].
CMCS uses a centralised Scientic Annotation Middleware (SAM) [21] repository to
store provenance information, which is URL referenceable les representing all resources
such as data objects, processes and invoked web services of a workow. Provenance in-
formation is populated by applications in workows or manually entered by scientists via
a portal interface. Open Source Java Messaging Service, OpenJMS, is used to reliably
deliver messages, including provenance information.
Provenance-Aware Condor (PAC) transparently gathers provenance information while
a job runs on Condor [141, 142]. The provenance information, modelled by PAC schema
includes a job's execution environment and all les related to the job's execution. Prove-
nance information can help identify if a job was run on machines with a faulty processor
and to determine if a job is aected by a hardware problem. The components in PAC
are Condor, Quill and FileTrace. Quill gathers job execution runtime information from
Condor daemons whilst FileTrace collects information about les used by Condor jobs.
Provenance information is recorded into a central PostgreSQL database, which is eval-
uated to have little performance impact on Condor. Quill provides fault tolerance for
reliably recording provenance information.
Similarly to PAC, gLite, the Grid middleware of EGEE project, automatically collects
and keeps tracking the provenance of a job [47, 97, 61]. Provenance information includes
two aspects: job input (e.g., job description, a job's input les and parameters) to enable
job re-running and the job's runtime environment (e.g., versions of used software and
environment settings). A Logging and Bookkeeping service securely and reliably collects
job provenance as the job is running on gLite. It submits the provenance information
into a Job Provenance (JP) service, which stores provenance data in a backend database.
Since only a few JP services are installed in the whole EGEE gLite middleware, each JP
service is required to be scalable enough in order to deal with provenance data generated
from millions of jobs. Although gLite uses several JP repositories, the provenance of one
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Kepler is a scientic workow system which supports diverse types of workows from
those designed for job control and data movement in Grids to those for high-level con-
ceptual scientic experiments [10, 22, 110]. To achieve this, Kepler provides a cong-
urable provenance collection framework to track all aspects of provenance in scientic
workows, including runtime context, input/output data, intermediate data products,
workow denition, and information about the workow's evolution. Provenance data
is collected in XML format by the workow enactment engine and archived in a prove-
nance repository. Kepler also provides a unique \smart"rerun functionality that extracts
provenance information to rerun partial workow in the case of a workow parameter
change [10].
VisTrails is a visualisation and scientic workow system [62]. VisTrail not only collects
the provenance for data products, but also becomes the rst system to capture the
provenance of a workow, i.e., the evolution of a workow, by recording all versions of a
workow and all its instances since the workow was created by a user. With VisTrail,
users can return to previous versions of workows and workow runs to compare their
results. The provenance information is captured by workow editor or the enactment
engine and recorded in a centralised repository.
Provenance information in the above work is mainly collected by their respective work-
ow enactment engine. This approach however cannot capture sucient provenance
information in distributed workow systems where the invoked services use external ser-
vices or call other workows. Another shortcoming is the diculty of verication. If only
the enactment engine records documentation about a process, it is impossible for third-
parties to verify if the process took place as documented, because they have no other
record to compare with. Therefore, by allowing multi-site recording, i.e., both services
and enactment engine to record documentation independently, provenance information
can also be used for accountability or verication purposes.
To address this problem, Karma supports provenance collection from both the work-
ow enactment engine and services [150]. Karma is a general provenance framework
for scientic workows. It uses asynchronous Publish/Notication model to record
provenance-related workow activities such as service invocations, input/output data
for each invocation. Workow enactment engine and services publish these activities as
notications to WS-Messenger [88], a Web service-based messaging middleware specif-
ically for Grid applications. A provenance service then listens for those notications
and stores them in a relational database. Reliably delivery of provenance information is
ensured by WS-Messenger.
The Virtual Data System (VDS) targets at large scale grid applications (e.g., high-
energy physics and astronomy) with the provision of data virtualisation independent
of data's location, representation and physical materialisation [58, 176, 35]. VDS uses
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data, the invocations of those procedures as well as the datasets produced by those
invocations. Then VDL statements are compiled to create abstract workows, which
are further materialised to executable workows that can be run on the Grid. During
workow execution, provenance information about both application runtime behaviour
and the runtime environment is collected and recorded in a repository called virtual data
catalog (VDC). Similarly to Karma, VDS also supports provenance collection from multi-
sites. In addition, VDS supports multiple VDCs, connected by virtual data hyperlinks,
to support large-scale grid applications [58]. One limitation of VDS is that it does not
store explicit relationships between input and output data of services within a workow,
so determining provenance of data relies on the presence of the same workow denition
as was executed at the time.
The Provenance Aware Service Oriented Architecture (PASOA) project has built a
generic, domain-independent and technology-independent infrastructure to provide in-
teroperable means for recording and using provenance [77, 126]. PASOA uses an SOA-
based approach, which models a process as a set of causally related interactions between
services via message passing [80]. An open provenance recording protocol PReP [82] is
developed, which, to our knowledge, is the rst formalised recording protocol to spec-
ify the behaviour of recording actors and provenance stores. Due to the open nature,
users can capture data provenance at any granularity level. All services involved in a
process for generating a result contribute to the process documentation for determining
the provenance of that result. A linking mechanism is developed to connect multiple
provenance stores to facilitate provenance collection in large scale environments [76]. A
concrete implementation of PReP is provided, named Process documentation Recording
for Services (PReServ) [79]. PReServ contains a Provenance Store Web Service, a set
of interfaces for recording and querying provenane store, a set of Java client libraries
for easily accessing those interfaces, and an Axis handler for automatically recording
process documentation for Axis based web services. A Python version of the client side
library is also available [18]. A wide range of applications have used PASOA to record
their process documentation, which we will detail in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.2.2 Discussion
We now discuss these systems according to Table 2.1.
Domain Independent Early provenance-related research was related to specic domains,
such as Biology (myGrid) and Chemistry (CMCS). The shortcoming of being domain
dependant is that it hinders the reusability of provenance components. Application de-
velopers have to re-implement components for recording or using provenance in dierent
execution contexts. Recent works have focused on the development of general systems
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Technology Independent All the above works except PASOA are technology dependent
since they are tightly coupled to the workow technologies. myGrid, CMCS, Kepler
and VisTrail all have their own workow systems with built-in functionalities or third
party software to support provenance collection. PAC and gLite are strictly restricted
to their respective execution engines (Condor and gLite, respectively). Although Karma
is designed to be a general provenance framework independent of any specic workow
systems, it still relies on the notion of a workow, because it is designed to capture
workow activities. VDS is not conned to any particular workow system either. But
it does not store explicit relationships between input and output data of services within a
workow, so determining provenance of data relies on the presence of the same workow
denition as was executed at the time.
There are two drawbacks of being technology dependent. Firstly, distributed workow
execution involves execution under dierent workow engines and heterogeneous prove-
nance collection mechanisms. Therefore, it becomes dicult to integrate provenance
derived from those dierent workow systems and represented using dierent models.
In addition, many applications do not need or wish to commit to a workow environ-
ment, which we will illustrate in Section 2.2.3. Provenance systems replying on workow
technologies, however, cannot cope with these applications.
PASOA's domain and technology independent nature distinguishes it from all the other
provenance-related systems. It is a generic and standalone provenance architecture
independent of the notion of workow.
Type of Provenance The surveyed systems all focus on dierent types of provenance.
Data provenance gives the history of deriving a data product; job provenance is con-
cerned with workow runtime information that enables job rerun; workow provenance
reveals the evolution of a workow. PASOA allows users to capture data provenance and
a component's state information [167], which can be used for job provenance. Although
PASOA has not demonstrated that it can record workow evolution, it has successfully
tracks the provenance about workow renement [118], which is similar to workow
evolution as both reect how a workow is changed before execution.
Multi-Site Recording Provenance information in most reviewed systems is only provided
by a workow enactment engine. As mentioned before, this approach has disadvantages
such as the incapability of giving sucient information to determine the provenance of
a piece of object when a workow is highly decentralised. Karma, VDS and PASOA
support gathering provenance from both workow enactment engine and services.
Multiple Provenance Stores Given that large-scale SOA applications may involve services
owned by many institutions, it is impractical to expect a single provenance store to be
used to retain all of the process documentation due to issues such as single point of
failures, scalability, security and access control. PASOA and VDS provide similar Web-
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assume a centralised data store to maintain provenance information.
PASOA records links along with process documentation in provenance stores. A link is a
pointer to a remote provenance store. The set of links forms a pointer chain connecting
all the provenance stores hosting the documentation of a process. Using the pointer
chain, distributed documentation can be retrieved from one store to another. VDS [58]
connects multiple provenance repositories using hyperlinks, which form a provenance
chain spanning across a range of servers to enable scalable recording. However, VDS is
technology-dependent and does not have a well-dened API for querying its provenance
repositories.
Reliable Recording PAC and gLite provide fault-tolerant support for provenance col-
lection mainly through persisting messages in local site and retransmitting them in the
event of failures. In PAC, the Quill service writes provenance information to log les and
then periodically reads the logs and inserts the data into a relational database shared
by all machines in a Condor pool. In gLite, the Logging and Bookkeeping service (LB)
provides a notication-based messaging infrastructure to securely and reliably collect
job information (in the form of events) from individual Grid components. In order to
provide reliability of transporting event messages, LB also logs events on a component's
local disk before delivering them to a LB server.
Both CMCS and Karma employ third party message queue middleware (OpenMQ and
WS-Messenger, respectively) to reliably record their provenance data. Messages are
placed onto a queue and stored in the queue until the recipient retrieves them. Fault-
tolerant functionalities are provided by the message queueing systems to ensure that
messages do not get lost and can be successfully delivered in the event of a system
failure. We will detail message queue systems in Section 2.6.3.
The other provenance systems do not consider failures; hence they cannot guarantee the
successful recording of provenance information when failures occur.
Summary From the above discussion, we can see that PASOA has a generic nature of
recording provenance information in large scale heterogeneous environments. Its domain
and technology independent model allows users to capture any type of provenance at
any granularity for any application no matter if it is workow centric. In addition, it
supports provenance collection from multi-sites and provides a mechanism to connect
multiple repositories to enable scalable recording. The main deciency of PASOA is that
it cannot guarantee the reliable recording of provenance data in the presence of failures
which are common in large scale heterogeneous environments like the Grid. In the next
section, we will describe a wide range of applications that have used PASOA to record
process documentation to further demonstrate the advantages of PASOA as a generic
provenance architecture.Chapter 2 Related Work 20
2.2.3 Applications that Used PASOA
A number of applications have used PASOA to derive provenance of their data products,
including healthcare application [44, 11], fault tolerance in the Grid and SOAs [157, 169,
158], auditing of private data use [9], aerospace engineering [96], biodiversity [167], trust
calculations [140] and workow renement [118]. In addition to the Java version, the
client side library developed in PASOA has also been implemented in Python, enabling a
wide range of Python applications, applications with Python interface and Python-glued
workows to be provenance-aware [18].
We now briey introduce these applications. The purposes of introducing these appli-
cations are twofold: rstly, they provide a range of evidences demonstrating the advan-
tages of PASOA, such as openness, technology independence, and support of multi-site
recording and multiple provenance repositories; secondly, the lack of reliable recording
of provenance information has profound impact on a wide variety of applications that
have used PASOA and hence deserves further investigation.
Healthcare application An SOA-based healthcare application used PASOA to record his-
tory information of a patient's treatments in order to facilitate auditors to verify if a
particular process was executed as expected, and to facilitate doctors to adopt proper
subsequent treatments of the patient [44, 11]. In a typical healthcare scenario, health-
care data is often distributed among several heterogeneous and autonomous information
systems (actors) under dierent healthcare authorities, e.g., general practitioners, hospi-
tal departments. This means each actor operates independently and denes its processes
and data representation without the assumption on a pre-described workow. The open,
technology-independent nature of PASOA enables provenance information to be gath-
ered and recorded in such a scenario. Multiple provenance repositories are also suitable
to be used by those heterogeneous and autonomous actors in this application.
Fault Tolerance in the Grid and SOAs A provenance-aware fault-tolerance framework,
FT-Grid, is developed to tolerate software faults that occur in service-oriented applica-
tions through multi-version design (MVD) [157, 169, 158]. In order to provide users with
a correct result, FT-Grid invokes multiple functionally equivalent services and performs
voting on their results in order to mask software faults (i.e., incorrect results) from ser-
vices. However, MVD may still give incorrect results due to the possible presence of
common-mode failures, which means multi-version services may share common faulty
services, thus leading to similar errors between versions of an MVD system. In order
to detect common mode failures, FT-Grid employs PASOA to capture provenance in-
formation, which reects the causal relationship between service interactions and hence
provides topological awareness of service dependency. Therefore, with recorded prove-
nance information, FT-Grid can improve the voting algorithm and return correct results
to users without being aected by common mode failures. Although it is unclear if mul-
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multiple stores if FT-Grid is used by large-scale distributed applications.
Auditing of Private Data Use A provenance-based auditing architecture based on PA-
SOA has been developed for auditing the processing of private data in organisations'
IT systems as required by many regulatory frameworks such as UK Data Protection
Act (DPA) [9]. DPA provides protection for an individual's private information placing
restrictions on how organisations can acquire, store, share or dispose personal informa-
tion that they hold. Provenance information tells the regulators the history of data use,
which can be veried if the use of private data within organisations is compliant with
specic regulations. In order to provide complete and sucient provenance information,
multiple parties are required to record such information into several provenance reposi-
tories due to privacy concerns. Provenance information captured using this architecture
has been evaluated to be able to answer a range of queries from DPA regulators.
Aerospace Engineering An aerospace engineering application uses PASOA to record
documentation of complex simulation processes during the manufacturing of ights.
Process documentation is used for compliance and liability reasons and to facilitate pro-
cess analysis [96]. A workow regarding the engineering process is specied consisting
of several computational components in the simulations. Due to the distributed simu-
lation environments of the application, several provenance stores are required to record
documentation produced at dierent simulation sites.
BioDiversity A biodiversity experiment is conducted to demonstrate how provenance
information can help identify execution bottleneck, result accuracy and service through-
put in the process of making predictions of the anticipated eects of climate change
upon biodiversity [167]. An experimental resource is wrapped as a Web service tailored
to that particular resource's inputs and exposed by a standard set of methods. These
web services are then invoked by a workow enactment engine. A monitoring daemon is
used to monitor the execution of the workow, running at the site of enactment engine
and each service. Information about service workload, CPU/disk/memory usage, service
response latency and throughput is also documented as provenance information using
PASOA and recorded in multiple provenance stores. Provenance information is then
queried by scientists in order to evaluate experimental results.
Trust Calculations Provenance information has been used for evaluating trust in the
outcome of workow execution [140]. A rule-based analysis tool is introduced to perform
subsequent analysis on the process documentation aiming to automatically calculate
trust measures for a workow's result. Using this approach, a workow enactment
engine is able to automatically choose the most trustworthy service.
Workow Renement Workow compiler Pegasus has been integrated with PASOA to
capture provenance information regarding workow renements (i.e., transformations)
so that a user can understand how an abstract workow description dened by the user
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models the renement process as interactions between several services, i.e., Pegasus and
ve reners. All these services record documentation about their interactions as well
as the relationships between these interactions (i.e., the relationship between an output
and an input of a service). Hence, a causality graph can be produced reecting the whole
renement process leading to an executable workow to be executed on the Grid. This
example also demonstrates the open and technology independent nature of PASOA since
the renement process is not workow itself but local method calls between Pegasus and
several rening functions.
Python Applications In addition to the Java version, the client side library developed by
PASOA has also been implemented using Python, enabling a wide range of Python
applications, applications with Python interface and Python-glued workows to be
provenance-aware [18]. Python is a general-purpose high-level programming language,
whose greatest strength is a large standard library providing a wide variety of tools to
interact with programs written in lower-level languages such as C and C++. Therefore,
Python is a powerful glue language between dierent languages and tools [46]. For this
reason, more and more scientic applications in the elds of mathematics, physics, or
engineering are developed in Python and those written in C, C++ or Fortran usually
provide Python interfaces for convenient integration in working environments. In addi-
tion, many computationally intensive parts of application codes are still written in C and
C++ whereas Python is used as a means to congure these codes, to setup the overall
computing workow, or to manage the involved data [92]. With the Python version of
client side library, all the above applications can benet from the recording of process
documentation to determine the provenance of their data products.
2.2.4 Summary
This section reviews the state of the art research about provenance. The provenance
community has been growing in recent years and many eorts have been seen to support
provenance in a wide range of applications. Through a comprehensive comparison of ma-
jor provenance-related systems, PASOA has several advantages over the other systems,
which have been demonstrated in a wide variety of applications.
The advantages of PASOA are summerised as follows. Firstly, it is domain and tech-
nology independent. It uses an SOA approach to model provenance information, which
can support dierent domain applications. It also species a generic recording protocol,
which can be implemented in dierent languages such as Java and Python. Secondly,
it is an open architecture. It allows application developers to customise the granularity
level provenance information is collected at. Thirdly, it supports multi-site recording,
i.e., all participating parties in a process, such as workow enactment engine and ser-
vices, contribute to the provenance information of the data product of that process. This
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Fourthly, it introduces a linking mechanism to connect multiple provenance stores, which
have been demonstrated in many applications to be necessary.
The major disadvantage of PASOA is the lack of mechanism for reliably recording prove-
nance information in the presence of failures. Given that PASOA has been widely
adopted in various applications, such a disadvantage would have profound negative im-
pact on those applications and hinder the use of PASOA in future applications.
Based on the analysis in this section, we have decided to extend PASOA with functional-
ities supporting reliable recording of process documentation. In this way, we can remove
the disadvantage whilst preserving the advantages of PASOA. We now detail PASOA's
key aspects.
2.3 PASOA
In this section, we introduce key aspects of PASOA: the SOA-based approach to repre-
senting provenance [76, 77, 80], the generic recording protocol PReP [82] and the linking
mechanism that connects multiple provenance stores [76].
2.3.1 Process Documentation
In service-oriented architectures, clients typically invoke services, which may themselves
act as clients for other services. The term actor is used to denote either a client or
a service. In SOAs, messages are the only mechanism used to transfer information
between actors. We note that the SOA approach adapted by PASOA is not limited
to Web services. In order to be generic, the following are all considered as \services"
because they all exchange messages (i.e., inputs and outputs) in one way or another: local
functions/methods, Web services, Corba or RMI objects, and command line programs.
An actor that sends an application message is referred to as a sender, whereas an actor
that receives an application message is known as a receiver. One message exchanged
between a sender and a receiver is an interaction. PASOA denes a process as a causally
connected set of interactions between actors involved in that process. By documenting
all the interactions that have taken place between actors involved in the computation
of some data, one can replay an execution, analyse it, verify its validity or compare it
with another execution. Describing such interactions is thus core to producing process
documentation.
An actor documents an interaction by making p-assertions to provide a sender or re-
ceiver's view of the interaction and how those interactions are related. Process documen-
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 An interaction p-assertion documents the content of a message and is created by
the actor that has sent or received that message. Both the sender and receiver
of an interaction make an interaction p-assertion in order to support multi-site
recording.
 A relationship p-assertion is made by an actor to describe how the actor produced
output data (whether the returned result or invocation message to other actors)
from input data that it received by applying some function on the input data.
The output data is the eect and the input data is the cause. An eect can have
multiple causes. We use terms eect interaction and cause interaction to denote
the interactions where the eect and cause are transferred, respectively. Therefore,
a relationship p-assertion captures causal connections between an eect interaction
and cause interaction(s).
 An actor state p-assertion is made by an actor about its internal state in the
context of a specic interaction, which may include the function the actor per-
forms, the workow that is being executed, the amount of disk and CPU used in
a computation, and application-specic state descriptions, etc.
An interaction key is generated by the sender of an interaction for uniquely identifying
the interaction from all other interactions. The receiver then uses the interaction key to
generate and record p-assertions about the same interaction.
We now illustrate these p-assertions using Figure 2.1, which shows a simple process
consisting of two interactions, represented by interaction keys I1 and I2. Actor A1 sends
to actor A2 a message M1 containing data d1. After receiving M1, A2 performs a
function f on d1 and produces a result d2. A2 then returns the result in message M2 to
A1. We assume A2 needs to record the version number of function f.
In this gure, d2 and d1 are the eect and the cause, respectively. Correspondingly,
interactions I2 and I1, where d2 and d1 are exchanged to/from other assertors, are
eect interaction and cause interaction, respectively. A relationship p-assertion can be
created to capture the causal connection (f) between I2 and I1.
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Table 2.2 summarises several p-assertions that are made in this process. In the rst
interaction where A1 sends M1 to A2, A1 creates an interaction key I1 and then makes
an interaction p-assertion documenting M1. We use S to denote A1's view kind in
the interaction, i.e., the sender. Interaction key I1 is exchanged to A2 in M1, so A2
can document the same interaction by making an interaction p-assertion about the
receipt of M1, where its view kind is the receiver (denoted by R). After performing
function f(d1) and obtaining result d2, A2 creates interaction key I2 and embeds d2 and
I2 in a response message M2. In the second interaction, A2 makes an interaction p-
assertion about the returning of M2 and a relationship p-assertion describing the causal
relationship between d2 and d1: d2 is produced from d1 using f. In addition, A2 makes
an actor state p-assertion documenting the version number of function f. On the other
side, when receiving M2, A1 documents M2 in an interaction p-assertion using the same
interaction key I2. The six p-assertions contribute to the process documentation that
can be used to determine the provenance of d2.
Actor Interaction Key View Kind P-assertion Type P-assertion Content
A1 I1 S interaction M1
A2 I1 R interaction M1
A2 I2 S interaction M2
A2 I2 S relationship d2=f(d1)
A2 I2 S actor state version 1.3.2
A1 I2 R interaction M2
Table 2.2: P-assertions generated in the example process of Figure 2.1
2.3.2 Representing Provenance
The provenance of a particular data item can be represented as an annotated causality
graph, which consists of several elements (Figure 2.2). The edges of the graph repre-
sent causal relationships between data items. These relationships denote functions or
operations applied to data. The nodes of the graph are data items, which are the ef-
fects or causes indicated by a causal relationship. Data items are also annotated by an
interaction key and actor states. The interaction key indicates the interaction where
the corresponding data is exchanged between actors whilst the actor states describe an
actor's knowledge about the receipt and sending of the data. The nodes and edges are
extracted from relationship p-assertions and the annotation information is obtained from
the interaction p-assertion and actor state p-assertions.
A causality graph is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that indicates where and how
the data was used and derived [76]. Such a DAG starts with the data item followed
by the relationships in scope that represent the process that lead to such data item.
Therefore, in order to answer provenance questions, users can traverse the causality
graph to identify how a data item was produced. As the example of Figure 2.1, the
provenance of d2 is represented as a graph shown in Figure 2.3. The graph can be usedChapter 2 Related Work 26
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Figure 2.2: Concept map representing provenance (revised from [76])
to answer questions such as which algorithm was used to generate d2, what the version
number of the algorithm is, and which input data was used to derive d2.
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Figure 2.3: An example causality graph
Figure 2.4 gives another example process, where ve institutions are modelled as actors,
participating in four interactions. For simplication, we do not show the messages
exchanged between actors. Data d3 is the output of function f1, which takes two inputs
d1 and d2. Therefore, d3 is the eect of two causes d1 and d2. Another function f2
is used by A4 to generate d4 from d3. Figure 2.5 shows this process's causality graph,
where each institution's name is recorded as actor state information. This graph reects
how d4 is derived from d1 and d2.Chapter 2 Related Work 27
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Figure 2.5: Generated causality graph
2.3.3 Recording Process Documentation
Actors record process documentation to a dedicated repository, the provenance store,
which is built to persistently store large amounts of process documentation and to deal
appropriately with problems such as security and access control.
PASOA provides an implementation independent P-assertion Recording Protocol, PReP,
to specify the communication between actors and the expected behaviour of those actors
when recording p-assertions to a provenance store. PReP enforces that p-assertions
are created and organised as appropriate process documentation and maintained in
provenance stores ready to be retrieved.
In order to eciently locate and extract p-assertions from process documentation, PReP
species that all p-assertions created by an actor about the same interaction are sub-
mitted to a provenance store in a single message, which is termed an Interaction Record
(IR). Table 2.3 gives the four interaction records documenting the example process inChapter 2 Related Work 28
Figure 2.1. For simplication, we use ipa, rpa and apa to denote interaction p-assertion,
relationship p-assertion and actor state p-assertion, respectively. In this table, A1 makes
two interaction records IR1 and IR4, whilst A2 creates IR2 and IR3. We note that IR2
and IR3 document the cause interaction and eect interaction of the relationship p-
assertion, respectively. The relationship p-assertion has been specied by PReP to be
included in the interaction record about the eect interaction since it describes the causal
reason for the occurrence of the eect interaction.
IR Actor Interaction Key View Kind IR Elements Element Content
IR1 A1 I1 S ipa M1
IR2 A2 I1 R ipa M1
IR3 A2 I2 S ipa M2
rpa d2=f(d1)
apa version 1.3.2
IR4 A1 I2 R ipa M2
Table 2.3: Four interaction records documenting example process in Figure 2.1
In order to derive a causality graph to determine provenance, both actors in an inter-
action must document their view of the interaction by making an interaction record,
which includes a compulsory interaction p-assertion reecting the exchange of a data
item, any necessary relationship p-assertions indicating the causal connections between
data items, and optional actor state p-assertions.
A concrete implementation of PReP is provided by PReServ [79], which contains a
Provenance Store Web Service and a client side library for recording p-assertions and
querying a provenance store. By using PReServ, applications can easily record process
documentation to a provenance store.
2.3.4 Linking Multiple Provenance Stores
With the linking mechanism, an actor can record an interaction record into any prove-
nance store. This means that the two actors in an interaction can employ two dierent
stores to record their respective interaction record. In addition, an actor can record the
interaction records about the eect and cause interactions captured by a relationship
p-assertion into dierent stores.
There are two types of links, viewlink and causelink. Each actor records a viewlink in its
interaction record, pointing to the provenance store where the opposite actor records its
interaction record about that interaction. Therefore, both views of an interaction can be
retrieved by navigating from one provenance store to the other. A causelink is embedded
in the relationship p-assertion when the actor makes the p-assertion, indicating the
provenance store where the interaction record about the corresponding cause interaction
is stored in.Chapter 2 Related Work 29
We now detail the linking mechanism in Figure 2.6, using the same example as in Figure
2.1. We assume A1 and A2 use provenance stores PS1 and PS2, respectively. An actor
can obtain its viewlink via built-in knowledge or from request/response messages. In
this gure, the address of PS1 or PS2 is exchanged to the other actor in messages M1 or
M2. An actor then extracts store address and records it as its viewlink, i.e., VL1, VL2,
VL3 and VL4. Table 2.4 summarises the content of IR1, IR2, IR3 and IR4 with their
respective provenance store to be recorded into. Since A2 uses the same store to record
IR2 and IR3, causelink CL in IR3 refers to PS2. After knowing the viewlink, an actor
can record its interaction records to its respective store. Figure 2.6 shows PS1 and PS2
are interlinked via arc VL1, VL2, VL3, and VL4.
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Figure 2.6: Using two provenance stores
PS IR Actor Interaction View Kind IR Elements Element Content
Key
PS1 IR1 A1 I1 S ipa M1
VL1 PS2
PS2 IR2 A2 I1 R ipa M1
VL2 PS1
PS2 IR3 A2 I2 S ipa MS2
rpa d2=f(d1), CL = PS2
apa version 1.3.2
VL3 PS1
PS1 IR4 A1 I2 R ipa M2
VL4 PS2
Table 2.4: Interaction records with links appended (using two stores)
In order to retrieve the documentation of the process that led to data d2, a querying
actor starts from PS1 which stores IR4 that describe the receipt of d2. Then by following
the viewlink and causelink embedded in each interaction record, the other distributed
records IR1, IR2, IR3 can be retrieved from PS1 and PS2. Figure 2.7 shows the retrieving
path, where an interaction record is indexed by the tuple of an interaction key and a
viewkind to help locate the interaction record in a store.Chapter 2 Related Work 30
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Figure 2.7: Retrieving documentation recorded in Figure 2.6
In the next example (Figure 2.8) where four stores are in use, we assume A2 sends
message M2 to a third actor A3 , and A2 records IR2 and IR3 into two dierent stores
PS2 and PS3, respectively. Each actor can obtain its viewlink from built-in knowledge
or request/response message. In order to simplify the gure, we only show the exchange
of PS1 and PS3 in messages M1 and M2. Table 2.5 give the contents of interaction
records with links. Since A2 uses two stores to record IR2 and IR3, the causelink in
IR3 now points to PS2. By following links, the documentation of the process that led to
data d2 can be retrieved across the four provenance stores from PS4, as shown in Figure
2.9.
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PS IR Actor Interaction View Kind IR Elements Element Content
Key
PS1 IR1 A1 I1 S ipa M1
VL1 PS2
PS2 IR2 A2 I1 R ipa M1
VL2 PS1
PS3 IR3 A2 I2 S ipa M2
rpa d2=f(d1), CL = PS2
apa version 1.3.2
VL3 PS4
PS4 IR4 A3 I2 R ipa M2
VL4 PS3
Table 2.5: Interaction records with links appended (using four stores)Chapter 2 Related Work 31
In summary, a viewlink points to a store that contains the other actor's interaction
record (which provides a dierent view on a same interaction). A causelink points to
a store containing the interaction record asserted by the same actor (which is making
assertions about a cause interaction). Two actors in a same interaction each record a
viewlink pointing to the other actor's provenance store. Although only one viewlink
is used when retrieving documentation, the two-way approach is useful in some cases
where both views of an interaction need to be veried and compared.
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Figure 2.9: Retrieving documentation recorded in Figure 2.8
2.3.5 Summary
In this section, we highlighted key aspects of PASOA. PASOA uses an SOA-based ap-
proach to modelling a process as a set of causally related interactions between services
through message passing. It denes several types of assertions to describe an interaction
and introduces a protocol PReP to record process documentation. This approach is
generic, open and independent of domains and technologies.
We also introduced an annotated causality graph, which is extracted from process doc-
umentation to represent the provenance of a data object. The linking mechanism was
then detailed, which can exibly connect a large number of provenance stores in order
to retrieve distributed process documentation.
PASOA, however, does not consider failures that may happen when an actor is recording
its interaction records into a provenance store. The consequence is the incapability to
retrieve complete process documentation from multiple interlinked provenance stores
either due to the loss of documentation or a broken pointer chain. The rest of this
chapter will review research related to failures, fault-tolerant mechanisms and formal
specications for fault-tolerant protocols, which help us to develop our solution.
2.4 Failures
Distributed systems are generally modelled as asynchronous and synchronous systems
[113]2. An asynchronous system does not make assumptions about process execution
2The term of partially synchronous is also introduced to refer to various systems between completely
asynchronous and completely synchronous [48].Chapter 2 Related Work 32
speeds, message delivery delays and/or clock drift. On the contrary, a synchronous
system makes timing assumptions, where the relative speeds of processes, any delays
associated with communication channels and clock drift are bounded. Since all systems
can be modelled as asynchronous systems, a protocol designed for use in an asynchronous
system can be used in any distributed system [113]. Therefore, we are more interested
in the failures of asynchronous systems.
Failures can be categorised by abstract models that describe how a system will behave in
the presence of failures. A variety of failure models are commonly found in the literature
of asynchronous distributed systems. All are based on assigning responsibility for faulty
behaviour to the system's components: processes and communication channels. We
summarise these models as follows.
 Crash. A process fails by halting. Once it halts, the process will not execute any
further steps of its program ever [31].
 Crash-Recovery. A process fails by halting but later recovers [31, 8].
 Send-Omission. A process fails by halting, or intermittently omits to send messages
it was supposed to send, or both [137].
 Receive-Omission. A process fails by halting, or intermittently omits to receive
messages sent to it, or both [137].
 Channel-Omission. A channel fails by losing some messages, but does not create,
duplicate or corrupt messages [137].
 Arbitrary (Byzantine) Failures. A process or a channel fails by exhibiting arbitrary
behaviour [104].
Crash failures in asynchronous systems have been studied extensively. When a process
crashes, it loses the content of its volatile memory. The crash-no recovery model has been
considered unrealistic to a major part of applications [31, 8]. To model real distributed
systems that support user applications, the crash-recovery model is proposed. In crash-
recovery model, processes are provided with stable storage to log critical data in order
to make them able to recover from crash failures. A process may keep on crashing and
recovering indenitely.
The other three models, send-omission, receive-omission and channel-omission, are all
concerned with message loss. Each models a dierent cause for the loss and attributes
the loss to a dierent component. Send-omission and receive-omission model overows
of local message buers of a process, or the behaviour of a malicious adversary with
control over the message ow of certain processes, or message loss due to a crashedChapter 2 Related Work 33
process. Essentially, for every send or receive omission failure, there is a process respon-
sible for it; channel-omission failure puts the blame of a message loss to the unreliable
communication channel.
Finally, arbitrary failures are the most disruptive. In addition to encompassing the
above failures, it also represents random software or hardware faults as well as malicious
attacks by a hacker. For example, a process or channel may send/transmit arbitrary
messages at arbitrary times, commit omissions; a process may stop or take an incorrect
step and produce an incorrect result while continuing to interact with the rest of the
system. A system that can tolerate arbitrary failures can tolerate any failures.
2.5 Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance allows a distributed system to survive a variety of failures. As the size
of a distributed system increases, the number of its components increases and so does
the probability that some of its components will fail. Thus, fault tolerance must be
considered when designing distributed applications.
Fault tolerance is carried out via detection and system recovery [15]. Failure detection
is the rst building block in the design, analysis and implementation of a lot of fault-
tolerant distributed applications. A failure detection service detects that a failure has
occurred so that a recovery procedure can be activated in order to bring the system
back from a failure state to a normal state. Figure 2.10 outlines common techniques
involved in fault tolerance. We rstly brief common techniques regarding detection
(Section 2.5.1) and recovery (Section 2.5.2). Then we introduce concrete fault-tolerant
approaches (Section 2.6). In Section 2.7, we discuss fault-tolerant solutions used in grid
applications.
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2.5.1 Detection
The timeout-based approach is commonly used to implement failure detection compo-
nents such as failure detectors [31] and grid monitoring services [159, 85] to detect crash
failures. Two types of keep-alive messages are usually used: heartbeat and ping [51, 85].
Heartbeat is a message periodically sent from a monitored process to the monitoring
component (e.g., failure detector) to inform that it is still alive. If the heartbeat does
not arrive before a timeout expires, the monitoring component suspects the process
is down. On the other hand, ping is a message continuously sent from a monitoring
component to a monitored process. The monitoring component expects to receive an
acknowledgment as response before a timeout. However, it is dicult or even impossi-
ble to determine whether a process has actually crashed in asynchronous environments,
where a process may be slow and keep-alive messages may be delayed or even omitted.
Therefore, processes which do not contact a monitoring component or respond to its
question in time are normally considered as suspect.
Failure detector deserves further introduction as it has been widely studied in distributed
system literatures [143, 135]. It helps address problems that are impossible to solve in
asynchronous systems prone to failures. One of the most famous problems is the con-
sensus problem: the impossibility of deterministically reaching agreement among remote
processes subject to crash failures in completely asynchronous systems. By augmenting
the asynchronous system with unreliable failure detector, which may wrongly suspect
that a correct process has crashed, the consensus problem can be solved under certain
conditions with various failure models, such as crash model with reliable communication
channels (i.e., they do not lose messages) [31] and crash-recovery model with channels
that can omit messages [8].
Timeout is also used to facilitate reliable message delivery, as has been seen in many
specications such as TCP and Java Message Service (JMS). A timer is set by a sender
after sending a message to the receiver, which is expected to provide an acknowledge-
ment. If the acknowledgement is received by the sender before the timeout, then the
sender can conrm that the message has been delivered to the receiver; otherwise, the
sender cannot determine if the receiver has received or processed that message since ei-
ther the original message or the acknowledgement can be lost, or the receiver can crash
before providing the acknowledgement, all leading to a timeout on the sender's side. In
the presence of a timeout, the sender can take remedial actions such as resending the
original message.
Byzantine failures cannot be detected by seeing whether a process or an application
responds to requests, because it might arbitrarily omit to reply or produce arbitrary
results. A solution to detecting Byzantine failures is via a voting procedure [106], which
invokes multiple functionally equivalent versions of a component and votes on their
outputs or actions. In the event of a disagreement, those versions that do not meetChapter 2 Related Work 35
certain criteria are considered to be faulty.
2.5.2 Recovery
Redundancy (time redundancy or space redundancy) is one of the ecient ways to
provide fault-tolerance for distributed systems [128]. Time redundancy is achieved by
repeatedly performing key actions, e.g., message retransmission upon a timeout to mask
transient omission failures, whilst space redundancy is achieved by using alternative
components, or replicating software/hardware modules to provide backup capacity in
order to tolerate failures.
Replication can take one of two forms: active replication and passive replication [16].
In active replication, a second machine receives a copy of all inputs to the primary
one and independently generates an identical system state by running its own copy of
all necessary software. In passive replication, a cold spare machine is maintained as a
backup system to the primary. In both cases, should the primary machine crash does
the second one take over control of the primary's responsibilities. The dierence is
that the changeover in the active mode requires a negligible amount of time at the cost
of doubling the number of computing resources whilst that in the passive mode may
incur some interruption of service. We will provide more details regarding replication in
Section 2.6.2.
It should be noted that some redundancy-based techniques, such as duplicated copies of
same software in dierent machines, assume independent system failures. They cannot
tolerate correlated failures like a software bug in all copies of the software. In this case,
Multi-Version Design (MVD) is favoured, where two or more systems aim at delivering
the same functionalities through separate designs and implementations [107]. MVD is
also used to tolerate Byzantine failures [106]. As introduced in Section 2.5.1, the voting
procedure weights results from multiple functionally equivalent versions of a component,
compares their outputs with the consensus output, and forwards the consensus output
as the nal system result. Thus Byzantine faults can be tolerated by discarding those
outputs that do not meet specied criteria.
Another common approach to handling failures is to use checkpointing techniques to
save system state, and rollback techniques to revert back to a state that was saved
before a failure occurred. The challenge is to orchestrate checkpoints and rollbacks,
while maintaining high-performance and scalability. This approach has been studied
in multiple contexts, including Messaging Passing Systems [49], Web Services [45] and
Transactions [75].
In the case of Messaging Passing Systems, rollback recovery techniques model a message-
passing application as a xed number of processes in a distributed system that commu-
nicate over a network by sending and receiving messages. A process is assumed to haveChapter 2 Related Work 36
access to some kind of stable storage that will survive even in the event that the process
crashes. During the execution of an application, the system periodically records a snap-
shot of processes composing the application to the stable storage. In the event that a
process fails, the application's computational state can be restored to some failure-free
state by rolling back all processes to the most recent checkpointed state.
In addition to checkpoint-based rollback, there is a log-based rollback technique, which
supplements normal checkpointing with a record of messages sent and received by each
process. If a process fails, the log can be used to replay the progress of the process
after the most recent checkpoint in order to reconstruct its previous state. This has the
advantage that process recovery results in a more recent snapshot of the process state
than checkpointing-based technique can provide. The range of applications that benet
from these rollback techniques tend to be long-running, scientic applications [49].
Reinitialising or restarting a system is a good way of dealing with some kinds of faults
[159]. However, this may result in signicant system down time and may restart correctly
functioning components. To minimise these side eects, system should be divided into
small and independent pieces in a well organised approach. If a fault occurs in one of
these components, those components that are directly aected can be restarted while
the rest of the system remains untouched and continues working. For example, a web
server could be dependent on a database. If the web server experiences a crash, it should
be restarted individually without interfering with the database.
2.6 Major Fault Tolerance Solutions
In this section, we introduce several fault-tolerant approaches: transactions, cluster-
based architectures and messaging middleware. These approaches have been widely used
to build reliable distributed applications and databases, thus being possible candidates
to solve the problem of reliably recording process documentation.
2.6.1 Transactions
Transactions have been used to provide reliable information processing in many ap-
plication domains from classical debit-credit style centralised and distributed database
operations, to more recent workow management and Web Services. The amount of
published research work on transactions is huge and a number of survey papers and
books have been published [162, 163].
In the database world, a transaction consists of a group of operations executed to perform
some specic functions by accessing and/or updating a database. From a broader range
of application areas such as workow management, Web services and Grid computing,Chapter 2 Related Work 37
a transaction refers to a reliable and coherent process unit interacting with one or more
systems, independently of other transactions, that provides a certain service or function
for a running application [162].
The checkpoint and log based mechanism is used to support failure recovery in database
transactions. When creating a database checkpoint, the entire state of a database is
made persistent, e.g., all operations stored in volatile memory are written to stable
storage. When a transaction fails, the database can rollback to the state created at
the checkpoint, and/or redo any operations performed thereafter using the informa-
tion stored in persistent transaction logs. Such a mechanism is widely used in current
database systems, such as Oracle Database, IBM DB2, Berkeley DB.
A distributed transaction consists of sub-transactions that may access multiple local
database systems. These transactions typically require all-or-nothing atomicity to main-
tain system consistency [163] via several approaches, e.g., Two-Phase Commit (2PC)
protocol. 2PC is a simple and elegant distributed algorithm that results in either all
parties committing the transaction or aborting, even in the case of network failures or
crash failures. A coordinator manages all participants, coordinates their decisions to
start, commit or roll back, and ensures atomicity at a global level. For example, a dis-
tributed database transaction may contain a sequence of database operations, spawning
several sites to read or update data objects. A global commit decision of updating a
data object is based on the agreement of all the participating sites. Should any of these
sites abort the updating operation, a global decision of abort is made by the coordi-
nating site. Consequently, all sites abort updating the data object, which ensures the
consistency of distributed databases.
However, in some long-running business transactions the all-or-nothing atomicity is not
always possible to be held because parts of a transaction may have been committed or
because parts of a transaction (e.g., communications with external agents) are impossible
to undo. In such cases, compensations, actions taken to recover partial executions of
transactional processes [29], can be used as a way of dealing with faults [25].
2.6.2 Cluster-based Architectures
Many systems are based on clusters where a number of computing resources simulta-
neously share the load and act as a backup to each other. Cluster-based architectures
take advantage of resource redundancy to meet both high availability and scalability re-
quirements. To have redundant resources, data needs to be replicated across all servers
or databases (for availability) and the load is partitioned to use all available resources
(for scalability).
In a typical cluster, as exemplied in Figure 2.11, the network trac is rst oered to the
cluster head(s), where a load balancer is instantiated to route incoming requests to anChapter 2 Related Work 38
appropriate processing server. Each component of the cluster has redundant components
in order to eliminate single point of failure at the entry or inside the cluster. Stateful
components such as databases are replicated on a number of replicas during failure-free
periods to maintain consistent state. Should the primary component fail, a backup
component takes over control of a failed one's responsibilities.
/RDG￿
%DODQFHU
)DLORYHU
:HE
6HUYHU￿
:HE￿&RQWDLQHU￿￿
'DWDEDVH￿
%DFNXS￿
/RDG￿
%DODQFHU
:HE
6HUYHU￿
&OXVWHU
:HE￿&RQWDLQHU￿￿
:HE￿&RQWDLQHU￿￿
:HE￿&RQWDLQHU￿￿
&OLHQW
'DWDEDVH￿
&OXVWHU
Figure 2.11: An example of cluster-based architecture [145]
As introduced in Section 2.5.2, there are two types of replication mechanisms: active
and passive replication. The passive replication also has two main forms: checkpointing
approach and message logging approach [16]. Active replication has short recovery time
at the cost of performing redundant computation in all replicas whilst passive approaches
may have long recovery time and introduce some interruption of service. All replication
mechanisms tend to be sophisticated in order to balance the tradeo between preserving
consistent state in replicas and reducing replication overhead. The following summary
is based on [16].
The active replication ensures that all redundant machines receive a copy of all inputs to
the primary one and maintain the same consistent system state by running its own copy
of all necessary software. In addition, this approach guarantees that only one machine
is replying to a client at a given time by consolidating outputs from all replicas. In
order to ensure that a group of replicas reliably receive the oered requests sent to the
primary one, dierent techniques can be used. The rst technique is based on protocols
originally considered for setting up group membership, e.g., the atomic broadcast/mul-
ticast protocols. A second solution consists of delivering the trac exchanged between a
client and the replicas to an intermediate gateway or proxy that would reliably perform
one-to-many message delivery to the replicas on one hand and many-to-one message
delivery to the client on the other hand.
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standby machine(s). If the primary node fails, the most recent checkpoint is recovered,
so that the processing can resume using the restored state. Dierent checkpointing ap-
proaches exist, diering in terms of their frequency and completion time. The most
aggressive checkpointing approach is incremental checkpointing, which aims to max-
imising the consistency of the replicated states by performing checkpoints each time a
state change occurs at the primary node. The major drawback of this approach is its
cost in CPU consumption at the primary node and the added latency to end-to-end
communication.
Message logging approach is to redundantly store or log on a replica all the messages
delivered to the primary server. For reliability purposes, a message would not be pro-
cessed until an acknowledgment is received from the replica conrming that the message
has been successfully stored. During failsafe periods, replicas are idle. Once the primary
server fails, the logged messages are replayed and reprocessed on the elected replica. Dif-
ferent approaches exist for message logging. Pessimistic message logging logs a message
into a stable storage as soon as it is received. Dependency-based message logging pro-
poses to copy each received message into a volatile log space, which will be ushed into
stable storage once it becomes full. Optimistic message logging also copies the incoming
message into a volatile log space, but proposes to ush it on stable storage periodically
or when the number of logged messages reaches a given threshold.
2.6.3 Message Oriented Middleware
The Java Message Service (JMS) API [4] is a Java Message Oriented Middleware (MOM)
API for reliably sending messages between two or more clients. Message senders do not
need to have precise knowledge of message receivers, since communication is performed
via an intermediary component, a messaging queue. Messages are placed onto the queue
and stored there until the recipient retrieves them. Message queueing systems typically
provide resilience functionality to ensure that messages do not get lost in the event
of a system failure. There are many free, open source and proprietary message queue
products, such as OpenMQ, IBM WebSphere MQ and Tibco Enterprise JMS.
Figure 2.12 illustrates a typical architecture of a message queueing system. At the
heart of the system is a broker [4, 42]. The broker reliably delivers messages, and
provides administrative tools to manage, monitor and tune the messaging system. In
order to send or receive messages, a JMS client (a message producer and/or a message
consumer) must rst connect to the broker before producing or consuming messages.
Message transmission between producer and consumer can be based on point-to-point
or publish/subscribe pattern. Using point-to-point pattern, a client sends a message to a
queue destination from which only one receiver may get it. With the publish/subscribe
pattern, a client sends a message to a topic destination from which any number of
consuming subscribers can retrieve it.Chapter 2 Related Work 40
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Figure 2.12: Overview of a Message Queueing System
There are several approaches to reliable message delivery. The broker may persist mes-
sages and its states in a stable storage so that if the broker fails before the message is
consumed, the broker can retrieve the stored copy of the message and state information
to retry an operation upon recovery. Acknowledgements are also used between a mes-
sage producer/consumer and the broker to ensure reliable delivery of messages. In the
case of message production, the broker replies the producer with an acknowledgement
conrming that it has received the message and has stored it persistently. The producer
blocks until it receives this broker's acknowledgement. In the case of message consump-
tion, the consumer acknowledges that it has received a message and consumed it. Upon
receiving the consumer's acknowledgement can the broker delete the message from its
persistent storage. JMS species dierent acknowledgement modes that balance the
tradeo between reliability and performance in dierent degrees. In addition, brokers
can be interconnected into a cluster: a set of brokers that work collectively to perform
message delivery between message producers and consumers. Clustered brokers further
enhance scalability and availability to a Message Queue service.
The JMS API also supports distributed transactions, which means the production and
consumption of messages can be part of a larger, distributed transaction that includes
operations involving other resources, such as database systems. The JMS message service
tracks the various send and receive operations within the distributed transaction, persists
transactional states, and completes the messaging operations using a two-phase commit
protocol. We note a JMS messaging service supports distributed transactions only when
it is used in a Java Enterprise Edition (Java EE) application server [4], which provides
a Java Transaction Service (JTS) as a distributed transaction manager.Chapter 2 Related Work 41
2.6.4 Discussion
This section discusses how transactions, cluster-based architecture and messaging mid-
dleware can help us to reliably record process documentation.
Provenance store has been designed to maintain process documentation in a database,
therefore local database transactions are useful when dealing with database operations.
We now discuss distributed transactions, which involve a transaction manager, an actor
and a provenance store during the recording of the actor's interaction record. A dis-
tributed transaction ensures that either the interaction record is successfully recorded
in the store and removed from the actor's memory, or it remains in the actor's memory
without being recorded in a store. When the distributed transaction is committed, the
actor knows that its interaction record has been successfully recorded in the store and
been safely removed from its memory. If the provenance store fails, the actor is notied
that the transaction is aborted. Then the actor can resend the interaction record to the
same store or another store until the transaction is committed.
This approach is feasible but comes with performance overhead for reasons including roll-
back segments maintenance, forced logging, connections with transaction manager, and
the cost introduced by commit protocols. Given that a process may involve thousands
or tens of thousands of interactions and each interaction will have two distributed trans-
actions (one in the sender side and one in the receiver side), the performance penalty
can be signicant.
Instead of using distributed transactions, we adopt a looser consistency model. An
actor can set a timeout after sending its interaction record to a provenance store, which
provides an acknowledgement after successfully recording the message. Only after the
actor receives an acknowledgement from the store can it remove the message from its
local memory. If it does not receive the acknowledgement before the timeout, it can take
remedial actions such as resending the interaction record to the same or an alternative
store until the message is acknowledged before a timeout. The use of timeout, however,
may result in redundant information recorded in a provenance store in the case where the
store actually received the interaction record but the actor saw a timeout and used an
alternative store. To reduce the probability of having potential redundant information,
an actor can be congured to resend an interaction record to a same store for certain
times before using an alternative store.
Provenance stores can be organised as a cluster sharing a same store address. If the
primary store fails, another one takes over the work of the failed one so as to provide
services to actors.
Messaging middleware can also be used to reliably transport process documentation.
As discussed in Section 2.2.2.2, third party messaging services (OpenMQ and WS-
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the conguration of a broker, residing between a client application and a provenance
store. In the event of a provenance store crash, process documentation is persistently
maintained in the broker until the store comes back online and consumes the documen-
tation.
Both approaches can support reliable recording of provenance information but with lim-
itations. Firstly, in open distributed environments like SOAs, where there could be
a large number of provenance stores managed by dierent institutions across dierent
regions, we should not assume the use of clustered provenance stores or messaging mid-
dleware in all situations. In addition, these approaches do not deal with disconnected
process documentation that could appear in the presence of failures. Therefore, we aim
to design a generic approach to reliably recording process documentation while ensur-
ing its retrievability. These approaches, however, can be complementary to ours when
necessary.
2.7 Fault Tolerance for Grid Applications
Section 1.3 states that the Grid community has reported many results regarding failures.
Therefore, this section overviews fault detection and handling/recovery mechanisms for
Grid applications such as GWE, Triana, Unicore, Pegasus, Condor, DAGMan, etc. Most
of this section is based on survey [139].
2.7.1 Fault Detection
In Grid applications, failures can take place at Hardware, Operating Systems, Mid-
dleware, Workow Task, Workow or User level. At the lowest level, Hardware level,
machine crashes and network disconnection can happen. At the level of Operating Sys-
tems, tasks may run out of memory or disk space, or exceed CPU time limits or disk
quota. At the Middleware level, non-responding services can be found, probably caused
by too many concurrent requests. Authentication, le staging or job submission failures
can also happen, and submitted jobs could hang in local queues, or even be lost before
being executed. At the Task level, job-related faults can happen, like deadlock, memory
leak, uncaught exceptions, missing shared libraries or job crashes, even incorrect output
results could be produced. At Workow level, failures can occur in data movement or
innite loops in dynamic workows. Incorrect or not available input data could also
produce faults. Finally, at the highest level, the User level, user-denable exceptions
and assertions can lead to failures.
Many Grid monitoring services have been developed to monitor Grid applications and
detect various failures. The pinging-and-timeout mechanism is used to detect task fail-
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response from the task within a certain amount of time. Hwang et al. [90] presented
a failure detection service (FDS) on the Grid, aiming to detect both task crashes and
user-dened exceptions. A notication mechanism is developed based on the interpreta-
tion of notication messages being delivered from dierent entities (i.e., the task itself,
the Grid server and the heartbeat monitor) residing on each Grid node.
2.7.2 Fault Recovery and Fault Handling
Fault recovery and handling techniques for Grid application mainly fall into two levels:
Task level and Workow level.
Task-level techniques refer to recovery techniques that are to be applied in the task level
to mask the eect of task crash failures. These techniques include retrying, checkpoint-
ing, etc. Upon detecting a failure, a failed task is rescheduled to either the same or an
alternative resource to reattempt. Resubmission can cause signicant overheads if the
following tasks have to wait for the completion of the failed task and if a failed task has
to be restarted over from the beginning. A good solution to this is to save checkpoints
and resume task execution from the last checkpoint later.
Workow-level techniques refer to recovery techniques that enable the specication of
failure recovery procedures as part of application structure. These techniques include
using alternative tasks, data and workow redundancy, checkpointing and transactions.
Redundancy means one task is executed concurrently on several resources, assuming
that one of the tasks will survive any independent failure. It can cause overhead by
occupying more resources than necessary, but guarantees failure-free execution as long
as at least one task does not fail. Checkpointing technique can also be used to save an
intermediate state of a whole workow for a restart later. Distributed transactions can
also be used for handling failures in workow level, which has been used in Condor.
There are several other approaches to supporting reliable Grid services. A web service-
based messaging middleware, WS-Messenger, is developed to deliver messages for SOA-
based Grid applications [88]. By wrapping up the underlying message queuing systems,
WS-Messenger creates interoperable Web services-based publish/subscribe systems to
decouple event producers and consumers, and achieve scalable, reliable and ecient
message delivery. In addition, as has been introduced in Section 2.2.3, a fault tolerance
framework, FT-Grid [169], is developed to tolerate software faults that occur in SOA-
based Grid applications through multi-version design (MVD) and the use of provenance
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2.8 Formal Methods for Fault Tolerance
Fault-tolerant protocols are designed to be resistant to failures. Proving the resistance
of protocols to failures is very challenging, since we have to stay in control of not only
the normal system behaviour when there is no failure but also of the complex situations
which can occur when failures happen. Formal methods can help us to rigorously develop
and reason about fault-tolerant protocols.
Formal methods are mathematically-based techniques for the specication, development
and verication of software and hardware systems [165]. The application of formal meth-
ods makes it possible to achieve provable correctness and reliability in the various steps
of system design and implementation. A formal specication precisely and unambigu-
ously describes what a system should do. The use of formal specication reduces the
complexity of a system by hiding irrelevant details so that users can understand the
system without understanding all the details of its construction. Once a formal spec-
ication has been produced, the specication can be used as a guide to develop the
concrete system. For example, the observed behaviour of the concrete system can be
compared with the behaviour of the specication. Given a formal specication, it is
possible to use formal verication techniques to demonstrate that a candidate system
design is correct with respect to the specication. This has the advantage that incorrect
candidate system designs can be revised before a major investment has been made in
actually implementing the design.
2.8.1 Fault Tolerance Specication
Based on papers by Gartner [70, 69], this section generally introduces formal specication
for fault tolerance.
When specifying interactive systems it is necessary to distinguish between the system
and its environment. A system is usually dened as a \thing" that interacts with its
environment in a discrete fashion across a well-dened boundary (called an interface).
The environment consists of all \things" that have access to the interface of the system.
A system may be constructed using many subsystems, each of which having its own
interface and its own specication. For example, in a distributed system consisting of n
processes p1;:::;pn that communicate via a communication subsystem, each process as
well as the communication channel form a larger system (Figure 2.13). Each subsystem
is part of the environment of the other. The specication for a larger distributed system
denes what tasks should be solved by coordinated actions of its subcomponents.
A specication of a system S asserts that S will guarantee a property M under the
assumption that the environment guarantees some property E (formally, E ) M). In
the example of a specication for process pi, E will de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Figure 2.13: System and Environment [70]
communication subsystem (i.e., the type and order of messages received) and M will
describe how pi reacts (i.e., what messages it will send).
We now use a state-based approach to illustrate a property. A state is some assignment
of values to the \variables" of an interface. The set of all possible combinations of value
assignments to variables is called the state space. An execution of a system is a sequence
of states and a property is a set of executions. A system by itself denes a property,
which is the set of all executions starting from an initial state. A property P holds for a
system S if the set of executions dened by S is contained in P. A state change is called
an action. State changes are either initiated by the system or by the environment.
The correctness of a distributed protocol typically has two kinds of requirements: safety
and liveness [113, 101]. The safety requirement informally states that some bad thing
will never happen. It imposes that a certain property must hold for each execution of
the system in every conguration reached in that conguration. On the other hand,
the liveness requirement informally states that some good thing will eventually happen.
It imposes that a certain property must hold for each execution of the system in some
conguration reached in that execution. Termination is an example of liveness property.
Given E ) M, a fault tolerance specication is usually obtained by weakening either
E or M (or both). Weakening E resembles the anticipation of abnormal behaviour of
the environment, whereas weakening M indicates that the system itself will sometimes
deviate from its original failure-free specication.
As introduced in previous sections, a failure model describes the manner in which sys-
tem or subcomponents of a system may fail. Volzer [160] observed that failure models
formally consist of two distinct parts: (1) the impact model, a specication of the ad-
ditional faulty behaviour of the system, and (2) the rely specication, a specication of
assumptions that restrict the set of possible system executions. The impact model is
responsible for weakening the ideal (failure-free) specication of some system (i.e., M):
more executions become possible through the added behaviour. On the other hand,
the rely specication is usually a global assumption (i.e., E) on a composed system,
bounding the additional behaviour from becoming too bad.Chapter 2 Related Work 46
For example, a system crash can be modeled by adding a boolean variable up to the
state of the system and by inhibiting all aected transitions if :up holds. The state
transition from up to :up can be viewed as a crash failure. In addition, a global failure
assumption is usually made to be \at most t < n processes may crash".
The idea to represent failures as additional program actions goes back to a paper by
Cristian [39]. It was further developed in a series of papers by Arora et al. [12, 14, 13],
who stress that every form of failure can be modeled by this method. Gartner [69] gives
formal specications of several failure models such as Crash, Send Omission, Receive-
Omission, General-Omission and Byzantine.
2.8.2 A Brief Survey
Gartner [71] surveys methods to specify and verify fault-tolerant systems based on a
notion of transformation. A transformation is a general concept and almost anything
where there is a notion of \change" can be formulated as a transformation. So it has
been interesting to formulate fault tolerance methodologies which do not directly refer to
the notion of a transformation, e.g., multitolerance [13] and the state machine approach
[148].
Transformations oer the potential of being automated and thus can help aid the me-
chanical verication of fault-tolerant systems. For example, a failure model is a trans-
formation, i.e., a function that maps a program A to a program A0. Program A is the
original program, which by itself runs in an ideal fault-free environment; A0 is program
A that may be subject to failures. We note that A0 will never be explicitly implemented;
the transformation process is just a means to be able to reason about transformed pro-
grams to evaluate fault tolerance properties.
The state machine approach was rst described in Lamport [102] for environments in
which failures could not occur. It was generalised to handle fail-stop failures in Schneider
[147], a class of failures between fail-stop and Byzantine failures in Lamport [102], and
full Byzantine failures in Lamport [103].
The input/output (I/O) automaton model [112], developed by Lynch and Tuttle, is a
labelled transition system model for components in asynchronous distributed systems.
The I/O automaton is a simple type of state machine in which transitions are associated
with named actions, classied as either input, output or internal. The inputs and outputs
are used for communication with the automaton's environment, while the internal actions
are visible only to the automaton itself. This model has been used to describe faulty
communication channels and process crash failures [113]. The proof method supported
in the automaton model for reasoning about the system involves invariant assertions.
An invariant assertion is dened as a property of the state of a system that is true in
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proved using the method of induction. The work done using I/O Automaton has been
carried out by hand [68, 113].
B [5] is a tool-supported formal method based on Abstract Machine Notation. The
B Method adopts the top-down approach to system development, which starts from
creating a formal system specication and continues with renement of the specication.
In B, a specication is represented by a collection of modules, called Abstract Machines.
An abstract machine encapsulates a local state (local variables) of the machine and
provides operations on the state.
Recently, another formal method called Event-B [5] has been developed, which is con-
sidered an evolution of B. Event-B is particularly suitable for developing distributed,
parallel and reactive systems. It is a simpler notation and comes with tool support in
the form of the Rodin Platform [6]. The operations in Event-B are called events, which
are atomic meaning that, once an event is chosen, its execution will run until completion
without interference. The guard of an event represents the necessary conditions on the
state of the system for the event to be triggered. When the guard is true, event actions
are executed, possibly changing the state and allowing another event to be triggered.
Applying formal methods to the design and reasoning of fault-tolerant protocols has been
practiced in many applications, e.g., mobile agent systems [100, 121], control systems
[99, 168] and replicated distributed database systems [170].
Moreau [121] presented a fault-tolerant directory service for mobile agents, which can
be used to route messages reliably to them, even in the presence of crash failures of
intermediary nodes between senders and receivers. This algorithm relies on redundancy
information stored in dierent locations, hence able to tolerate a maximum of N   1
failures of intermediary nodes. The distributed directory service is formalised as an
Abstract State Machine (ASM). The formalisation adopts the impact model and the
rely specication, introduced in Section 2.8.1, to model crash failure and communication
omission failures by adding a boolean variable and several transitions regarding failures
to the system. Liveness and safety properties are stated and proved by hand based on
mathematical induction. A fully mechanical proof of the algorithm's correctness is also
derived using the proof assistant Coq [36].
Xu et al. [168] used coordinated atomic (CA) actions to design and validate a sophis-
ticated and embedded control system that has high reliability and safety requirements.
Their work was based on an extended production cell model, which represents a man-
ufacturing process involving redundant mechanical devices to maintain specied safety
and liveness properties even in the presence of device and sensor failures. They for-
malised CA action-based designs as a state transition system, which is characterised by
its (global) state space, a set of initial states, and a next-state relation.
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distributed database systems. They analysed the problem of formation of deadlocks
among conicting transactions and outlined an approach to preventing deadlocks and
transaction failures. They also demonstrated how to formally verify by renement that
the design of a replicated database conrms to the one copy database abstraction.
Laibinis et al. [100] presented a formal approach for the development of fault-tolerant
mobile agent systems based on Event-B framework. They started from an abstract
system specication modelling agents together with their communication environment
and gradually introduced implementation details in a number of correctness-preserving
transformations. In the renement steps, loss of connections and agent failures are con-
sidered and modelled by additional events in the system. To tolerate loss of connections,
a timeout mechanism is adopted, modelled by a variable timers in the formalisation. In
addition, several variants, such as disconn limit, recover limit are introduced to avoid
deadlock by limiting the number of successive disconnections and the amount of error
recovery attempts, respectively. They are initialised with an intial value and their values
decrease by 1 whenever a related event occurs. As soon as for some agent recovery limit
becomes zero, the agent's error recovery terminates and the error is treated as irrecov-
erable.
2.9 Summary
This chapter provided relevant background information on provenance, failures, fault-
tolerant mechanisms and formal method for fault tolerance. We also positioned our work
and discussed various solutions to addressing our problem.
We rstly reviewed provenance research. Provenance has attracted attention in many
elds, especially in fast growing workow communities, which support SOA-based in
silico scientic applications. We then compared several major provenance systems for
SOA applications. Through this comparison, we demonstrated that PASOA is a generic,
domain and technology independent approach to modelling and recording process docu-
mentation. This conclusion was further supported by a wide range of applications that
used PASOA to record their provenance information.
Then we highlighted key aspects of PASOA. PASOA models a process as a set of causally
related interactions between services through message passing. It denes several types
of assertions to describe interactions and introduces a protocol PReP to record process
documentation. Based on this part of the survey, we have decided to extend PASOA in
our work in order to inherit the following advantages.
PASOA has a number of advantages over other provenance systems. Firstly, it is do-
main and technology independent. It uses an SOA approach to modelling provenance
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ing protocol PReP, which can be implemented in dierent languages, such as Java and
Python. Secondly, it is an open architecture. It allows application developers to cus-
tomise the granularity level provenance information is collected at. Thirdly, it supports
multi-site recording, i.e., all participating parties in a process, such as workow enact-
ment engine and services, contribute to the provenance information of the data product
of that process. This is crucial for obtaining sucient provenance data in highly decen-
tralised applications. Fourthly, it introduces a linking mechanism to connect multiple
provenance repositories, which have been demonstrated in many applications to be nec-
essary.
PASOA, however, does not consider failures that may happen when an actor is record-
ing its interaction records into a provenance store. The consequence is the incapability
to retrieve complete process documentation from multiple interlinked provenance stores
either due to the loss of documentation or a broken pointer chain. Therefore, we intro-
duced several failure models and surveyed major fault-tolerant techniques. We aim to
design a generic approach to reliably recording process documentation for SOA-based
applications without the assumption on specic implementation strategies.
Formal methods can assist us in rigorously designing a fault-tolerant distributed protocol
and verifying its correctness. Therefore, we will use them to formalise our solution and
establish properties to prove its correctness.
With these conclusions, we now present our approach in the next chapter.Chapter 3
Protocol
At the beginning of this dissertation, we outlined the need for recording process docu-
mentation in the presence of failures while ensuring its entire retrievability for SOA-based
applications. Furthermore, we surveyed a number of provenance systems and concluded
that we adopt PASOA's approach to modelling process documentation and extend PReP
to inherit a number of advantages.
This chapter now presents our solution F-PReP, a coordinator-based protocol to record
process documentation in large, open distributed environments where numerous prove-
nance stores could be present and failures may occur.
The main idea of our protocol is to analyse all the possible behaviours that a system
can exhibit in the presence of failures and to provide remedial actions when failures
occur. Basic fault-tolerant mechanisms such as timeouts, retransmission of messages and
alternative provenance stores are used to guarantee the recording of complete process
documentation. To preserve the retrievability of distributed documentation, an Update
Coordinator is introduced to update incorrect links in provenance stores so that multiple
provenance stores are still properly connected.
The contributions of this chapter are twofold:
Firstly, we describe a generic protocol, F-PReP, for recording process documentation in
the presence of failures (specically, provenance store crash and communication failures).
It is a distributed protocol specifying the behaviour of three components: recording
actor, provenance store and the update coordinator. We dene protocol messages and
their exchanges between components.
Secondly, we formalise F-PReP using an Abstract State Machine (ASM) approach. We
begin with a formalisation without consideration of failures. Then we model failures by
extending system state space and adding extra transitions. Our ASM-based formalism
provides a precise and implementation independent means of specifying the protocol.
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It sketches the essence of the protocol and accurately denes protocol's behaviour. In
addition, it promotes a rigorous design of the protocol and helps us better understand
the complex system behaviour in the presence of failures.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 recalls several terms dened by PA-
SOA. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 state assumptions on the kinds of failures that we consider and
present the requirements that F-PReP supports. In Section 3.4, we outline F-PReP's
design philosophy based on the analysis of PReP's problems in the presence of failures.
After that, we dene protocol messages and detail F-PReP in Section 3.5. Section 3.6
formalises the protocol and species the internal behaviour of recording actors, prove-
nance stores and the coordinator. Finally, we discuss the protocol and conclude this
chapter.
3.1 Terminology
We expect readers to be familiar with Section 2.3, which provides an introduction to
PASOA. This section recalls several terms that are important to the understanding of
our work.
In service-oriented architectures, clients typically invoke services, which may themselves
act as clients for other services. The term actor is used to denote either a client or a
service. An actor that sends an application message is referred to as a sender, whereas
an actor that receives an application message is known as a receiver. One application
message exchanged between a sender and a receiver is an interaction. A process is
modelled as a causally connected set of interactions between actors involved in that
process.
We use the term assertor to refer to an actor that creates and records p-assertions. Using
p-assertions, an assertor documents an interaction to provide a sender or receiver's view
of the interaction and how those interactions are related. In order to eciently locate and
extract p-assertions from process documentation, PReP species that all p-assertions
created by an assertor about the same interaction are submitted to a provenance store
in a single message, which is termed an interaction record. Process documentation
therefore consists of a set of interaction records. PReP species that both assertors
in an interaction must make their interaction record documenting the interaction for
accountability or verication purposes.
One kind of p-assertion is interaction p-assertion, which documents the content of an
application message and is created by the assertor that has sent or received that message.
Another kind of p-assertion is relationship p-assertion. It is made by an assertor to
describe how the assertor produced output data from input data that it received by
applying some function on the input data. The output data is the eect and the inputChapter 3 Protocol 52
data is the cause. An eect can have multiple causes. We use terms eect interaction and
cause interaction to denote the interactions where the eect and cause are transferred,
respectively. Hence, a relationship p-assertion captures causal connections between an
eect interaction and cause interaction(s). A relationship p-assertion has been specied
by PReP to be included in the interaction record about the eect interaction since it
describes the causal reason for the occurrence of the eect interaction.
In the example of Figure 3.1, we assume that output data d2 is produced by assertor
a, which applies a function f on the input data d1. Hence, d2 and d1 are the eect
and the cause, respectively. Correspondingly, interactions I2 and I1, where d2 and
d1 are exchanged to/from other assertors, are eect interaction and cause interaction,
respectively. A relationship p-assertion can be created to capture the causal connection
(f) between I2 and I1, and it is sent to a store as part of IR2.
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Figure 3.1: An example of a simple process and causelink
For scalability, an assertor can use various stores to record interaction records about
dierent interactions. A notion of link, i.e., a pointer to a provenance store, has been
introduced to connect multiple provenance stores. PASOA denes two types of links,
causelink and viewlink. By following links, distributed process documentation can be
retrieved from across multiple stores.
A causelink is embedded in the relationship p-assertion, indicating the provenance store
that records the interaction record about the corresponding cause interaction. The asser-
tor has the knowledge about causelinks at deployment time. For example, a causelink can
be determined from a conguration le or be hard coded into an application's program.
In Figure 3.1, the assertor creates two interaction records IR1 and IR2 documenting
the cause interaction I1 and eect interaction I2, respectively. It also makes a rela-
tionship p-assertion, capturing the causal relationship between I1 and I2. The assertor
uses provenance stores PS1 and PS2 to record IR1 and IR2, respectively. Therefore,
it embeds a causelink to PS1 in the relationship p-assertion, which is included in IR2
and recorded to PS2. Then there is a causelink in PS2, pointing to PS1 where theChapter 3 Protocol 53
interaction record about the cause interaction is recorded.
Another type of link is viewlink. Each assertor includes a viewlink in its interaction
record, pointing to the provenance store where the opposite assertor records its interac-
tion record about the same interaction. Therefore, both views of an interaction can be
retrieved by navigating from one provenance store to the other. Each assertor must have
a viewlink before it submits its interaction record to a provenance store. The viewlink
can be built into an assertor at deployment time or obtained from application messages
from another assertor. In Figure 3.2, the sender sends an application data to the re-
ceiver in an interaction I. Both sides document their view of the interaction by creating
interaction records IR1 and IR2. After recording its interaction record with a viewlink
into a provenance store, we know that IR2 is recorded in PS2 by checking the viewlink
in IR1 from store PS1, and vice versa.
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Figure 3.2: An example of viewlink
3.2 Assumptions
Failures are non-deterministic in nature and typically very hard to predict. Restricting
our scope to particular failures is hence necessary. We state the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. We assume a crash-recovery model on a provenance store, i.e., a store
fails by halting and later restarts from its latest consistent state.
A provenance store has been implemented as a stateless web service with a database
storage system. We denote as a crash all kinds of failures that bring down the provenance
store server and cause all data in volatile memory to be lost, but leave all data on stable
secondary storage intact.
Assumption 1 states that a provenance store has the ability to restart from its most
recent and consistent state, which refers to the initial state of the web service as well
as the latest consistent state of the database system. Such a consistent state can be
preserved via a recovery procedure following a crash, e.g., restarting the web serviceChapter 3 Protocol 54
and/or performing fault-tolerant operations (e.g., checkpoint/rollback/rollforward) on
the database.
The crash that we assume in Assumption 1 is sometimes referred to as soft crash case,
since it leaves all data on secondary storage intact, unlike a hard crash that corrupts
secondary storage media. A hard crash model is concerned with media failures [133],
such as disk head crash and magnetic decay. The consequence of media failures is the
loss of partial or complete process documentation, which cannot be retrieved even after
being successfully recorded in provenance stores. Since disk storage technology is already
highly reliable and recovery from media failures is not likely to happen more often than
once or twice a year [84], it is reasonable to ignore the hard crash case and state the
following assumption.
Assumption 2. Process documentation is persistent once being successfully recorded in
provenance stores.
In real world, applications with dierent requirements on process documentation can
decide if media failures should be considered. For those with less requirement on the
durability of process documentation, this type of failures can be ignored given the low
probability of occurrence. For industrial-strength applications, where process documen-
tation is critical, recovery from media failures is mainly through two approaches. The
traditional one is the combination of periodically creating database backups during nor-
mal operations and maintaining archive logs. The logs can be applied to the backup
data to redo committed transactions in order to restore the data up to the point of the
media failures. Another approach is mirroring disk storage based on techniques such
as RAID (\Redundant Array of Independent Disks"). Mission-critical applications usu-
ally combine both approaches: backups with archive logging as well as RAID storage
technology.
Assumption 3. Messages to/from provenance stores can be omitted, reordered but not
duplicated in communication channels.
Assumptions 1 and 3 give the failure model with regard to recording process docu-
mentation whilst Assumption 2 lays the foundation for our analysis on the retrieval of
process documentation in later chapters as it assumes no documentation is lost once
being recorded to provenance stores.
Assumption 4. We do not consider application failures.
Applications1 should provide fault tolerance mechanisms to ensure assertors' availability
and the completion of an application. Section 2.7 has reviewed some fault-tolerant
approaches for grid applications.
1In the rest of the dissertation, we use the term application to denote a provenance-aware application
that can create and record process documentation.Chapter 3 Protocol 55
Assumption 5. An assertor has a choice of several provenance stores to use.
In SOAs, it is convenient to deploy a number of provenance store services for an assertor
to use.
Assumption 6. The update coordinator does not fail.
As will be detailed later, a coordinator is used to facilitate viewlink update in order
to enable documentation retrievability. We can use a coordinator cluster to ensure its
availability for two reasons. First, a coordinator only maintains a minimum amount
of information, therefore the cost for preserving consistent states in all replicas can be
small. Second, a coordinator is not involved in every interaction of a process2, which
means a single coordinator can support all applications in the system.
However, we do not assume the use of a provenance store cluster. First, it does not
deal with message loss and hence cannot prevent disconnected process documentation.
Second, replication is sophisticated and comes with a signicant cost due to maintain
consistent states among replicas. Given that the documentation produced in a process
can be in large quantity, e.g., on the order of terabytes, replication may become very
expensive in terms of computing resource utilisation and performance impact. Therefore,
a provenance store cluster may not be appropriate in all situations. Third, we are dealing
with SOA-like systems where there may be any number of provenance stores managed
by dierent institutions across dierent regions, so it is unrealistic to assume each is
facilitated with replicated backups.
3.3 Requirements
F-PReP is dened based on an interaction. It species the behaviour of the sender and
receiver in terms of creating and recording their respective interaction record about an
interaction. It also denes the actions of a provenance store and the coordinator in
terms of dealing with messages (e.g., an assertor's interaction record) with regard to the
interaction.
In order to establish our thesis statement, we identify several requirements for F-PReP
to support. Given that a process consists of a set of interactions, if the protocol can
ensure that the following requirements are supported on interaction level, then the doc-
umentation of the whole process is shown to meet these requirements. Chapter 4 will
formalise these requirements as properties and prove that F-PReP preserves these prop-
erties. Chapter 5 will use these properties as building blocks to establish the properties
of whole process documentation.
2A coordinator is only used when an assertor wants to update a link in a provenance store after
failures occurred.Chapter 3 Protocol 56
The most important requirement is to ensure the successful recording of an interaction
record in the presence of failures.
Requirement 1 (Guaranteed Recording). An assertor's interaction record must
be eventually recorded in a provenance store.
Multiple provenance stores are connected by a chain of pointers (i.e., links) to enable the
retrieval of distributed documentation. Thus, we have the following two requirements.
Requirement 2 (Causelink Accuracy). Accurate causelink(s) regarding an eect
interaction must eventually exist in a provenance store. Each must point to the store
where an interaction record about the corresponding cause interaction was successfully
recorded.
Requirement 3 (Viewlink Accuracy). Accurate viewlinks regarding an interaction
must eventually exist in a provenance store. Each must point to the store where the
other assertor in the interaction successfully recorded its interaction record documenting
that interaction.
Creating and recording interaction records have already introduced overhead into the
application [78]. Remedial actions coping with failures may however take up computing
resources and interfere with the application. Therefore, we identify a nonfunctional
requirement:
Requirement 4 (Efficient Recording). The recording of interaction records should
be ecient and introduce acceptable recording overhead on the application's performance.
3.4 Design Philosophy
In this section, we analyse several problems that may occur when recording interaction
records to a provenance store in the event of failures and outline how F-PReP addresses
these problems to satises the four requirements.
There are several challenges in designing a distributed protocol that can cope with fail-
ures. Firstly, we need to state an appropriate failure model and systematically identify
system behaviour in the case of failures. Secondly, the protocol may involve the co-
operation of several parties such as provenance-aware applications, provenance stores
and the coordinator. Designing such a distributed protocol is notoriously dicult, since
we have to stay in control of not only the normal system behaviour when there is no
failure but also of the complex situations which can occur when failures happen.
PReP does not specify well-dened behaviour when recording documentation in the
presence of failures. Firstly, PReP allows a provenance store to return an acknowledge-
ment before persisting an interaction record. This has the risk that the acknowledgedChapter 3 Protocol 57
interaction record can be lost in the event of a store crash whilst the assertor is unaware
of it. In addition, PReP assumes an assertor always obtains an acknowledgement from a
provenance store and hence does not consider the situation where the acknowledgement
is lost or the provenance store crashes.
To address the rst problem, F-PReP enforces that a provenance store returns an ac-
knowledgement to an assertor only after successfully recording the interaction record
that is being acknowledged.
Regarding the second problem, we systematically analyse several failure scenarios where
an assertor sends an interaction record (IR) to a provenance store (PS) and PS replies
the assertor with an acknowledgement (Ack) after recording IR. Since messages can
get lost (Assumption 3) and a store can crash (Assumption 1), we present the following
cases based on the failure assumptions. We discuss the loss of IR and Ack and the
situations where a PS can fail.
1. The message IR is lost;
2. PS crashes before completely receiving IR;
3. PS crashes after completely receiving IR, and before successfully recording IR
and replying Ack;
4. PS crashes after successfully recording IR and before sending out Ack;
5. PS crashes after sending out Ack;
6. The message Ack is lost.
If a provenance store crashes after providing Ack (Scenario 5) this means it has suc-
cessfully recorded IR. From an assertor's perspective, all the other scenarios result in
failure to receive an acknowledgement from a provenance store.
Without the acknowledgement, an assertor does not know if its IR has been successfully
recorded in a provenance store. To avoid waiting for the acknowledgement indenitely,
F-PReP explicitly sets a timeout for an assertor after it sends IR to a store. If the
assertor does not receive a response before the timeout, it knows failures may have
occurred but cannot ascertain if the provenance store has recorded its IR due to the
incapability of distinguishing the loss of IR or Ack from store crash. In addition, a low
speed network or a provenance store experiencing slowdown can also cause a timeout.
In order to guarantee the successful recording of documentation, an assertor interprets
a timeout as \failure has occurred" and takes remedial actions. Several fault-tolerant
mechanisms are adopted by F-PReP in the presence of a \failure" (i.e., timeout): re-
transmitting messages and using alternative provenance stores. An assertor can resendChapter 3 Protocol 58
an IR to a same provenance store or an alternative one until the IR is acknowledged
before the timeout. A provenance store has been designed to handle duplicate retrans-
mitted IRs and always return the same Ack for a specic IR. The use of alternative
provenance stores is a general approach to tolerating provenance store crashes with-
out assuming any provenance store cluster, although the latter can be complementary.
Guaranteed Recording is met when IR is acknowledged before a timeout.
It may be the case where there is an innite series of crashes and/or channel omissions,
resulting in the impossibility of receiving any acknowledgement. However, we do not
consider this case since such a case indicates a fundamental problem with the entire
system rather with the recording of process documentation. Since a provenance store
is able to recover from failures (Assumption 1), we make another assumption stating
that an acknowledgement is \eventually" received by an assertor given the presence of
an appropriate timeout value as well as the use of message retransmissions.
Assumption 7. Within the set of provenance stores that an assertor decides to use, at
least one acknowledgement is received by the assertor before a timeout.
Since provenance stores hosting distributed process documentation have been interlinked
using a pointer chain, one challenge F-PReP has to face is the potential breakage of the
pointer chain due to the use of alternative provenance stores. This means a link to
the original store becomes invalid if a specic interaction record is not recorded in the
original store. We now discuss causelinks and viewlinks using the examples in Section
3.1.
In Figure 3.3, if the assertor fails to record IR1 to PS1, it uses an alternative store
PS10, which successfully records IR1. Since the recording of interaction records is
asynchronous to the execution of the application, the use of alternative stores is not
known by the assertor when the causelink to PS1 is embedded in the relationship p-
assertion. Therefore, the causelink becomes inaccurate as it points to a location where
IR1 cannot be found.
In the case of viewlinks, since one or two assertors may use alternative stores, we discuss
two situations. In Figure 3.4, the sender uses another store PS1 to record IR1, hence
making the receiver's viewlink in PS2 inaccurate, which still points to the sender's
original store PS1. Figure 3.5 shows the situation where both assertors use alternative
stores to record their interaction record.
The presence of inaccurate links results in distributed process documentation unable to
be retrieved from multiple provenance stores. Therefore, F-PReP must provide actions
to x inaccurate causelinks and viewlinks, making them point to the correct location.
To satisfy Causelink Accuracy, F-PReP species the following actions. Firstly, all
IRs created by the same assertor are placed into a local queue before being recorded toChapter 3 Protocol 59
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Figure 3.3: An example of inaccurate causelink
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Figure 3.4: An example of inaccurate viewlink
a provenance store. Only after the IR at the head of the queue has been successfully
recorded can it be removed from the queue. Secondly, given a relationship p-assertion,
the IR about any cause interaction is always enqueued before the IR about the eect
interaction. Thirdly, an assertor maintains history information in a log table about the
use of alternative stores when recording an IR.
The use of a queue has two purposes. Firstly, it allows the recording of IRs to be asyn-
chronous to application execution, which improves recording performance. Secondly,
it serialises the recording of IRs about the eect interaction and cause interaction(s).
Therefore, when the assertor is ready to submit the IR about the eect interaction,
which is the head of the queue, it knows if an alternative store was used when recording
the IR about the cause interaction by checking the log table. Then the assertor can
update any incorrect causelink according to the history information in the log table.
In the example of Figure 3.6, an alternative store PS10 was used to record IR1, which is
about the cause interaction I1. The log table now reects that in interaction I1 where
the assertor was a receiver (R), an alternative store PS10 was used to record IR1. When
IR2 is to be submitted, the assertor checks all relationship p-assertions in IR2 accordingChapter 3 Protocol 60
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Figure 3.5: An another example of inaccurate viewlink
to the log table. If there is an entry regarding a cause interaction in the table, then
the assertor uses the alternative store's identier to update the corresponding causelink.
In the gure, the causelink is redirected to PS10, which is the store that successfully
recorded IR1.
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Figure 3.6: Causelink updated
To achieve Viewlink Accuracy, an update coordinator is employed to facilitate
viewlink update. F-PReP species that any assertor that successfully recorded its IR
to an alternative store takes the initiative to update the other's viewlink by sending a
request to the coordinator.
In the case of Figure 3.4, after recording IR1 in PS10, the sender knows that the re-
ceiver's viewlink must have been out-dated. Hence it requests the coordinator to update
PS2, which the sender assumes the receiver is still using. Then the coordinator sends
an update request to PS2, making the receiver's viewlink point to PS10. Therefore, the
viewlink in PS2 becomes accurate.
If the receiver also used an alternative store, as illustrated in Figure 3.5, the coordinator'sChapter 3 Protocol 61
update is not successful as PS2 did not record IR23. However, since the receiver also
sends a request to the coordinator for updating the sender's viewlink, the coordinator
now possesses global knowledge from both sides. Then it makes another decision on
how to update two assertors' viewlink: it updates the viewlink in PS10 by redirecting
it to PS20 and updates the viewlink in PS20 by redirecting it to PS10. Therefore, both
viewlinks become accurate (Figure 3.7). We will detail the coordinator's behaviour in
Section 3.5.2.
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Figure 3.7: Viewlink updated
To meet Efficient Recording, F-PReP is designed with a number of considerations.
Firstly, it is an asynchronous protocol, allowing assertors to send IRs at any time with-
out delaying their execution. In addition, remedial actions, e.g., selecting alternative
stores, are taken by the protocol irrespective of the application. We will introduce more
implementation considerations to achieve good recording performance in Chapter 6.
After a brief description of F-PReP, next section will detail the protocol and provide
more justications about design decisions.
3.5 Protocol Description
3.5.1 Denitions
To facilitate the description of our protocol, we dene three new terms:
Denition 8 (OwnLink). It refers to the provenance store that an assertor is currently
using to record an interaction record.
Denition 9 (Default Link). It refers to the provenance store that an assertor ini-
tially used when recording an interaction record but may not have been successful in doing
so.
3It may be the case that PS2 happens to record IR2, and the receiver experiences a timeout and uses
an alternative store. In this case, PS2 records duplicate information, which we will discuss in Section
3.7.Chapter 3 Protocol 62
Denition 10 (Default Store). If a provenance store is referred by an assertor's
default link, then it is the assertor's default store.
We note that an actor is free to use a dierent provenance store when recording another
interaction record. So the default link may not be the same in each interaction.
In the example of Figure 3.8, we assume assertor a initially used PS1 to record its
documentation IR but failed. Then it used another store PS2 to record IR. In this
case, a's default link refers to PS1, which is its default store. Its own link is changed
from PS1 to PS2 since PS2 is currently being used.
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Figure 3.8: An Example of ownlink and default link
3.5.2 Messages
F-PReP species the behaviour and communications of assertors, provenance stores and
the update coordinator. There are six messages in the protocol: Application Message
(app), Interaction Record Message (record), Record Ack Message (ack), Repair Message
(repair), Update Message (update), and Update Ack Message (uack). We now dene
each message with Figure 3.9, which provides an example of message exchanges.
3.5.2.1 Application Message
The application message app is exchanged by all assertors in the application. It contains
application specic data needing to be transferred between actors. In the context of a
provenance system, the application message is adapted to include interaction contextual
information: an interaction key and the sender's ownlink.
An interaction key is generated by the sender in an interaction for uniquely identifying
the interaction from all other interactions. The receiver can then use the interaction key
to generate and record p-assertions about the same interaction.
In Figure 3.9, we assume that the key for the interaction in which the sender a sends
an application message to the receiver b is i. We also assume the default provenance
stores that a and b use are PS1 and PS2, respectively. In Step 1, a sends an app to bChapter 3 Protocol 63
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Figure 3.9: Protocol message exchanges
containing application data d, interaction key i and a's ownlink to PS1. Upon receiving
app, b becomes aware of its viewlink to PS1. We assume that a's viewlink to PS2 has
been made available to a by means not explained in the gure; the viewlink can be built
into a at deployment time, transferred to a in a response message, or in an extra message
from b.
3.5.2.2 Interaction Record Message
For each interaction, both assertors document the interaction by asserting p-assertions
and sending them in an interaction record message, record, to their respective provenance
stores. The message record contains: (1) an interaction key, identifying the interaction
being documented; (2) a view kind, indicating the role of the assertor in the interaction,
i.e., a sender or a receiver; (3) the identity of the assertor that documents the interaction,
which is essential for recording attributable process documentation; (4) a viewlink of the
assertor for that interaction; (5) a set of p-assertions made by the assertor to describe
the interaction.
In Figure 3.9, a and b create a set of p-assertions, pas a and pas b, respectively, about
the interaction i. They send pas a and pas b in record messages with their respective
viewlink to PS2 and PS1 (Steps 3, 8). We note that the two record messages can be sent
in any order, not restricted by the step numbers in the gure.
The set of p-assertions must contain an interaction p-assertion to document the exchange
of app message. If app is the consequence of receiving other messages, then the sender
of app must make a relationship p-assertion to capture the causal connections betweenChapter 3 Protocol 64
these messages.
Due to the asynchronous nature of the protocol, an assertor accumulates record messages
in a local queue and submits them to their respective provenance store at its most
convenient time. When a record message becomes the head of the queue, the assertor
checks all the relationship p-assertions in the message and updates inaccurate causelinks
before submitting it to its provenance store. These actions are detailed in Section 3.6.3.
3.5.2.3 Record Ack Message
A provenance store acknowledges a record message by means of an acknowledgement
message ack, only after it has successfully recorded the content of record in its persistent
storage. An ack message includes an interaction key and a view kind, indicating from
which view of an interaction, a record is being acknowledged.
An assertor sets a timeout when waiting for an ack immediately after it sends a record
to a provenance store. This helps the assertor take remedial actions without waiting too
long. If an ack is not received before the timeout, then the assertor resends the same
record to the assertor's default store or an alternative store. Only after receiving an ack
acknowledging a record can the assertor eliminate the record from its local queue. An
ack means that the acknowledged record message has been processed and recorded in a
provenance store persistently.
An assertor keeps history information of using alternative stores in a log table in order
to facilitate causelink update. It always places the record about a cause interaction into
the queue before placing the record about the eect interaction. The FIFO nature of the
queue ensures that when the record about the eect interaction is ready to be submitted
from the queue, the assertor knows if any alternative store was used for submitting the
record about the cause interaction. Therefore, by checking the log table, the assertor
can update any incorrect causelink in the record about the eect interaction.
In Figure 3.9, we assume a sends a record to its default store PS1 (Step 2) but does not
receive an ack before a timeout. Then it selects another store PS10 to use (Step 3) and
nally receives an ack (Step 4). In Section 3.5.3, we will discuss the case where both
assertors use an alternative store.
3.5.2.4 Repair Message
After an assertor records a record to an alternative store, the other assertor's viewlink
points to an incorrect store. F-PReP species that any assertor that successfully recorded
its IR to an alternative store takes the initiative to update the other's viewlink by sending
a repair request to the coordinator.Chapter 3 Protocol 65
In Figure 3.9, the sender sends its record to the alternative store PS10 (Step 3) and
receives an ack (Step 4). As a consequence, the receiver's viewlink to PS1 becomes
incorrect, hence requiring an update. In order not to interfere with the application, the
protocol does not allow the sender to directly inform the receiver with its new ownlink,
which is now pointing to PS10. Instead, the sender requests an update coordinator (Step
5) to help update the receiver's viewlink recorded in PS2, which the sender thinks the
receiver is still using.
A repair message consists of four elements: (1) an interaction key, indicating in which
interaction the opposite assertor's viewlink is to be updated; (2) the requesting assertor's
view kind in the interaction; (3) a pointer (DestPS) to the provenance store where the
requesting assertor thinks the opposite assertor's viewlink is recorded; (4) the requesting
assertor's ownlink, which points to the provenance store from which the requesting asser-
tor received an ack for that interaction, indicating the store has recorded the assertor's
interaction record.
A coordinator is necessary since both sender and receiver may issue a repair request in
an interaction (Figure 3.5). This cannot be achieved by a direct update of the other
assertor's provenance store, because at that moment, an assertor does not know which
store the opposite assertor is actually using. In Figure 3.5, the receiver uses an alternative
store to record its record; hence the sender's viewlink to PS2 becomes incorrect as well.
In that case, the receiver needs to issue another repair request to the coordinator. We
will detail this case in Section 3.5.3.
In order to deal with the case where both assertors in an interaction each issue a repair
request, which could be in any order, the coordinator maintains request information:
the identity of the destination store, specied by the DestPS eld in the repair message,
and the requesting assertor's ownlink. This request information is indexed by the pair
of interaction key and view kind. In Figure 3.9, after receiving a repair request from the
sender, the coordinator records a tuple hPS2;PS10i indexed by the pair (i;S), indicating
the sender in interaction i sent a repair message.
Since an update coordinator is not involved in every interaction, we recommend that
all assertors participating in a process employ one coordinator. If using more than one,
then any two assertors exchanging an application message must share the same one in
order to ensure Viewlink Accuracy. The identier of a coordinator can be built in
assertors or exchanged to other assertors in the application message app. Figure 3.9
employs the former approach.
By Assumption 3, we do not consider the loss of repair messages in the channel between
an assertor and the coordinator4. Hence, Assumption 6 implies that a repair request is
always processed by the coordinator.
4This can be relaxed by using an extra acknowledgement and message retransmissions.Chapter 3 Protocol 66
3.5.2.5 Update Message
After receiving a repair message, the coordinator sends a message update to a provenance
store in order to update a viewlink in that store. The message contains: (1) an inter-
action key, indicating for which interaction, an assertor's viewlink in the store needs to
be updated; (2) the view kind of the requesting assertor that issued a repair request for
that interaction; (3) the ownlink of the requesting assertor. The DestPS eld in the
repair message tells the coordinator where to send the update message.
In Figure 3.9, the coordinator sends to PS2 an update message containing the sender's
ownlink to PS10 (Step 6). Therefore, the receiver's viewlink in PS2 is replaced with
PS10 and hence becomes accurate.
If the coordinator receives two repair messages each from one assertor in an interaction,
then it sends out two update messages after performing operations using the maintained
request information to ensure that both update messages are delivered to correct desti-
nation stores. We will detail this case in Section 3.5.3.
A provenance store may receive an update and a record message in any order (Steps 6,
8). The protocol species that the viewlink obtained from update is NOT overwritten
by the one from record in order to achieve requirement Viewlink Accuracy.
3.5.2.6 Update Ack Message
After updating a viewlink in a provenance store, the store returns an acknowledgement
message uack, containing an interaction key and a view kind, to the coordinator ac-
knowledging the respective update message. Since messages update or uack may be lost
in channel and a destination store may crash, the coordinator sets a timeout when wait-
ing for a uack. A timeout event leads the coordinator to resending the update message
to the same provenance store. Given that a store eventually recovers (Assumptions 1),
retransmission of update eventually results in the destination store being updated.
3.5.3 Dealing with Two Repair Messages
The coordinator needs to deal with the case where two repair messages are received
regarding the same interaction. We now use Figure 3.10 to illustrate this. To simplify
our presentation, we only show message parameters of repair and update as the two
messages are relevant to the coordinator. We also omit messages uack in the gure.
In Figure 3.10, both assertors used alternative stores PS10 and PS20 to record their
respective interaction record (Steps 3 and 8). Hence, each sent one repair message to the
coordinator (Steps 5 and 10). When receiving one repair, the coordinator rstly checksChapter 3 Protocol 67
if it has a record from the other assertor of the given interaction. If not, it keeps a
record of the destination store and an assertor's ownlink, and sends an update (Step 6)
to the destination store provided the destination is available. However, in this gure,
the coordinator's update is not successful as PS2 did not record the receiver's viewlink
due to failure.
Later, when the coordinator receives another repair from the other assertor (Step 10),
it now possesses global knowledge from both sides. It replaces one view's destination
store with another view's ownlink, making each view's destination store correct (Step
11). After the replacement, the destination store of each tuple becomes PS20 or PS10,
which is the ownlink in the other tuple (Figure 3.10). Then the coordinator dispatches
two update messages to their new destination (Steps 12 and 13): it updates the viewlink
in PS10 by redirecting it to PS20 and updates the viewlink in PS20 by redirecting it to
PS10. Therefore, both viewlinks in PS10 and PS20 become accurate (as has been shown
in Figure 3.7).
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Figure 3.10: The coordinator receiving two repair requests
3.5.4 Discussion
Two factors aect the accuracy of a causelink or viewlink:
Firstly, the asynchronous nature of the protocol allows an assertor to record documen-Chapter 3 Protocol 68
tation in parallel with the application's execution. When an assertor is creating a rela-
tionship p-assertion embedding causelinks or is sending an application message with its
ownlink (Step 1 in Figure 3.9), it uses the default link of the corresponding interaction.
However, the default link may not point to the store which will successfully record the
assertor's interaction record later.
Secondly, an assertor can use an alternative store to record its interaction record in the
presence of failures (i.e., timeout events). Similarly to the coordinator retransmitting
message update to a store, an assertor can keep resending record messages to a same
provenance store without using alternative stores. But an assertor is not expected to
do so since it may aect application performance if a crashed provenance store recovers
after a long period of time. Hence, using an alternative store is one of our eorts to meet
requirement Ecient Recording. The coordinator, on the other hand, does not aect
the application when updating a viewlink in a provenance store. So it is acceptable that
the update is delivered to a store after a while.
3.6 Protocol Formalisation
F-PReP has been formalised through the use of an abstract state machine (ASM). The
ASM notation we adopt has been used previously to describe a distributed reference
counting algorithm [122], a fault-tolerant directory service for mobile agents [120] and
PReP [76].
The ASM characterises the behaviour of a distributed system consisting of assertors,
provenance stores and the coordinator with respect to the messages the subcomponents
send and receive. This behaviour is specied by the permissible transitions that the
ASM is allowed to perform. Such a formalisation provides a precise, implementation-
independent means of describing the system. It is also systematic and can easily be
encoded in a mechanical prover (as illustrated by other proofs [119, 123, 121] successfully
encoded in Coq [36]).
Our approach to formalising F-PReP follows two steps. Firstly, we model F-PReP's
behaviour in a failure-free environment (without considering Assumptions 1 and 3) in
Sections 3.6.1 to 3.6.5. Secondly, we discuss failures by rening the failure-free speci-
cation in Section 3.6.6.
In Section 3.6.1, we begin by describing the state space of the ASM, and then proceed
to discuss its transitions. Sections 3.6.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.4 and 3.6.5 detail the behaviour of
each kind of actors. In Section 3.6.6, we consider failures by extending the system state
space and adding transitions to the ASM. Chapter 6 will introduce how we implement
the protocol based on the formalisation.Chapter 3 Protocol 69
3.6.1 System State Space
Figure 3.11 shows the system state space in a failure-free environment. We identify
specic subsets of actors in the system, namely, the assertors (senders and receivers),
provenance stores, and update coordinators. In the rest of this dissertation, we assume
a single coordinator is used in the system (jCOIDj = 1) and it is known by all assertors.
We will evaluate if one coordinator leads to a performance bottleneck in Chapter 6.
The set of each protocol message is dened formally as an inductive type. For example,
the set of application messages is dened by an inductive type whose constructor is
app and whose parameters are from sets DATA, IK and OL. The notation DATA
refers to the set of application related data. The set of all protocol messages (M) is
dened as the union of these message sets. The power set notation (P) denotes that
there can be more than one of a given element. Messages are exchanged over a set
of communication channels, K. Since no assumption is made about message order in
communication channels and the fact that message retransmissions can lead to duplicate
messages in communication channels, K is represented as bags5 of messages between
pairs of actors.
To ensure the uniqueness of an interaction key, we use the sender and receiver's identiers
and a natural number to model the interaction key IK. Since the interaction key is
created by the sender of an interaction, the sender needs to ensure that the natural
number is locally unique on the sender side of each interaction. In terms of VK, we use
S and R to denote the sender and receiver's viewkind, respectively.
We dene the set of relationship p-assertions as an inductive type whose constructor is
rel-pa. The name of a relationship is given in the set REL. Since a relationship p-assertion
captures causal connections between an eect interaction and cause interaction(s), we
use set EID and CID to index the respective eect and cause interactions, each containing
an interaction key (IK) and the viewkind (VK) of an assertor in that interaction. With
EID or CID, the p-assertions about an interaction can be found in a local provenance
store or a remote store (indicated by the causelink in set CL). The set of interaction
p-assertions is constructed by i-pa whose parameter is from IK and DATA. The set
of all kinds of p-assertions (PA) is dened as the union of these p-assertion sets. Since
actor state p-assertions are application specic and not used in our protocol, we do not
model them in the state space.
The internal functionality of each kind of actors is modelled as follows.
5In mathematics, a bag is a generalisation of a set. A member of a bag can have more than one
membership, whilst each member of a set has only one membership.Chapter 3 Protocol 70
A = fa1;:::;ang (Set of Actor Identities)
AID  A (Assertor Identities)
SID  AID (Sender Identities)
RID  AID (Receiver Identities)
PID  A (Provenance Store Identities)
COID  A (Coordinator Identities)
jCOIDj = 1
M = app : DATA  IK  OL ! M (Set of Protocol Messages)
j record : IK  VK  AID  VL  P(PA) ! M
j ack : IK  VK ! M
j repair : IK  VK  DESTPS  OL ! M
j update : IK  VK  OL ! M
j uack : IK  VK ! M
K = A  A ! Bag(M) (Set of Channels)
IR = fm 2 M j m = record(;v;a;vl;pas)g (Set of Interaction Records)
IK = SID  RID  N (Set of Interaction Keys)
VK = fS, Rg (Set of ViewKinds)
OL = PID (Set of Ownlinks)
VL = PID (Set of Viewlinks)
DESTPS = PID (Set of Destination Stores)
PA = rel-pa : REL  EID  P(CID) ! PA (Set of P-Assertions)
j i-pa : IK  DATA ! PA
REL = fr1;:::;rng (Business Logic Descriptions)
EID = IK  VK (Set of EectIDs)
CID = CL  IK  VK (Set of CauseIDs)
CL = PID (Set of CauseLinks)
ASSERTOR = AID ! IK  VK ! STR?  DL?  OL?  VL?  P(PA) (Set of Assertors)
STR = fINIT;READY;SEND;SENT;ACKED;OKg (States of Interaction Record)
DL = PID (Set of Defaultlinks)
LOG = AID ! IK  VK ! CHANGED?  APS? (Set of Log Tables)
CHANGED = Bool (Flags of Using Alt. PS))
APS = PID (Set of Used Alt. Stores)
QUEUE = AID ! Queue(IR) (Set of Record Queues)
LC = SID ! N (Sender's Local Counters)
PSLIST = AID ! P(PID) (Set of Alt. Store Lists)
TIMER = A ! IK  VK  PID ! STATUS?  TIMEOUT (Set of Timers)
STATUS = fENABLED;DISABLEDg (Set of Timer Statuses)
TIMEOUT = N (Set of Timeouts)
RC = A ! IK  VK ! N (Set of Retry Counters)
PS = PID ! IK  VK ! AID?  VL?  P(PA) (Set of Provenance Stores)
VLST = PID ! IK  VK ! VLS? (ViewLink State Tables)
VLS = fDEFAULT;UPDATEDg (Set of ViewLink States)
COORD = COID ! IK  VK ! DESTPS?  OL? (Set of Coordinators)
UPDATE = COID ! IK  VK  PID ! STATE? (Set of Update Tables)
STATE = fUPDATE;WAIT;UPDATEDg (Set of Update States)
C = ASSERTOR  LOG  QUEUE  LC  TIMER 
RCPS  VLST  COORD  UPDATE  K (Set of Congurations)
Characteristic Variables:
a 2 AID, as 2 SID, ar 2 RID, aps 2 PID, ac 2 COID, m 2 M, k 2 K, d 2 DATA,  2 IK, v 2 VK,
ol 2 OL, vl 2 VL, adps 2 DESTPS, pa 2 PA, pas 2 P (PA), r 2 REL, cids 2 P (CID), cl 2 CL,
assertor T 2 ASSERTOR, str 2 STR, dl 2 DL, log T 2 LOG, changed 2 CHANGED, aps 2 APS,
queue T 2 QUEUE, lc 2 LC, psList 2 PSLIST, timer T 2 TIMER, status 2 STATUS, to 2 TIMEOUT,
rc 2 RC, store T 2 PS, vlstate T 2 VLST, coord T 2 COORD, update T 2 UPDATE, c 2 C
Initial State of Conguration:
ci = hassertor Ti;log Ti;queue Ti;lci;timer Ti;rci;store Ti;vlstate Ti;coord Ti;update Ti;kii
where:
assertor Ti = av  h?;?;?;?;;i, log Ti = av  h?;?i, queue Ti = a  ;,
lci = a  0, timer Ti = avaps  h?;0i, rci = av  N,
store Ti = apsv  h?;?;;i, vlstate Ti = apsv  ?, coord Ti = acv  h?;?i,
update Ti = acvaps  ?, ki = aa  ;
Figure 3.11: System state spaceChapter 3 Protocol 71
3.6.1.1 Sender and Receiver State Space
An assertor (a 2 AID) uses various tables (assertor T 2 ASSERTOR, log T 2 LOG,
queue T 2 QUEUE, lc 2 LC, timer T 2 TIMER and rc 2 RC) to record record
messages into a provenance store.
A table maps a key to a tuple. Since an assertor may be involved in dierent interactions
where it can be a sender or a receiver, table assertor T maps an interaction key ( 2 IK)
and the assertor's view kind (v 2 VK) to a tuple of ve elements: the state (str 2 STR)
of an interaction record message, the assertor's defaultlink (dl 2 DL), ownlink (ol 2 OL),
viewlink (vl 2 VL) in that interaction, and the p-assertions created about the interaction
(pas 2 P(PA)). We use STR? to denote that the initial state of STR is ?. We note
that table assertor T is only used for maintaining the assertor's state to facilitate our
reasoning and proof; it is not implemented.
We use DL to denote the set of default links. In the example of Figure 3.9, the default
link of assertor a and b refers to PS1 and PS2, respectively. Hence, PS1 and PS2 are
the assertors' default stores in that interaction.
A Log table (log T 2 LOG) maintains information about an assertor's use of alternative
stores to facilitate causelink update. A ag (changed 2 CHANGED) is set to TRUE
if an alternative store was used. The identier of the used alternative store is kept in a
eld (aps 2 APS).
After creating interaction records, an assertor accumulates them in a local queue (queue T
2 QUEUE) before shipping them to their respective provenance store. The FIFO prop-
erty of the queue guarantees successful causelink update. The notation LC denes a
function mapping a sender's identier to a natural number, used to distinguish inter-
actions which may occur between the same sender and receiver. The sender needs to
ensure that the natural number is locally unique. The list of alternative provenance
stores are modelled by table psList 2 PSLIST, mapping an assertor's identity to a set
of store identities.
The timer table (timer T 2 TIMER) models the timer, which is set by an assertor
and the coordinator when waiting for an acknowledgement from a provenance store
regarding a specic interaction. The key used by a timer table includes a store's identity
(aps 2 PID) as well as an interaction key ( 2 IK) and a view kind (v 2 VK). The
timer's state (status 2 STATUS) indicates if the timer is enabled or disabled. A
timeout (to 2 TIMEOUT) is a natural number, which keeps decreasing after the timer
is enabled.
In order to prevent innitely resending messages, an application usually limits the num-
ber of retry attempts. We formalise this with a retry counter (rc 2 RC), which has an
initial value indicating the max number of resubmissions. The counter decreases by oneChapter 3 Protocol 72
after the assertor attempts a retry.
3.6.1.2 PS and Coordinator State Space
The set PS models provenance stores, each containing a table (store T 2 PS) indexed by
a provenance store's identity. The table maps an interaction key and the view kind of the
assertor that created and recorded p-assertions in the interaction to a tuple: the identity
of the assertor, a viewlink and the set of p-assertions documenting the interaction.
Since the viewlink in a provenance store may be updated, we use a table (vlstate T 2
VLST) to keep the status of a viewlink. If the state is DEFAULT the viewlink is provided
by an assertor without being updated by the coordinator. If it is UPDATED the viewlink
has been updated by the coordinator. We note that this table is also solely for the
purpose of reasoning and proof of the protocol's properties; it is not implemented.
A coordinator maintains repair request information in a table (coord T 2 COORD)
and the states of updating a viewlink in another table (update T 2 UPDATE). The
key used by table update T includes a store's identity (aps 2 PID), which refers to the
destination store to be updated by the coordinator.
We will further detail these tables when describing the rules of provenance store and
update coordinator.
3.6.1.3 State Machine Rules
Given the state space, the ASM is described by an initial state and a set of transitions.
A transition is the application of a rule to one conguration in order to achieve another
conguration. Figure 3.11 contains the initial state (ci 2 C), which can be summarised as
empty channels, empty tables and any counters being initialised to zero in all actors. The
ASM proceeds from this initial state through its execution by going through transitions
that lead to new states.
The state machine rules are represented using the following notation.
rule name(v1;v2;:::) :
condition1(v1;v2;:::)^ condition2(v1;v2;:::) ^ :::
! f
pseudo statement1;
:::
pseudo statementn;
gChapter 3 Protocol 73
Rules are identied by their name and a number of parameters that the rule operates
over. Any number of conditions must be met for a rule to re. Once a rule's conditions
are met, the rule res. The execution of a rule is atomic, so that no other rule may
interrupt or interleave with an executing rule. This maintains the consistency of the
ASM. A new state is achieved after applying all the rule's pseudo-statements to the
state that met the conditions of the rule.
For convenience, we use notation a   b to bind a local variable a to a value b. We then
dene an assignment operator := for table update pseudo-statements. The table update
operation puts a message into a table or changes the content of the table. It can assign
a value to a eld of a table, or assign a tuple to a table. We use notation table T to
refer to any table in the system state space, formally:
 If table T is a component of state h:::;table T;:::i, then the expression
table T(:::):y := V denotes the state h:::;table T0;:::i, where table T0(:::):x =
table T(:::):x if x 6= y, and table T0(:::):y := V .
 If table T(:::) has one eld x, then the expression table T(:::) := V denotes
table T(:::):x := V .
 If table T(:::) has elds x1;:::;xn and V = hv1;:::;vni, then the expression
table T(:::) := V denotes for m = 1;:::;n, table T(:::):xm := vm if vm 6= .
In the following example, the fourth eld of assertor T(a;;v) (i.e., viewlink vl) is not
aected when  is present.
assertor T(a, ;v) := hOK;PS1;PS2;;pasi 
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
assertor T(a, ;v):str := OK
assertor T(a, ;v):dl := PS1
assertor T(a, ;v):ol := PS2
assertor T(a, ;v):pas := pas
To manipulate an assertor's queue, which is used for accumulating interaction records,
we dene the following operations: head(queue T(a)), enqueue(m;queue T(a)),
dequeue(queue T(a)) and replaceHead(queue T(a);m).
 The expression head(queue T(a)) returns the head element of queue queue T(a).
 The expression enqueue(m;queue T(a)) denotes queue T(a) := queue T(a)km,
which means m is added at the tail of queue queue T(a).
 The expression dequeue(queue T(a)) denotes queue T(a) := tail(queue T(a)),
which means the head of queue queue T(a) is removed.Chapter 3 Protocol 74
 The expression replaceHead(queue T(a);m) denotes queue T(a) :=
mktail(queue T(a)), which means the head of queue queue T(a) is replaced by
m.
We use send and receive pseudo-statements. Informally, send(m;a1;a2) inserts a mes-
sage m into the communication channel from actor a1 to actor a2, and receive(m;a1;a2)
removes m from the channel. Formally, send, receive pseudo-statements act as state
transformers and are dened as follows.
 If k is the set of message channels of a state h:::;ki, then the expression
send(m;a1;a2) denotes the state h:::;k0i, where6 k0(a1;a2) = k(a1;a2)fmg and
k0(ai;aj) = k(ai;aj);8(ai;aj) 6= (a1;a2).
 If k is the set of message channels of a state h:::;ki, then the expression
receive(m;a1;a2) denotes the state h:::;k0i, where k0(a1;a2) = k(a1;a2) 	 fmg,
and k0(ai;aj) = k(ai;aj);8(ai;aj) 6= (a1;a2).
Having dened the system state space and ASM rules, we now introduce the rules for
assertors (the senders and receivers), provenance stores and the coordinator. These rules
precisely dene these actors' internal behaviour.
3.6.2 Assertor Rules in Exchanging phase
An assertor's behaviour can be summarised in two phases Exchanging and Recording,
which are described in this section and Section 3.6.3, respectively.
The sender and receiver in an interaction have dierent rules in the Exchanging phase
(Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13). The sender sends to the receiver an application message
app including application data (d), an interaction key () and the sender's ownlink (aps).
Both actors document the exchange of app by producing a record, which is accumulated
in the queue (queue T). This buering of interaction records is designed to meet Ecient
Recording. It reduces the performance penalty upon the application by allowing an actor
to send interaction records when convenient.
We note that in order to re transition prepare record, the sender's viewlink must be
equal to the receiver's defaultlink. This has been assumed when we explained Figure
3.9. The viewlink can be built into the sender at deployment time, or transferred to the
sender in a response message from the receiver.
In this phase, an assertor also initialises several tables. For example, when an assertor's
default link is initialised in transitions send app and receive app, it is equal to the
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send app(as;ar;aps;d;r) :
//triggered when d, produced by a function
//described by r, is to be sent by as to ar
! f
   newIdentifier(as;ar);
send(app(d;;aps);as;ar);
pas   createPA(as;;d;r);
assertor T(as;;S) := hINIT;aps;aps;?;pasi;
log T(as;;S) := hFALSE;?i;
g
prepare record(as;ar;) :
assertor T(as;;S):str = INIT^
assertor T(as;;S):vl = assertor T(ar;;R):dl
! f
l   assertor T(as;;S):vl;
pas   assertor T(as;;S):pas;
enqueue(record(;S;as;l;pas);queue T(as));
assertor T(as;;S):str := READY;
g
Figure 3.12: The Sender's rules in exchanging phase
receive app(as;ar;aps;d;;vl) :
app(d;;vl) 2 k(as;ar) ^ assertor T(ar;;R):str = ?
! f
receive(app(d;;vl);as;ar);
pas   createPA(ar;;d;?);
enqueue(record(;R;ar;vl;pas);queue T(ar));
assertor T(ar;;R) := hREADY;aps;aps;vl;pasi;
log T(ar;;R) := hFALSE;?i;
// business logic
g
Figure 3.13: The Receiver's rules in exchanging phase
Function newIdentifier(as;ar) creates a globally unique interaction key. This function
takes the identities of the sender and the receiver as inputs and returns a new interaction
key represented by a tuple, consisting of assertor identities and a locally unique counter.
Since it is the sender that creates a new interaction key, the local counter is maintained
by the sender of an interaction.
Denition
newIdentifier : SID  RID ! IK
newIdentifier(as;ar) :
lc(as) := lc(as) + 1;
return has;ar;lc(as)i;
Function createPA(a;;d;r) species how p-assertions are produced. It takes an as-
sertor identity (a), an interaction key (), application data (d), and a business logic
description (r) as input and returns a set of p-assertions documenting the interaction
() in which d is transferred.
6We use the operators  and 	 to denote union and dierence on bags.Chapter 3 Protocol 76
Denition
createPA : A  IK  DATA  REL ! P(PA)
createPA(a;;d;r) :
pas   if r = ?
fi-pa(;d)g;
fi-pa(;d);rel-pa(r;h;Si;cids)g;
where cids = fhcl;0;Ri j 0 2 cause(a;;r) and cl = assertor T(a;0;R):olg;
return pas;
In createPA(a;;d;r), the created p-assertions include an interaction p-assertion doc-
umenting the exchange of an application message that contains  and d. If d is the
consequence of receiving other messages (i.e., r 6= ?), then according to transition
send app, the sender must make a relationship p-assertion to capture the causal connec-
tions between these messages. A function cause(a;;r) is used to nd the interaction
keys of cause interactions when creating a relationship p-assertion. An assertor may
create other application dependent p-assertions, which are not shown in the denition.
Denition
cause : A  IK  REL ! P(IK)
cause(a;;r) :
causeIK  IK;
//This function is application specic.
//Let  represent the eect interaction and causeIK represent the set of cause
//interactions, which are all related to a same relationship described by r at
//assertor a.
return causeIK;
3.6.3 Assertor Rules in Recording phase
In Recording phase, an assertor sends queued record messages to a provenance store and
takes remedial actions in response to timeouts. To facilitate presentation, we assume
each assertor employs a Recording Manager (RM), which monitors the assertor's queue
and submits record messages to a provenance store. The behaviour of RM is specied
in Figure 3.14.
 Updating causelinks. Transition pre check checks the record message at the head
of queue (queue T(a)) and updates causelinks in all relationship p-assertions in-
cluded in that message. A log table (log T) maintains a history of the use of
alternative provenance stores for each interaction. If the log table shows that an
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pre check(a;;v;vl;pas) :
queue T(a) 6= ; ^ record(;v;a;vl;pas) = head(queue T(a)) ^ assertor T(a;;v):str = READY
! f
1 for each pa 2 pas, such that pa = rel-pa(r0;h;vi;cids0)
2 do for each cid 2 cids0
3 do hcl0;0;v0i   cid;
4 if (log T(a;0;v0):changed), then
5 cid0   hlog T(a;0;v0):aps;0;v0i;
6 cids0 := cids0 	 fcidg  fcid0g;
7 replaceHead(queue T(a);record(;v;a;vl;pas));
8 assertor T(a;;v) := hSEND;;;;pasi;
g
send record(a;;v;vl;pas;t) :
queue T(a) 6= ; ^ record(;v;a;vl;pas) = head(queue T(a)) ^ assertor T(a;;v):str = SEND
! f
aps   assertor T(a;;v):ol;
send(record(;v;a;vl;pas);a;aps);
timer T(a;;v;aps) := hENABLED;ti;
assertor T(a;;v):str := SENT;
g
timer click(a;;v;aps) :
timer T(a;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(a;;v;aps):to > 0
! f
timer T(a;;v;aps):to := timer T(a;;v;aps):to   1;
g
timeout ack(a;;v;aps) :
timer T(a;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(a;;v;aps):to = 0 ^ rc(a;;v) > 0
! f
timer T(a;;v;aps) := hDISABLED;0i;
rc(a;;v) := rc(a;;v)   1;
a0
ps   random(psList(a));
log T(a;;v) := hTRUE;a0
psi;
assertor T(a;;v) := hSEND;;a0
ps;;i;
g
receive ack(a;aps;;v) :
ack(;v) 2 k(aps;a)
! f
receive(ack(;v);aps;a);
if (timer T(a;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(a;;v;aps):to > 0), then
dequeue(queue T(a));
timer T(a;;v;aps) := hDISABLED;0i;
assertor T(a;;v):str := ACKED;
g
post check(a;ac;;v) :
assertor T(a;;v):str = ACKED
! f
if (log T(a;;v):changed = TRUE), then
aps   assertor T(a;;v):ol;
adps   assertor T(a;;v):vl;
send(repair(;v;adps;aps);a;ac);
assertor T(a;;v):str := OK;
g
Figure 3.14: Assertor's rules in recording phaseChapter 3 Protocol 78
(i.e., log T(a;0;v0):changed is true), then the corresponding causelink is updated
(Line 6). Since the set of p-assertions in the record message may be altered with
causelink updated, we need to update the current set of p-assertions maintained
in assertor T(a;;v) (Line 8) as well as the head of the queue (Line 7).
 Submitting a record message. RM sends a record message to a provenance store
and sets timeout when waiting for an ack message (transition send record).
 Resubmitting a record message. If RM does not receive an ack when the time-
out expires (transition timeout ack), then it infers that failures may have oc-
curred. In this case, it uses an alternative store to resend the message. Function
random(psList(a)) returns an alternative store's identity, selected from a list of
candidates. There can be various ways of selecting a store from a list of stores.
Here we randomly select one to use. A retry counter rc has been introduced to
limit the number of reattempts. We will detail the use of the counter when we
model failures in Section 3.6.6.
 Updating log table. If an alternative store was used to record a record message,
RM sets log T(a;;v):changed to TRUE and log T(a;;v):aps to the identity of
the alternative store (transition timeout ack). This information is to be used for
updating causelinks as described above.
 Receiving acknowledgement. If the timeout has not expired upon the receipt of ack
message, then RM eliminates the acknowledged record from the queue (transition
receive ack).
 Requesting to update viewlinks. If an alternative store was used, RM needs to
request the coordinator to update the opposite assertor's viewlink by sending a
repair message (transition post check).
We note that the FIFO property of the queue guarantees successful update of causelinks
because transitions send app and receive app enforce that an assertor always makes
p-assertions about a cause interaction, in which it receives a message, before an eect
interaction, in which it sends another message as consequence of the received messages.
This implies that the interaction record about a cause interaction is always placed into
the queue before that about the eect interaction. Therefore, by checking log table log T
before sending record messages, causelinks can be updated successfully. Although current
model implies that there is only one queue per assertor, it can be relaxed by adding a
process identier to queue T(a). Then, each process that an assertor participates in
utilises a queue to permit parallel recording, though sequential recording still remains
for each process.Chapter 3 Protocol 79
3.6.4 Provenance Store Rules
Figure 3.15 gives provenance store's rules. A provenance store replies an ack message
only after it has processed a record message (transition receive record). A store checks
if it has recorded p-assertions about a given interaction before processing the record
message. This prevents processing duplicate record messages.
The notation v in transition receive update stands for the opposite view in an inter-
action. For example, if v is the view of the sender, then v represents the view of the
receiver.
We note that table vlstate T(aps;;v), indicating the state of a viewlink: DEFAULT or
UPDATED, is only used to facilitate our proof in the next chapter.
receive record(a;aps;;v;vl;pas) :
record(;v;a;vl;pas) 2 k(a;aps)
! f
receive(record(;v;a;vl;pas);a;aps);
if (store T(aps;;v):pas = ;); then
store T(aps;;v) := ha;;pasi;
if (store T(aps;;v):vl = ?); then
store T(aps;;v):vl := vl;
vlstate T(aps;;v) := DEFAULT;
send(ack(;v);aps;a);
g
receive update(aps;ac;;v;v;ol) :
update(;v;ol) 2 k(ac;aps)
! f
receive(update(;v;ol);ac;aps);
store T(aps;;v):vl := ol;
vlstate T(aps;;v) := UPDATED;
send(uack(;v);aps;ac);
g
Figure 3.15: Provenance store's rules
Since a provenance store may receive an update and a record message regarding a same
interaction in any sequence, to achieve requirement Viewlink Accuracy, the viewlink
obtained from record must NOT overwrite any existing one which may come from an
update.
3.6.5 Coordinator Rules
Coordinator's rules are shown in Figure 3.16. Transition receive repair is triggered
when the coordinator receives a repair request. If there exists request information from
the opposite view with regard to the same interaction, this means the coordinator has
received another repair message (detailed in Section 3.5.3). In this case, the coordinator
replaces one assertor's destination store with the other's ownlink (Lines 6 and 7 in tran-
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coordinator is ready to dispatch two update messages to their respective new destination
stores by setting update status to UPDATE.
receive repair(a;adps;ac;;v;v;ol) :
repair(;v;adps;ol) 2 k(a;ac)
! f
1 receive(repair(;v;adps;ol);a;ac);
2 if (coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i); then
3 coord T(ac;;v) := hadps;oli;
4 if (coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i); then
5 a0
dps   coord T(ac;;v):ol;
6 coord T(ac;;v) := ha0
dps;i;
7 coord T(ac;;v) := hol;i;
8 update T(ac;;v;ol) := UPDATE;
9 aps   coord T(ac;;v):adps;
10 update T(ac;;v;aps) := UPDATE;
g
send update(ac;;v;aps;t) :
update T(ac;;v;aps) = UPDATE
! f
ol   coord T(ac;;v):ol;
send(update(;v;ol);ac;aps);
update T(ac;;v;aps) := WAIT;
timer T(ac;;v;aps) := hENABLED;ti;
g
timer click(ac;;v;aps) :
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(ac;;v;aps):to > 0
! f
timer T(ac;;v;aps):to := timer T(ac;;v;aps):to   1;
g
timeout uack(ac;;v;aps) :
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(ac;;v;aps):to = 0 ^ rc(ac;;v) > 0
! f
update T(ac;;v;aps) := UPDATE;
timer T(ac;;v;aps) := hDISABLED;0i;
rc(ac;;v) := rc(ac;;v)   1;
g
receive uack(aps;ac;;v) :
uack(;v) 2 k(aps;ac)
! f
receive(uack(;v);aps;ac);
if (timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(ac;;v;aps):to > 0), then
timer T(ac;;v;aps) := hDISABLED;0i;
update T(ac;;v;aps) := UPDATED;
g
Figure 3.16: Coordinator's rules
The coordinator sends an update message to a destination store and sets timeout when
waiting for the acknowledgement uack (transition send update). The coordinator also
uses rc to count the number of retries to avoid innite message retransmissions (transi-
tion timeout uack). We will detail the use of the counter in Section 3.6.6.
In the current design, we do not remove request information maintained in the coordi-
nator. Request information with regard to an interaction can only be eliminated after
the coordinator has successfully updated the provenance store in each view of the in-
teraction. If there exists request information about only one view, then the coordinator
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Given that an assertor sends a repair message within nite time (due to the use of time-
outs), the coordinator can remove any request information with corresponding update
status being UPDATED after a reasonably long period of time.
3.6.6 Modelling Failures
After formalising the protocol in a failure-free environment, this section considers As-
sumptions 1 and 3. We extend the system state space (Figure 3.17) and revise or add
transitions to the ASM (Figures 3.18 to 3.20.). Section 2.8.1 has introduced the common
approach to modelling failures, which inspires us. Our approach is also similar to [121],
where an ASM is used to model crash failures and communication omissions.
We note that the protocol formalised in the previous sections can be used for implemen-
tation whilst the extended system state space and transitions introduced in this section
will never be explicitly implemented; they are just a means to be able to evaluate pro-
tocol properties [70, 69], which will be done in the following chapters.
CRASH = PID ! Bool (Set of PS Crash Tables)
LOST = A  PID ! Bag(M) (Set of Message Loss Tables)
FC = IK ! N (Set of Global Failure Counters)
C0 = C  CRASH  LOST  FC (Set of Congurations)
Characteristic Variables:
crash T 2 CRASH, lost 2 LOST, fc 2 FC, c0 2 C0
Initial State of Conguration:
c0
i = hci;crash Ti;losti;fcii
where:
crash Ti = aps  FALSE, losti = aaps  ;, fci =   0
Figure 3.17: Extended system state space
In Figure 3.17, we use PS Crash Table (crash T 2 CRASH) to model the state of
a provenance store: crashing (TRUE) or normal (FALSE). The table is initialised as
FALSE.
A lost table (lost 2 LOST) maintains messages that are omitted by communication
channels. Since message retransmissions can lead to duplicate messages, which can also
be omitted by channels, we represent the lost table as a bag of messages between a pair
of actors. In order to simplify rules, lost(a1;a2) is dened to be bidirectional, containing
messages that are lost in either k(a1;a2) or k(a2;a1).
We use a Global Failure Counter (fc 2 FC) to limit the number of failures (store crashes
and channel omissions) that may occur regarding an interaction. Intuitively, it is realistic
to experience a nite number of store crashes and message losses when an assertor is
recording an interaction record and when the coordinator is updating a store. This
counter is initialised with a natural number by the sender of an interaction (Figure 3.18).
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and msg loss channel in Figures 3.19 and 3.20). This counter is crucial to the proof of
the protocol's termination property in the next chapter.
send app(as;ar;aps;d;r;n) :
//triggered when d, produced by a function
//described by r, is to be sent by as to ar
! f
   newIdentifier(as;ar);
send(app(d;;aps);as;ar);
pas   createPA(as;;d;r);
assertor T(as;;S) := hINIT;aps;aps;?;pasi;
log T(as;;S) := hFALSE;?i;
fc() = n;
g
Figure 3.18: Extended sender's rules
receive record(a;aps;;v;vl;pas) :
record(;v;a;vl;pas) 2 k(a;aps) ^ :crash T(aps)
! f
receive(record(;v;a;vl;pas);a;aps);
if (store T(aps;;v):pas = ;); then
store T(aps;;v) := ha;;pasi;
if (store T(aps;;v):vl = ?); then
store T(aps;;v):vl := vl;
vlstate T(aps;;v) := DEFAULT;
send(ack(;v);aps;a);
g
receive update(aps;ac;;v;v;ol) :
update(;v;ol) 2 k(ac;aps) ^ :crash T(aps)
! f
receive(update(;v;ol);ac;aps);
store T(aps;;v):vl := ol;
vlstate T(aps;;v) := UPDATED;
send(uack(;v);aps;ac);
g
crash(;aps) :
fc() > 0 ^ :crash T(aps)
! f
crash T(aps) := TRUE;
fc() := fc()   1;
g
restart(aps) :
crash T(aps) = TRUE
! f
crash T(aps) := FALSE;
g
Figure 3.19: Extended provenance store's rules
With the extended system state space, we revise provenance store rules, as shown in
Figure 3.19. A new guard, :crash T(aps), is added to transitions receive record and
receive update to ensure that they are only red when the store is not crashing. Tran-
sitions crash and restart simulate store crash and restart events, respectively.
We have introduced a retry counter rc, whose value is decreased by 1 after each retry
attempt in transitions timeout ack (Figure 3.14) and timeout uack (Figure 3.16). Since
current formalisation does not consider the case where the counter reaches 0, we stateChapter 3 Protocol 83
msg loss pstore(aps;a;;m) :
fc() > 0 ^ crash T(aps) ^ m 2 k(a;aps)
! f
k(a;aps) := k(a;aps) 	 fmg;
lost(a;aps) := lost(a;aps)  fmg;
fc() := fc()   1;
g
msg loss channel(aps;a;;m) :
fc() > 0 ^ (m 2 k(a;aps) _ m 2 k(aps;a))
! f
if (m 2 k(a;aps)); then
k(a;aps) := k(a;aps) 	 fmg;
lost(a;aps) := lost(a;aps)  fmg;
else
k(aps;a) := k(aps;a) 	 fmg;
lost(a;aps) := lost(a;aps)  fmg;
fc() := fc()   1;
g
Figure 3.20: Communication channel's rules
Assumption 11 in order to preserve the protocol's correctness. Under Assumption 11,
transitions timeout ack or timeout uack is always executed whenever there is a timeout
event.
Assumption 11. For any a, ac,  and v, rc(a;;v) and rc(ac;;v) are always greater
than 0.
Figure 3.20 species rules for communication channels. As far as distributed system
modelling is concerned, it is unrealistic to consider that messages in transit on a com-
munication link remain present if the destination of the communication link exhibits a
failure. Transition msg loss pstore models that any message sent to a crashing store is
omitted in channel. Transition msg loss channel species that messages are lost in the
channel to/from a provenance store. These transitions remove a message from channel,
place it in the lost table and then decrease Global Failure Counter by 1.
3.7 Discussion
This section discusses several issues regarding the design and formalisation of F-PReP.
Since no system wide clock exists in distributed systems, F-PReP does not assume any
global time; all ordering is based on local time, as perceived by a given component
(an assertor, a provenance store or the coordinator) in the system. Each can cope
with messages received from other sites in any order. In addition, there is an ordering
requirement to enable causelink update: an assertor must enqueue the interaction record
about a cause interaction before the interaction record about the eect interaction, as
explained in Section 3.4.Chapter 3 Protocol 84
F-PReP uses timeout to detect potential failures. An assertor selects an alternative store
to record its interaction record if an acknowledgement is not received from the original
store before a timeout. The presence of a timeout however cannot tell an assertor if
the original store has processed a message. This implies that the original store may
still receive and record the assertor's interaction record, leading to duplicate viewlinks
or causelinks recorded in that store (as exemplied in Figures 3.21, 3.22). This would
aect documentation retrievability, which we will discuss in Chapter 5.
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Figure 3.21: Duplicate viewlink in PS1
The formalisation of a timeout is designed to be an abstract way of detecting a potential
failure in order to trigger the remedial actions. In practice, the triggering condition is
not necessarily limited to the event of a timeout. For example, it can be a failure to
connect to a provenance store and can also be the receipt of a response message with
a fault code indicating any exception thrown in the provenance store. The occurrences
of these events do not guarantee successful recording of documentation in a provenance
store, therefore remedial actions should also be taken.
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Figure 3.22: Duplicate viewlink in PS1 and PS2
Although an alternative store is always chosen in the presence of a timeout event in the
formalisation, the retransmission policy can be congured in practice. For example, an
interaction record can be resent to the same provenance store for certain times before
using an alternative store.Chapter 3 Protocol 85
In the formalisation, we assumed that a retry counter (rc(a;;v) and rc(ac;;v)) is
always greater than 0 so that transitions timeout ack and timeout uack are always
triggered whenever there is a timeout. We now discuss the case where the counter
reaches 0. The solution is to employ a local store at the assertor and coordinator's site,
which we will detail in Chapter 6. If rc(a;;v) reaches 0 before the interaction record
is successfully recorded in a provenance store, the assertor can checkpoint its recording
state by storing all outstanding interaction records to its local store and then resubmit
them at a later stage. If rc(ac;;v) reaches 0, the coordinator stops resending message
update and persistently keeps the request information, i.e., the identity of the destination
store and the requesting assertor's ownlink in the coordinator's local store. It can resend
the update message later.
F-PReP is based on PASOA's approach to modelling process documentation and it
extends PReP by adding fault-tolerant functionalities. The advantages of this add-
on approach include separation of concerns and Agile style development, which enable
us to separately develop and quickly test the core and fault-tolerant functionalities of
a recording protocol. However, we have to be fully compatible with previous design
of PReP. Instead, we can design our recording protocol that copes with failures from
scratch. This requires an in-depth understanding of both process documentation and
complex system behaviour that may appear in the presence of failures, which adds
diculty to our research given strict time constraints.
Our ASM-based formalisation provides a precise and implementation independent means
of specifying the protocol. Firstly, it sketches the essence of the protocol and accurately
denes required actor's behaviour with unnecessary message elds or messages removed.
Secondly, it promotes a rigorous design of the protocol and helps us better understand
the complex behaviour of actors (assertors, provenance stores and the coordinator) in
the presence of failures. With such a formal description, we have successfully identied
several deciencies in the early design of the protocol. For example, a deciency in
previous design was that the viewlink provided by an update message can be overwritten
by the viewlink from a record message (i.e., we did not check if store T(aps;;v):vl is ?
in rule receive record). Thirdly, the code-like specication is independent of any given
programming language or implementation. This enables our protocol to be implemented
using dierent languages and technologies.
3.8 Summary
We now summarise the contributions of this chapter:
Firstly, we described a generic protocol, F-PReP, for recording documentation (i.e.,
interaction records) in the presence of failures (provenance store crashes and commu-
nication omission failures). F-PReP also species remedial actions when a failure (i.e.,Chapter 3 Protocol 86
a timeout event observed by an assertor) occurs. Remedial actions include basic fault-
tolerant mechanisms such as message retransmission and the use of alternative prove-
nance stores. F-PReP uses a local queue and log table to enable causelink update. To
facilitate viewlink update, a coordinator is introduced to update incorrect viewlinks so
that multiple provenance stores are still properly connected.
Secondly, we formalised F-PReP using an ASM approach. We began with a formalisa-
tion without consideration of failures. Then we modelled failures by extending system
state space and adding extra transitions. With such a formal description, we have suc-
cessfully identied several deciencies in the early design of the protocol. Since code-like
specication is independent of any given programming language or implementation, our
protocol can be implemented using dierent languages and technologies.
Next chapter will formalise requirements Guaranteed Recording, Causelink Ac-
curacy and Viewlink Accuracy as correctness properties and prove that F-PReP
preserves these properties. Chapter 6 will introduce the implementation of F-PReP and
evaluate its performance demonstrating that it meets requirement Efficient Record-
ing.
3.9 Appendix: ASM Rules Summary
We have presented ASM rules in Sections 3.6.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.4, and 3.6.5. We also extended
the ASM with additional rules in Section 3.6.6. We now summarise the complete ASM
rules in Figures 3.23, 3.24, 3.26, 3.27 and 3.28, which will be referred to when we prove
the correctness of the protocol in the next chapter. Numbers are annotated in rules,
which will be used when we prove the protocol's termination property in Section 4.1.Chapter 3 Protocol 87
send app(as;ar;aps;d;r;n) :
//triggered when d, produced by a function
//described by r, is to be sent by as to ar
! f
   newIdentifier(as;ar);
send(app(d;;aps);as;ar);
pas   createPA(as;;d;r);
assertor T(as;;S) := hINIT;aps;aps;?;pasi;
log T(as;;S) := hFALSE;?i;
fc() = n;
g annotation not applicable
prepare record(as;ar;) :
assertor T(as;;S):str = INIT^
assertor T(as;;S):vl = assertor T(ar;;R):dl
! f
l   assertor T(as;;S):vl;
pas   assertor T(as;;S):pas;
enqueue(record(;S;as;l;pas);queue T(as));
assertor T(as;;S):str := READY; -4
g overall: -4
Figure 3.23: The Sender's rules in exchanging phase
receive app(as;ar;aps;d;;vl) :
app(d;;vl) 2 k(as;ar) ^ assertor T(ar;;R):str = ?
! f
receive(app(d;;vl);as;ar);
pas   createPA(ar;;d;?);
enqueue(record(;R;ar;vl;pas);queue T(ar));
assertor T(ar;;R) := hREADY;aps;aps;vl;pasi;
log T(ar;;R) := hFALSE;?i;
// business logic
g annotation not applicable
Figure 3.24: The Receiver's rules in exchanging phaseChapter 3 Protocol 88
pre check(a;;v;vl;pas) :
queue T(a) 6= ; ^ record(;v;a;vl;pas) = head(queue T(a)) ^ assertor T(a;;v):str = READY
! f
for each pa 2 pas, such that pa = rel-pa(r0;h;vi;cids0)
do for each cid 2 cids0
do hcl0;0;v0i   cid;
if (log T(a;0;v0):changed), then
cid0   hlog T(a;0;v0):aps;0;v0i;
cids0 := cids0 	 fcidg  fcid0g;
replaceHead(queue T(a);record(;v;a;vl;pas));
assertor T(a;;v) := hSEND;;;;pasi; -4
g overall: -4
send record(a;;v;vl;pas;t) :
queue T(a) 6= ; ^ record(;v;a;vl;pas) = head(queue T(a)) ^ assertor T(a;;v):str = SEND
! f
aps   assertor T(a;;v):ol;
send(record(;v;a;vl;pas);a;aps); +4
timer T(a;;v;aps) := hENABLED;ti; +1
assertor T(a;;v):str := SENT; -8
g overall: -3
timer click(a;;v;aps) :
timer T(a;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(a;;v;aps):to > 0
! f
timer T(a;;v;aps):to := timer T(a;;v;aps):to   1; -1/t
g overall: -1/t
timeout ack(a;;v;aps) :
timer T(a;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(a;;v;aps):to = 0 ^ rc(a;;v) > 0
! f
timer T(a;;v;aps) := hDISABLED;0i;
rc(a;;v) := rc(a;;v)   1; -10
a0
ps   random(psList(a));
log T(a;;v) := hTRUE;a0
psi;
assertor T(a;;v) := hSEND;;a0
ps;;i; //assert: was SENT +8
g overall: -2
receive ack(a;aps;;v) :
ack(;v) 2 k(aps;a)
! f
receive(ack(;v);aps;a); -2
if (timer T(a;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(a;;v;aps):to > 0), then
dequeue(queue T(a));
timer T(a;;v;aps) := hDISABLED;0i; -n
assertor T(a;;v):str := ACKED; //assert: was SENT -2
g overall: -4-n or -2
post check(a;ac;;v) :
assertor T(a;;v):str = ACKED
! f
if (log T(a;;v):changed = TRUE), then
aps   assertor T(a;;v):ol;
adps   assertor T(a;;v):vl;
send(repair(;v;adps;aps);a;ac); +18
assertor T(a;;v):str := OK; -22
g overall: -22 or -4
Figure 3.25: Assertor's rules in recording phaseChapter 3 Protocol 89
receive record(a;aps;;v;vl;pas) :
record(;v;a;vl;pas) 2 k(a;aps) ^ :crash T(aps)
! f
receive(record(;v;a;vl;pas);a;aps); -4
if (store T(aps;;v):pas = ;); then
store T(aps;;v) := ha;;pasi;
if (store T(aps;;v):vl = ?); then
store T(aps;;v):vl := vl;
vlstate T(aps;;v) := DEFAULT;
send(ack(;v);aps;a); +2
g overall: -2
receive update(aps;ac;;v;v;ol) :
update(;v;ol) 2 k(ac;aps) ^ :crash T(aps)
! f
receive(update(;v;ol);ac;aps); -4
store T(aps;;v):vl := ol;
vlstate T(aps;;v) := UPDATED;
send(uack(;v);aps;ac); +2
g overall: -2
crash(;aps) :
fc() > 0 ^ :crash T(aps)
! f
crash T(aps) := TRUE; +1
fc() := fc()   1; -2
g overall: -1
restart(aps) :
crash T(aps) = TRUE
! f
crash T(aps) := FALSE; -1
g overall: -1
Figure 3.26: Provenance store's rules
msg loss pstore(aps;a;;m) :
fc() > 0 ^ crash T(aps) ^ m 2 k(a;aps)
! f
k(a;aps) := k(a;aps) 	 fmg; - msg measure(m)
lost(a;aps) := lost(a;aps)  fmg; +2
fc() := fc()   1; -2
g overall: - msg measure(m)
msg loss channel(aps;a;;m) :
fc() > 0 ^ (m 2 k(a;aps) _ m 2 k(aps;a))
! f
if (m 2 k(a;aps)); then
k(a;aps) := k(a;aps) 	 fmg; - msg measure(m)
lost(a;aps) := lost(a;aps)  fmg; +2
else
k(aps;a) := k(aps;a) 	 fmg; - msg measure(m)
lost(a;aps) := lost(a;aps)  fmg; +2
fc() := fc()   1; -2
g overall: - msg measure(m)
Figure 3.27: Communication channel's rulesChapter 3 Protocol 90
receive repair(a;adps;ac;;v;v;ol) :
repair(;v;adps;ol) 2 k(a;ac)
! f
receive(repair(;v;adps;ol);a;ac); -18
if (coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i); then
coord T(ac;;v) := hadps;oli;
if (coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i); then
a0
dps   coord T(ac;;v):ol;
coord T(ac;;v) := ha0
dps;i;
coord T(ac;;v) := hol;i;
update T(ac;;v;ol) := UPDATE;//assert: was UPDATE, WAIT or UPDATED +0, +6 or +8
aps   coord T(ac;;v):adps;
update T(ac;;v;aps) := UPDATE; +8
g overall: -18, -10, -4 or -2
send update(ac;;v;aps;t) :
update T(ac;;v;aps) = UPDATE
! f
ol   coord T(ac;;v):ol;
send(update(;v;ol);ac;aps); +4
update T(ac;;v;aps) := WAIT; -6
timer T(ac;;v;aps) := hENABLED;ti; +1
g overall: -1
timer click(ac;;v;aps) :
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(ac;;v;aps):to > 0
! f
timer T(ac;;v;aps):to := timer T(ac;;v;aps):to   1; -1/t
g overall: -1/t
timeout uack(ac;;v;aps) :
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(ac;;v;aps):to = 0 ^ rc(ac;;v) > 0
! f
update T(ac;;v;aps) := UPDATE; //assert: was WAIT +6
timer T(ac;;v;aps) := hDISABLED;0i;
rc(ac;;v) := rc(ac;;v)   1; -10
g overall: -4
receive uack(aps;ac;;v) :
uack(;v) 2 k(aps;ac)
! f
receive(uack(;v);aps;ac); -2
if (timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED ^ timer T(ac;;v;aps):to > 0), then
timer T(ac;;v;aps) := hDISABLED;0i; -n
update T(ac;;v;aps) := UPDATED; //assert: was WAIT -2
g overall: -4-n or -2
Figure 3.28: Coordinator's rulesChapter 4
Protocol Analysis
In the previous chapter, we presented F-PReP and formalised it using an Abstract
State Machine (ASM). The documentation recorded using F-PReP is expected to meet
a number of requirements: Guaranteed Recording, Causelink Accuracy and
Viewlink Accuracy.
The contribution of this chapter is therefore the formal proof of the protocol's correct-
ness demonstrating that F-PReP meets these requirements. Specically, we show that
the sender and receiver's interaction records are guaranteed to be recorded in provenance
stores and the links in their interaction records are accurate. We also prove the termina-
tion of the protocol, which means the ASM executes a nite number of transitions. The
properties established in this chapter will be used as building blocks when we investigate
the entire retrievability of process documentation in the next chapter.
Recall that we have used tables to maintain link information, e.g., store T(aps;;v):vl,
assertor T(a;;v):ol and log T(a;;v):aps. To demonstrate Causelink Accuracy
and Viewlink Accuracy, we derive a number of equations between these tables.
In the proof, we establish various lemmas and invariants to facilitate the proof of a
property. Given an arbitrary valid conguration of the ASM, the proofs typically proceed
by induction on the length of the transitions that lead to the conguration, and by a
case analysis on the kind of transitions. This kind of proof has the advantages of being
systematic and not prone to error.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. We show the ASM terminates in Section
4.1. We formalise requirements Guaranteed Recording, Causelink Accuracy
and Viewlink Accuracy as properties and provide proof for them in Sections 4.2, 4.3
and 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the proof and concludes this chapter.
We note that all properties established in this chapter are preserved under Assump-
tion 11 (the retry counter of the assertor and coordinator is always greater than 0).
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This assumption ensures that transitions timeout ack and timeout uack are always red
whenever there is a timeout event.
4.1 Termination
According to the denition of interaction, an interaction involves the exchange of an
application message. After ring send app and receive app rules (Figures 3.23, 3.24), the
ASM generates a number of transitions to record documentation about the interaction.
We demonstrate that the ASM terminates with regard to one interaction. We dene the
termination property as follows.
Denition 12 (Termination). Termination is dened as the execution of a nite
number of ASM transitions (excluding send app and receive app) until there is no longer
any enabled transition.2
A conguration c is said to be reachable if there is a sequence of transitions t1;t2;:::;tn
from the initial conguration: ci 7!t1 c1 7!t2 c2::: 7!tn c.
In order to prove the termination property, we introduce a system measure that gives an
indication of how far the ASM is from completing its transitions. The system measure
is dened as follows.
Denition 13 (System Measure). For any reachable conguration, c, the system
measure of a conguration c is the sum of the table measures and message measures in
the system:
system measure(c)
= table measure(assertor T)
+ table measure(update T)
+ table measure(timer T)
+ table measure(crash T)
+ table measure(lost)
+ table measure(rc)
+ table measure(fc)
+
P
ai2A
P
aj2A
P
m2k(ai;aj) msg measure(m)
with
table measure(assertor T) =
P
a2A
P
2IK
P
v2VKmeasure(assertor T(a;;v):str)
such that
measure(INIT) = 40; measure(READY) = 36; measure(SEND) = 32,
measure(SENT) = 24; measure(ACKED) = 22; measure(OK) = 0
and
table measure(update T) =
P
2IK
P
v2VK
P
aps2PIDmeasure(update T(ac;;v;aps))Chapter 4 Protocol Analysis 93
such that
measure(UPDATE) = 8; measure(WAIT) = 2; measure(UPDATED) = 0
and
table measure(timer T) =
P
a2A
P
2IK
P
v2VK
P
aps2PIDtimer T(a;;v;aps):to=timer T(a;;v;aps):toi
1
and
table measure(crash T) =
P
aps2PIDmeasure(crash T(aps))
such that
measure(TRUE) = 1; measure(FALSE) = 0
and
table measure(lost) =
P
ai2A
P
aj2Ajlost(ai;aj)j  2
and
table measure(rc) =
P
a2A
P
2IK
P
v2VKrc(a;;v)  10
and
table measure(fc) =
P
2IKfc()  2
and
msg measure(record) = 4; msg measure(ack) = 2,
msg measure(repair) = 18; msg measure(update) = 4; msg measure(uack) = 2
2
Intuitively, the processing of a message can update a table, which in turn may trigger the
creation of new messages. The system measure of a conguration accounts for messages
and the contents of tables. The values for the component measures are chosen such
that the system measure of a conguration is always greater than that of any successor
conguration via transitions excluding send app and receive app. Pseudo statements in
rules are annotated with the change in system measure they cause in Figures 3.23, 3.24,
3.26, 3.27 and 3.28.
Lemma 14. For any reachable congurations c, c0 and for any transition t, such that t
leads from c to c0 and t is not send app or receive app, the following inequality holds:
0  system measure(c0) < system measure(c):
2
Proof. First, we note that the system measure of a conguration is always positive or
null (Denition 13). Second, the proof proceeds by an analysis of the dierent possible
1timer T(a;;v;aps):toi is the initial value of timer T(a;;v;aps):to.Chapter 4 Protocol Analysis 94
cases for transition t. We consider here the transition receive update. We compute the
system measure of the conguration after transition:
(1) An update message is consumed, hence the measure is decreased by 4;
(2) A uack message is inserted into channel, hence the measure is increased by 2.
As a result, after transition, the measure is decreased by 2, which proves the lemma.
Similar reasoning shows that the other transitions except send app or receive app also
cause the system measure to decrease strictly. The decrease has been clearly denoted
by the change in measures in Figures 3.23, 3.24, 3.26, 3.27 and 3.28.
2
Theorem 15 (Termination). For any reachable conguration, all transition paths
excluding send app and receive app terminate. 2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. Let us dene a successor relation on
the set of congurations; c2 is a successor of c1 if c2 is obtained from c1 by a transition
that diers from send app and receive app. With Lemma 14, the system measure of c1
is always larger than that of its successor conguration c2, which has a lower bound 0.
Therefore, we can conclude that there exists a successor conguration ck that does not
have a successor by executing a transition other than send app or receive app; ck is a
xed point of the successor relation. Given the xed point and the fact that every tran-
sition excluding send app and receive app decreases the system measure (Lemma 14),
we know the ASM can execute a nite number of transitions apart from send app and
receive app in all transition paths until it has not any enabled transition. Therefore, by
Denition 12, all transition paths that do not use send app and receive app terminate.
2
In the following sections, we will demonstrate that the protocol preserves properties
Guaranteed Recording, Causelink Accuracy and Viewlink Accuracy.
In our proof, we rely on case analysis either on its own or in the context of a proof by
induction to establish properties. Essentially, the rules of the ASM are analysed to show
that after any number of transitions the particular property still holds for the resulting
conguration of the state machine. The base case of the induction also requires us to
derive a lemma in the initial conguration. For simplication, we omit the parameters
of transitions except timer click(a;;v;aps) and timer click(ac;;v;aps), which have
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4.2 Guaranteed Recording
We now establish that the protocol meets requirement Guaranteed Recording, for-
mally expressed the following property:
Property 16 (Guaranteed Recording). For any a,  and v, the following implica-
tion holds when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If assertor T(a;;v):str 6= ?, then
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi;
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol and vl 6= ?.
2
Property 16 shows that an assertor's documentation about an interaction, i.e., assertor's
identity (a), viewlink (vl) and p-assertions (assertor T(a;;v):pas) will eventually be
recorded in a provenance store, i.e., store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi.
The precondition assertor T(a;;v):str 6= ? means that the assertor a has created an
interaction record about interaction , where it is in the view of v. Thus, when F-PReP
nishes recording the interaction record, the documentation ends up in a provenance
store.
To prove Property 16, we need to establish several relationships between the state of
an assertor (assertor T(a;;v):str) and other system components (from Lemma 17 to
Lemma 21). For example, we show that when the protocol terminates, assertor T(a;;v):str
is always in the state OK. We also show that if assertor T(a;;v):str is ACKED or OK,
then store T(aps;;v) has a record ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi.
We begin with the relationship between assertor T(a;;v):str and the state of protocol
messages.
Lemma 17. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and v, the following
implication holds:
If
_
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
record(;v;a;vl;pas) 2 k(a;aps)
record(;v;a;vl;pas) 2 lost(a;aps)
ack(a, ;v) 2 k(aps;a)
ack(a, ;v) 2 lost(a;aps)
then
assertor T(a;;v):str = SENT;
where vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl, pas = assertor T(a;;v):pas and aps =
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2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to INIT from ?. Therefore, the statement was preserved before the transition and
remains valid after the transition.
prepare record:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to READY from INIT. Therefore, the statement was preserved before the transition
and remains valid after the transition. In addition, record(;v;a;vl;pas) is inserted into
queue T(a), where vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl and pas = assertor T(a;;v):pas.
receive app:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to READY from ?. Therefore, the statement was preserved before the transition
and remains valid after the transition. In addition, record(;v;a;vl;pas) is inserted into
queue T(a), where vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl and pas = assertor T(a;;v):pas.
pre check:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to SEND from READY. Therefore, the statement was preserved before the transi-
tion and remains valid after the transition.
send record:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, record(;v;a;vl;pas)
is inserted into k(a;aps), where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. In addition,
assertor T(a;;v):str is set to SENT.
timeout ack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, an alternative store
a0
ps is selected, where a0
ps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. Therefore, assertor T(a;;v):ol is
changed, which makes the antecedent become false.
receive ack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, ack(a;;v) is re-
moved from k(aps;a), which preserves the statement.
post check:
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is set from ACKED to OK. Therefore, the statement was preserved before the transition
and remains valid after the transition.
receive record:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, record(;v;a;vl;pas)
is removed from k(a;aps) and ack(a;;v) is inserted to k(aps;a).
message loss pstore:
message loss channel:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions,
record(;v;a;vl;pas) or ack(a;;v) is removed from k(a;aps) or k(aps;a) and placed in
lost(a;aps).
2
After establishing the relationship between assertor T(a;;v):str and protocol mes-
sages, we now investigate the relationship between assertor T(a;;v):str and the state
of an assertor's timer.
Lemma 18. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and v, the following
implication holds:
^
(
timer T(a, ;v;aps):status = ENABLED
timer T(a, ;v;aps):to  0
i
assertor T(a;;v):str = SENT;
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. 2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
prepare record:
receive app:
pre check:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions,
timer T(a;;v;aps) is not aected and assertor T(a;;v):str is switched among states
?, INIT, READY and SEND. Therefore, the statement was preserved before these tran-
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send record:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition,
timer T(a;;v;aps):status is set to ENABLED, timer T(a;;v;aps):to is initialised, where
aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. In addition, assertor T(a;;v):str is set to SENT.
timer click(a;;v;aps):
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, timer T(a;;v;aps):to
is greater or equal to 0 and assertor T(a;;v):str is not aected.
timeout ack:
receive ack:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions,
timer T(a;;v;aps):status is set to DISABLED and timer T(a;;v;aps):to becomes 0.
Meanwhile, assertor T(a;;v):str is set to SEND or ACKED.
post check:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to OK from ACKED. Therefore, the statement was preserved before this transition
and remains valid after the transition.
2
Now we reveal the relationship between assertor T(a;;v):str and the assertor's local
queue.
Lemma 19. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and v, the following
implication holds:
assertor T(a;;v):str = READY;SEND or SENT, i
record(;v;a;vl;pas) 2 queue T(a);
where vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl and pas = assertor T(a;;v):pas. 2
Proof.
We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the conguration,
and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since table assertor T(a;;v) and queue T(a) are both empty. We now
consider only those transitions that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to INIT and no message is enqueued.
prepare record:
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is set to READY from INIT, and record(;v;a;vl;pas) is inserted into queue T(a), where
vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl and pas = assertor T(a;;v):pas.
receive app:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to READY from ?, and record(;v;a;vl;pas) is inserted into queue T(a), where
vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl and pas = assertor T(a;;v):pas.
pre check:
After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str is set to SEND from READY, and
record(;v;a;vl;pas) still remains in queue T(a). If pas is modied to update causelinks,
same changes apply to assertor T(a;;v):pas. Therefore, pas is still equal to
assertor T(a;;v):pas.
send record:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions, the rst part
of the statement remains true and record(;v;a;vl;pas) is not aected. Therefore, the
statement is still preserved.
timeout ack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to SEND from SENT (Lemma 18) and record(;v;a;vl;pas) is not aected. There-
fore, the statement is still preserved.
receive ack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to ACKED from SENT (Lemma 17) and record(;v;a;vl;pas) is dequeued. There-
fore, the statement is still preserved.
post check:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to OK from ACKED. Therefore, the statement was preserved before this transition
and remains valid after the transition.
2
Lemma 20 states the nal state of an assertor after nishing recording its interaction
record.
Lemma 20. For any a,  and v, the following implication holds when the ASM termi-
nates at nal conguration:
If assertor T(a;;v):str 6= ?, then
assertor T(a;;v):str = OK:
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Proof.
When the ASM terminates, no more transition can be red. This implies that:
 assertor T(a;;v):str cannot be INIT. Otherwise, transition prepare record can
be red.
 queue T(a) is empty. Otherwise, assuming record(;v;a;vl;pas) = head(queue T(a)),
by Lemma 19, assertor T(a;;v):str can be READY, SEND or SENT. If it is
READY or SEND, transitions pre check or send record will be red. If it is SENT,
by Lemma 18, transitions timer click(a;;v;aps) or timeout ack will be red.
 assertor T(a;;v):str cannot be ACKED. Otherwise, transition post check will
be red.
Therefore, we can conclude that when the ASM terminates, assertor T(a;;v):str is
OK.
2
We now establish the relationship between assertor T(a;;v):str and the content of a
provenance store. Lemma 21 shows that the receipt of an acknowledgement message is
crucial to Guaranteed Recording property.
Lemma 21. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and v, then the following
holds:
If ack(;v) 2 k(aps;a) _ assertor T(a;;v):str = ACKED or OK, then
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi;
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol and vl 6= ?.
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty and no message is in channel. We now consider
only those transitions that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
prepare record:
receive app:
pre check:
send record:
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The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions, the antecedent
is false.
receive ack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, an ack(;v) is
removed from k(aps;a) and assertor T(a;;v):str may become ACKED.
post check:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str
is set to OK from ACKED. Therefore, the antecedent remains true, which still preserves
the statement.
receive record:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, a record(;v;a;vl;pas)
is received and removed from channel k(a;aps). By Lemma 17, vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl,
pas = assertor T(a;;v):pas and aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. Therefore, after this
transition, store T(aps;;v) becomes ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, where aps =
assertor T(a;;v):ol and vl 6= ?. In addition, an ack(;v) is inserted into channel
k(aps;a). Hence, the implication holds.
receive update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, the antecedent
remains unchanged and store T(aps;;v):vl is not empty.
msg loss pstore:
msg loss channel:
After these transitions, ack(;v) is removed from k(aps;a). Therefore, the antecedent
may remain unchanged or become false. In either case, the statement is sill valid.
2
Theorem 22 (Guaranteed Recording). F-PReP preserves Guaranteed Recording
property (Property 16). 2
Proof. By Lemma 20, we know that when the ASM terminates, assertor T(a;;v):str
is OK. Therefore, by Lemma 21, store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi,
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. Hence, when the ASM terminates, the implication
is preserved.
2
Theorem 22 shows that once documentation about an interaction is created, it will end
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4.3 Causelink Accuracy
Recall the description of relationship p-assertion: a relationship p-assertion made by an
assertor (i.e., the sender of an eect interaction) denes the causal relationship between
the eect interaction and several cause interactions (where the same assertor is the
receiver of a cause interaction). Only in the eect interaction (in which the relationship
p-assertion is produced) does the assertor need to update causelinks of the relationship
p-assertion to preserve Causelink Accuracy.
Property 23 (Causelink Accuracy). For any a,  and vl, let S and R be the sender
and receiver's viewkind, respectively, then the following implication holds when the ASM
terminates at nal conguration:
If assertor T(a;;S):str 6= ?, then
for any pa 2 store T(aps;;S):pas, such that pa = rel-pa(rel;h;Si;cids),
for any c 2 cids, let hcl0;0;Ri = c,
cl0 = assertor T(a;0;R):ol ^
store T(cl0;0;R) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;0;R):pasi
where aps = assertor T(a;;S):ol.
2
According to system state space (Section 3.6.1), this property species that when the
ASM terminates, any relationship p-assertion (rel-pa(rel;h;Si;cids)) recorded in the
sender's provenance store has a set of records (cids) about cause interactions and each
record has an accurate causelink (cl0 = assertor T(a;0;R):ol), pointing to the store
(store T(cl0;0;R)) which successfully recorded documentation about the corresponding
cause interaction.
According to transition pre check in Figure 3.25, causelink update takes place when the
assertor is ready to record an interaction record to a provenance store. Therefore, we
begin our proof by establishing that causelinks are already accurate in an interaction
record when being recorded to a provenance store (Lemmas 24 to 26).
Firstly, we show that whenever an assertor uses an alternative store, log T(a;;v):aps
keeps the alternative store's address, i.e., the current value of assertor T(a;;v):ol.
Lemma 24. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and v, the following
implication holds:
If log T(a;;v):changed = TRUE, then
log T(a;;v):aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol:
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since log T(a;;v) is empty. We now consider only those transitions that
may have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
receive app:
After these transitions, log T(a;;v):changed is set to FALSE. Therefore, the implica-
tion is preserved.
timeout ack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, log T(a;;v):changed
is set to TRUE and log T(a;;v):aps records the selected alternative store's address,
which is referred by assertor T(a;;v):ol.
2
Next, we reveal the relationship between assertor T(a;;S):str and assertor T(a;0;R):str,
where  and 0 represent the respective eect and cause interaction that relate to one
relationship.
Lemma 25. For any reachable conguration and for any a and , let S, R be the sender
and receiver's viewkind, respectively, the following implication holds:
If assertor T(a;;S):str 6= ?;INIT or READY, then
for any pa 2 assertor T(a;;S):pas, such that pa = rel-pa(rel;h;Si;cids),
for any c 2 cids, let hcl0;0;Ri = c,
assertor T(a, 0;R):str = ACKED or OK.
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since assertor T(a;;S):str is ?. We now consider only those transitions
that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
After these transitions, assertor T(a;;S):str is set to INIT from ?. Therefore, the
implication is preserved.
prepare record:
receive app:
After these transitions, assertor T(a;;S):str is set to READY from ? or INIT. There-
fore, the implication is preserved.Chapter 4 Protocol Analysis 104
pre check:
After this transition, assertor T(a;;S):str is set to SEND from READY and
record(;S;a;vl;pas) is the head of queue T(a). According to FIFO nature of a queue,
we can imply that record(0;R;a;vl0;pas0) has been dequeued, where vl0 and pas0 are
the viewlink and p-assertions with regard to the cause interaction. By Lemma 19,
assertor T(a;0;R):str 6= READY;SEND and SENT. Therefore, we can conclude that
assertor T(a;0;R):str = ACKED or OK.
send record:
timeout ack:
receive ack:
post check:
After these transitions, assertor T(a;;S):str is switched among states SEND, SENT,
ACKED and OK. Therefore, the antecedent remains true, which preserves the statement.
2
One important property (Lemma 26) to be established is that if assertor T(a;;S):str 6=
?;INIT or READY, then any interaction record about a cause interaction has been suc-
cessfully recorded in a store (i.e., store T(cl0;0;R) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;0;R):pasi).
Lemma 26. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and vl, let S, R be the
sender and receiver's viewkind, respectively, the following implication holds:
If assertor T(a;;S):str 6= ?;INIT or READY, then
for any pa 2 assertor T(a;;S):pas, such that pa = rel-pa(rel;h;Si;cids),
for any c 2 cids, let hcl0;0;Ri = c,
cl0 = assertor T(a;0;R):ol ^
store T(cl0;0;R) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;0;R):pasi
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since assertor T(a;;S):str is ?. We now consider only those transitions
that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
After these transitions, assertor T(a;;S):str is set to INIT from ?. Therefore, the
implication is preserved.
prepare record:
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After these transitions, assertor T(a;;S):str is set to READY from ? or INIT. There-
fore, the implication is preserved.
pre check:
After this transition, assertor T(a;;S):str is set to SEND from READY and cl0 may
be set to log T(a;0;R):aps depending on log T(a;0;R):changed. We now analyse
log T(a;0;R):changed.
 log T(a;0;R):changed = TRUE:
By Lemma 24, log T(a;0;R):aps is equal to assertor T(a;0;R):ol.
 log T(a;0;R):changed = FALSE:
According to function createPA (dened in Section 3.6.2), when relationship p-
assertion rel-pa(rel;h;Si;cids) is created, cl0 is set to assertor T(a;0;R):ol.
Based on the above analysis, we have cl0 = assertor T(a;0;R):ol. By Lemma 25,
assertor T(a;0;R):str = ACKED or OK. Hence with Lemma 21, store T(cl0;0;R) =
ha;vl;assertor T(a;0;R):pasi. Therefore, the statement is preserved.
send record:
timeout ack:
receive ack:
post check:
After these transitions, assertor T(a;;S):str is switched among states SEND, SENT,
ACKED and OK. Therefore, the antecedent remains true, which preserves the statement.
2
We are now ready to prove Causelink Accuracy property.
Theorem 27 (Causelink Accuracy). F-PReP preserves Causelink Accuracy prop-
erty (Property 23).
2
Proof. Lemma 20 shows that when the ASM terminates, assertor T(a;;S):str is OK.
By Lemma 26, all causelinks in assertor T(a;;S):pas are accurate when being recorded
in a provenance store. By Property 16, p-assertions in assertor T(a;;S):pas are even-
tually recorded in store T(aps;;S):paswhere aps = assertor T(a;;S):ol. Therefore,
this implication is preserved. 2
After establishing properties Guaranteed Recording and Causelink Accuracy,
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4.4 Viewlink Accuracy
Property 16 species that when the protocol terminates, an assertor's documentation
about an interaction is guaranteed to be recorded in its provenance store. Property 28
requires that a viewlink recorded in the store must be accurate, pointing to the store
where the other assertor in the same interaction recorded documentation about that
interaction.
Recall that notation v stands for the opposite view in an interaction. For example, if v
is the view of the sender, then v represents the view of the receiver.
Property 28 (Viewlink Accuracy). For any a,  and v, and for some a0 and vl0,
the following implication must hold when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If assertor T(a;;v):str 6= ?, then
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):ol.
2
Assertors a and a0 are involved in the same interaction but in dierent views. Therefore,
for any a in an interaction, there is some a0 in that interaction.
When the ASM terminates, any viewlink in an assertor's provenance store
(store T(aps;;v), such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol) points to a correct location
(store T(a0
ps;;v), such that a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):ol), where the other assertor in
the same interaction recorded p-assertions.
Our proof is divided into two parts. First, we establish that when the ASM terminates,
any viewlink in an assertor's provenance store points to the same location as referred
by the opposite assertor's ownlink (i.e., store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol).
Then we use Property 16 to show that store T(a0
ps;;v) =
ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, such that a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):ol.
Now we outline the proof of the rst part. According to F-PReP, an assertor may send a
repair request to the coordinator to update the other assertor's viewlink. The coordinator
records the request information in table coord T and maintains the update state in table
update T, indicating if the update has been successful. Since each interaction involves
two views and the assertor in each view may send one request to the coordinator, there
are three cases that we need to consider.
1. coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i:
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regard to an interaction when the ASM terminates. We will establish the rst
part of Property 28 for this case in Lemma 42.
2. coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i:
This is the case where the coordinator received one repair message from the assertor
of each view. We will establish the rst part of Property 28 for this case in Lemma
46.
3. coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i2:
This is the case where the coordinator received only one repair message. We will
establish the rst part of Property 28 for this case in Lemma 48.
In order to prove Property 28 in the rst case, we rstly establish several lemmas. Lemma
29 show that if the sender did not use any alternative store when recording its inter-
action record, the receiver's viewlink remains accurate (i.e., assertor T(ar;;R):vl =
assertor T(as;;S):ol).
Lemma 29. For any reachable conguration and for any as,  and for some ar, let
S, R be the sender and receiver's viewkind, respectively, then the following implication
holds:
If assertor T(as;;S):str 6= ? ^ log T(as;;S):changed = FALSE, then
_
(
app(d, ;aps) 2 k(as;ar)
assertor T(ar;;R):vl = assertor T(as;;S):ol
where aps = assertor T(as;;S):ol.
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since assertor T(a;;v):str is ?. We now consider only those transitions
that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to INIT and log T(as;;S):changed
is set to FALSE. Meanwhile, app(d;;aps) is inserted in k(as;ar), where aps is equal to
assertor T(as;;S):ol. Therefore, the implication is preserved.
prepare record:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to READY from INIT. Therefore, the
precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
2Due to the symmetric nature, this case is equal to coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) 6=
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receive app:
After this transition, app(d;;aps) is removed from k(as;ar) and assertor T(ar;;R):vl
is set to aps. Since aps is equal to assertor T(as;;S):ol (according to send app), the
implication holds.
pre check:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to READY from SEND. Therefore,
the precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
send record:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to SENT from SEND. Therefore, the
precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
timeout ack:
After this transition, log T(as;;S):changed is set to TRUE. Hence, the precondition
of the statement becomes false. Therefore, the implication is still preserved.
receive ack:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to ACKED from SENT (Lemma 17).
Therefore, the precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implica-
tion.
post check:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to OK from ACKED. Therefore, the
precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
2
Recall the denitions in Section 3.5.1, a default link refers to the provenance store that
an assertor initially used when recording an interaction record.
Lemma 30 shows that log T(a;;v):changed indicates if an assertor has used an alter-
native store. If not, the assertor's ownlink remains equal to its default link.
Lemma 30. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and v, the following
implication holds:
log T(a;;v):changed = FALSE
i
assertor T(a;;v):ol = assertor T(a;;v):dl:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
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conguration since tables are empty. We consider only those transitions that may have
an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
receive app:
After this transition, log T(a;;v):changed is set to FALSE and assertor T(a;;v):ol
equals to assertor T(a;;v):dl. Therefore, the statement is preserved.
timeout ack:
After this transition, log T(a;;v):changed is set to TRUE and assertor T(a;;v):ol
refers to an alternative store. Therefore, the statement is still preserved.
2
Lemma 29 has shown that if the sender of an interaction did not use alternative stores
when recording its interaction record, the receiver's viewlink remains correct. In Lemma
31, we show that if the receiver did not use any alternative store, then the sender's
viewlink is also correct.
Lemma 31. For any reachable conguration, for any as and , and for some ar, let S,
R be the sender and receiver's viewkind, respectively, the following implication holds:
If (assertor T(as;;S):str 6= (? _ INIT)) ^ log T(ar;;R):changed = FALSE, then
assertor T(as;;S):vl = assertor T(ar;;R):ol
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration, since assertor T(a;;v):str is ?. We now consider only those transitions
that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
send app:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to INIT. Therefore, the precondition
is false, which preserves the implication.
prepare record:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to READY and assertor T(as;;S):vl
is equal to assertor T(ar;;R):dl. If log T(ar;;R):changed is FALSE,
assertor T(ar;;R):dl is equal to assertor T(ar;;R):ol (Lemma 30). Therefore,
assertor T(as;;S):vl is equal to assertor T(ar;;R):ol, which preserves the statement.
receive app:
After this transition, log T(ar;;R):changed is set to FALSE. Since the guard to re
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set to INIT when sending app(d;;vl). Therefore, the precondition of the statement is
false, which preserves the implication.
pre check:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to SEND from READY. Therefore,
the precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
send record:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to SENT from SEND. Therefore, the
precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
timeout ack:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to SEND from SENT. Therefore, the
precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
receive ack:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to ACKED from SENT. Therefore,
the precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
post check:
After this transition, assertor T(as;;S):str is set to OK from ACKED. Therefore, the
precondition of the statement remains true, which preserves the implication.
2
Lemma 32. For any a, , v and for some a0, then the following implication holds when
the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If log T(a;;v):changed = FALSE, then
assertor T(a0;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol
2
Proof. When the ASM terminates, assertor T(a;;v):str is OK (Lemma 20) and no
app message is in transit. Therefore, by Lemma 29 and Lemma 31, the implication is
preserved for both views.
2
Lemma 33 connects the state of an assertor and the state of the coordinator. It shows
that if an assertor has nished recording and used an alternative store during recording,
then it has sent a repair request to a coordinator. On the other hand, if the coordinator
has received a repair request, then we can imply that the requesting assertor has recorded
its interaction record in an alternative store.
We note that since there is only one coordinator in the system, the coordinator's identity
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Lemma 33. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and v, the following
equality holds:
assertor T(a;;v):str = OK ^ log T(a;;v):changed
=
_
(
repair(;v;a0
ps;aps) 2 k(a;ac)
coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i
where a0
ps = assertor T(a;;v):vl and aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol: 2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the cong-
uration, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the
initial conguration since table coord T(ac;;v) is empty and no message is in transit.
We now consider only those transitions that may have an eect on terms in the equality.
send app:
prepare record:
receive app:
pre check:
send record:
receive ack:
timeout ack:
After these transitions, assertor T(a;;v):str is switched among states ?, INIT, READY,
SEND, SENT and ACKED. Therefore, the rst part of the statement remains false. In
addition, these transitions do not aect the right part of the statement. Therefore, the
statement is preserved.
post check:
After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str is set to OK from ACKED. If
log T(a;;v):changed is TRUE, then repair(;v;a0
ps;aps) is inserted in k(a;ac), where
a0
ps = assertor T(a;;v):vl and aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. Therefore, the statement
is preserved.
msg loss pstore:
msg loss channel:
The two transitions do not remove repair(;v;a0
ps;aps) from k(a;ac), since we have as-
sumed that only messages to/from a provenance store can get lost (Assumption 3),
repair(;v;a0
ps;aps) is not lost. Therefore, the statement is preserved.
receive repair:
After this transition, repair(;v;a0
ps;aps) is removed from k(a;ac) and coord T(ac;;v)
becomes not empty.
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timeout uack:
receive uack:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions, coord T(ac;;v)
remains unaected.
2
Lemma 34 and Lemma 35 show how the coordinator updates a destination provenance
store by sending an update message.
Lemma 34. For any reachable conguration and for any , v and aps, the following
implication holds:
If update(;v;ol) 2 k(ac;aps); then
ol = coord T(ac;;v):ol:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive repair:
The statement is preserved by this transition. This transition does not alter
coord T(ac;;v):ol if coord T(ac;;v):ol 6= ? before the transition.
send update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update(;v;ol) 2
k(ac;aps) is inserted to k(ac;aps), such that ol = coord T(ac;;v):ol.
receive update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update(;v;ol) is
removed from k(ac;aps). Therefore, the antecedent becomes false, which preserves the
statement.
2
Lemma 35. For any reachable conguration and for any , v and aps, the following
implication holds:
If uack(;v) 2 k(aps;ac); then
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol:
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive update:
After this transition, update(;v;ol) is removed from k(ac;aps) and uack(;v) is in-
serted to k(aps;ac). In addition, store T(aps;;v):vl is set to ol, which is provided by
update(;v;ol). By Lemma 34, ol is equal to coord T(ac;;v):ol. Therefore, we have
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol.
receive uack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, uack(;v) is removed
from k(aps;ac). Therefore, the antecedent becomes false, which preserves the statement.
2
Lemma 36 shows the three possible states of a provenance store regarding an interaction:
initial state, possessing a viewlink and possessing an interaction record.
Lemma 36 (INVARIANT). For any reachable conguration, for any aps,  and v,
and for some a, the following statement holds:
_
8
> <
> :
store T(aps;;v) = h?;?;;i
store T(aps;;v) = h?;vl;;i
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
where vl 6= ?. 2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the cong-
uration, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the
initial conguration since table store T(aps;;v) is h?;?;;i. We now consider only
those transitions that may have an eect on terms in the equality.
receive record:
After this transition, store T(aps;;v) becomes ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, where
vl 6= ?.
receive update:
After this transition, store T(aps;;v):vl is not ?. If store T(aps;;v) was h?;?;;i
before the transition, then it becomes h?;vl;;i, such that vl 6= ?. If store T(aps;;v)
was ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, it remains as ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi with
store T(aps;;v):vl updated.
send app:
receive app:Chapter 4 Protocol Analysis 114
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions, a new interac-
tion key  is created. Therefore, store T(aps;;v) is in the initial state.
2
Lemma 37 gives the relationship among the coordinator's timer, protocol messages and
the destination provenance store to be updated.
Lemma 37. For any reachable conguration and for any , v and aps, the following
implication holds:
If
^
(
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED
timer T(ac;;v;aps):to  0
then
_
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
update(;v;ol) 2 k(ac;aps)
update(;v;ol) 2 lost(ac;aps)
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol
uack(;v) 2 k(aps;ac)
uack(;v) 2 lost(ac;aps)
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive repair:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, timer T(ac;;v;aps)
remains in the initial state and no message is inserted to channels.
send update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update(;v;ol) is
inserted to k(ac;aps). In addition, timer T(ac;;v;aps):status is set to ENABLED and
timer T(ac;;v;aps):to is initialised.
timer click(ac;;v;aps):
After this transition, timer T(ac;;v;aps):to remains greater than or equal to 0. There-
fore, the statement is preserved by this transition.
timeout uack:
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timer T(ac;;v;aps):to is set to 0. Therefore, the antecedent is false, which preserves
the implication.
receive uack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, uack(;v) is removed
from k(aps;ac). By Lemma 35, store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol. Therefore,
the implication still holds after the transition.
msg loss pstore:
msg loss channel:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions, update(;v;ol)
or uack(;v) is removed from k(ac;aps) or k(aps;ac) and placed in lost(ac;aps). There-
fore, the implication still holds after the transition.
receive update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update(;v;ol) is
removed from k(ac;aps). In addition, store T(aps;;v):vl is set to ol, which is provided
by update(;v;ol). By Lemma 34, ol is equal to coord T(ac;;v):ol. Therefore, we have
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol, which preserves the statement.
2
Lemma 38 connects the state of the coordinator and the state of a provenance store. It
shows how the ASM evolves after the coordinator has received a repair request. Table
(vlstate T 2 VLST) keeps the status of a viewlink. If the state is DEFAULT the viewlink
is provided by an assertor without being updated by the coordinator. If it is UPDATED
the viewlink has been updated by the coordinator.
Lemma 38. For any reachable conguration and for any  and v, then the following
equality holds:
coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i
=
_
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
update(;v;ol) 2 k(ac;aps)
update(;v;ol) 2 lost(ac;aps)
vlstate T(aps;;v) = UPDATED
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol
uack(;v) 2 k(aps;ac)
uack(;v) 2 lost(ac;aps)
update T(ac;;v;aps) = UPDATE
update T(ac;;v;aps) = UPDATED
where ol = coord T(ac;;v):ol, aps = coord T(ac;;v):adps.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the cong-
uration, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the
initial conguration since table coord T(ac;;v) is empty and no message is in transit.
We now consider only those transitions that may have an eect on terms in the equality.
receive repair:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, coord T(ac;;v)
becomes not empty and update T(ac;;v;aps) is set to UPDATE, where aps =
coord T(ac;;v):adps. Therefore, the statement is preserved.
send update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. In order to re this transition,
update T(ac;;v;aps) is UPDATE. After this transition, update(;v;ol) is inserted in
k(ac;aps), where ol = coord T(ac;;v):ol. Therefore, the statement was preserved before
this transition and remains valid after it.
timeout uack:
This transition does not aect coord T(ac;;v). In order to re this transition, we have
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED and timer T(ac;;v;aps):to > 0. By Lemma
37, the statement is preserved. After this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps) is set to
UPDATE. Therefore, the statement was preserved before this transition and remains
valid after it.
receive uack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, uack(;v) is removed
from channel. By Lemma 35, store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol. Therefore, the
statement is still preserved.
msg loss pstore:
msg loss channel:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions, update(;v;ol)
or uack(;v) is removed from k(ac;aps) or k(aps;ac) and placed in lost(ac;aps). There-
fore, the implication still holds after the transition.
receive update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update(;v;ol) is re-
moved from k(ac;aps) and uack(;v) is inserted in k(aps;ac). Besides, vlstate T(aps;;v)
is set to UPDATED and store T(aps;;v):vl is set to ol, which is from update(;v;ol).
Since ol is equal to coord T(ac;;v):ol (Lemma 34), store T(aps;;v):vl is equal to
coord T(ac;;v):ol.
2
Lemma 39, Lemma 40 and Lemma 41 establish that if the coordinator did not update
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an assertor.
Lemma 39. For any reachable conguration, for any aps, , v, and for some a, then
the following implication holds:
If vlstate T(aps;;v) = DEFAULT, then
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive record:
After this transition, if vlstate T(aps;;v) is set to DEFAULT, then store T(aps;;v):vl
is set to vl, which comes from record(;v;a;vl;pas) produced by an assertor a. By
Lemma 17, vl is equal to assertor T(a;;v):vl. Therefore, the implication is preserved.
receive update:
After this transition, vlstate T(aps;;v) is set to UPDATED. Therefore, the antecedent
is false, which preserves the implication.
2
Lemma 40. For any reachable conguration and for any aps,  and v, then the following
implication holds:
If store T(aps;;v):vl 6= ?, then
vlstate T(aps;;v) = DEFAULT or UPDATED:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the cong-
uration, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the
initial conguration since table store T(aps;;v) is empty. We now consider only those
transitions that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive record:
After this transition, if vlstate T(aps;;v) is set to DEFAULT, then store T(aps;;v):vl
is set to vl, which comes from record(;v;a;vl;pas). Therefore, the implication is pre-
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receive update:
After this transition, if vlstate T(aps;;v) is set to UPDATED, then store T(aps;;v):vl
is set to ol, which comes from update(;v;ol). Therefore, the implication is preserved.
2
Lemma 41. For any reachable conguration and for any a,  and v, then the following
implication holds:
If assertor T(a;;v):str = OK ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i, then
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl;
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol 2
Proof.
We proceed with the following reasoning. If coord T(ac;;v) is h?;?i, then by Lemma
38, vlstate T(aps;;v) is not UPDATED. If assertor T(a;;v):str is OK, then by
Lemma 21, store T(aps;;v):vl is not ?, where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. With
the fact that vlstate T(aps;;v) is not UPDATED and by Lemma 40, we can imply
that vlstate T(aps;;v) is DEFAULT. Therefore, with Lemma 39, the implication is
preserved.
2
We are now ready to prove Property 28's rst part for the rst case: assertors' viewlink
recorded in their respective provenance store is accurate if the update coordinator did
not receive any repair message when the protocol terminates.
Lemma 42. For any  and v, and for some a and a0, then the following implication
holds when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i, then
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol.
2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. The statement holds in the ini-
tial conguration. When the protocol terminates, assertor T(a;;v):str = OK and
assertor T(a0;;v):str = OK (Lemma 20). Since coord T(ac;;v) is h?;?i, by Lemma
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assertor T(a;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol (4.1)
and Lemma 41
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl: (4.2)
From (4.1) and (4.2),
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol;
such that
aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol:
Therefore, the implication is preserved.
2
We now consider the cases where the coordinator received one or two repair requests
from assertors. Lemma 43 shows that after receiving a repair request, the coordinator
knows the requesting assertor's ownlink, which the coordinator can later use to update
another assertor's viewlink.
Lemma 43. For any reachable conguration, for any  and v, and for some a, then the
following implication holds:
If coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i, then
coord T(ac;;v):ol = assertor T(a;;v):ol:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the cong-
uration, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the
initial conguration since table coord T(ac;;v) is empty. We now consider only those
transitions that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive repair:
After this transition, coord T(ac;;v) becomes not empty. Meanwhile, coord T(ac;;v):ol
is set to aps, which is provided by repair(;v;a0
ps;aps). By Lemma 33, aps is equal to
assertor T(a;;v):ol. Therefore, the statement is preserved.
send app:
receive app:
timeout ack:
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is assigned to a value and assertor T(a;;v):str is set to READY. By Lemma 33,
coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i. Therefore, the antecedent is false, which preserves the state-
ment.
2
Lemma 44 shows that after receiving two repair requests, the coordinator ensures that
the destination store to be updated is correct so as to successfully update viewlink in
that store.
Lemma 44. For any reachable conguration and for any  and v, then the following
implication holds:
If coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i, then
coord T(ac;;v):adps = coord T(ac;;v):ol:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since table coord T(ac;;v) is empty and no message is in transit. We
now consider only those transitions that may have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive repair:
After this transition, coord T(ac;;v) is not h?;?i. If coord T(ac;;v) is also not
h?;?i, then coord T(ac;;v):adps is set to coord T(ac;;v):ol. Therefore, the statement
is preserved.
2
Lemma 45 shows the end states of the coordinator and the provenance store that has
been updated when the ASM terminates.
Lemma 45. For any  and v, then the following implication must hold when the ASM
terminates at nal conguration:
If coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i, then
^
8
> <
> :
vlstate T(aps;;v) = UPDATED
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol
update T(ac;;v;aps) = UPDATED
where aps = coord T(ac;;v):adps.
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Proof. We proceed with the reasoning on Lemma 38. When the ASM terminates,
no message is in transit. In addition, update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= UPDATE. Otherwise,
send update transition will be red. Therefore, by Lemma 38, when the ASM termi-
nates, the implication is preserved.
2
We are now ready to prove Property 28's rst part for the second case, i,e., assertors'
viewlink recorded in their respective provenance store is accurate if the update coordi-
nator received a repair message from each assertor before the protocol terminates.
Lemma 46. For any  and v, and for some a and a0, then the following implication
holds when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i, then
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. 2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. By Lemma 45, when the ASM
terminates,
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol (4.3)
such that
aps = coord T(ac;;v):adps: (4.4)
With Lemma 44 and (4.4),
aps = coord T(ac;;v):ol: (4.5)
Since coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i and coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i,
by Lemma 43,
coord T(ac;;v):ol = assertor T(a;;v):ol (4.6)
and
coord T(ac;;v):ol = assertor T(a0;;v):ol: (4.7)
Hence, with (4.5) and (4.6)
aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol: (4.8)
Therefore, from (4.3), (4.7) and (4.8), when the protocol terminates,
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol;Chapter 4 Protocol Analysis 122
such that
aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol:
Therefore, the implication is preserved in the case.
2
After proving that Property 28's rst part holds in the rst two cases, we proceed to
the third case where assertors' viewlink recorded in their respective provenance store is
accurate if the update coordinator received only one repair message before the protocol
terminates. We rst need a lemma showing that if the coordinator receives one repair
message, then the destination store to be updated is indicated by the viewlink of the
requesting assertor.
Lemma 47. For any reachable conguration, for any  and v, and for some a, then the
following implication holds:
If coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i, then
coord T(ac;;v):adps = assertor T(a;;v):vl:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive repair:
After this transition, coord T(ac;;v) is not empty. If coord T(ac;;v) is still empty,
then coord T(ac;;v):adps becomes equal to adps, which is provided by repair(;v;adps;ol).
By rule post check (Figure 3.25), adps = assertor T(a;;v):vl. Therefore, the statement
is preserved.
prepare record:
receive app:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After them, assertor T(a;;v):vl are
initialised and assertor T(a;;v):str is set to READY. By Lemma 33, coord T(ac;;v) =
h?;?i. Therefore, the antecedent is false, which preserves the statement.
2
We now prove Property 28's rst part for the third case.
Lemma 48. For any  and v, and for some a and a0, then the following implication
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nal conguration:Chapter 4 Protocol Analysis 123
If coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i, then
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol.
2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. Since coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i, by
Lemma 45, when the ASM terminates,
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol; (4.9)
such that
a0
ps = coord T(ac;;v):adps: (4.10)
By Lemma 47,
coord T(ac;;v):adps = assertor T(a;;v):vl: (4.11)
Since coord T(ac;;v) is h?;?i, log T(a0;;v):changed is FALSE (Lemma 33). There-
fore, by Lemma 32,
assertor T(a;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol: (4.12)
Therefore, with (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12),
a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):ol: (4.13)
By Lemma 43, coord T(ac;;v):ol = assertor T(a;;v):ol. Therefore, with (4.9) and
(4.13), when the protocol terminates,
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol (4.14)
such that
a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):ol:
Since coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i and assertor T(a;;v) = OK, when the ASM termi-
nates, by Lemma 41,
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl: (4.15)
such that
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Therefore, with (4.12), (4.15) and (4.16)
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol; (4.17)
such that
aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol:
Therefore, from (4.14) and (4.17), 8v 2 VK, the implication is preserved.
2
Based on the above analysis, we are ready to prove Property 28, i,e., assertors' viewlink
recorded in their respective provenance store is accurate when the protocol terminates,
pointing to the store where the other assertor in the interaction recorded documentation
about the same interaction.
Theorem 49 (Viewlink Accuracy). F-PReP preserves Viewlink Accuracy property
(Property 28). 2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. The statement holds in the initial
conguration. We perform case analysis on coord T(ac;;v) and coord T(ac;;v).
(1) coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i:
This is the case where the update coordinator did not receive any repair message with
regard to one interaction. By Lemma 42, the rst part of the implication is preserved
in this case.
(2) coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i:
This is the case where the update coordinator received two repair messages from both
assertors. By Lemma 46, the rst part of the implication is preserved in this case.
(3) coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i:
This is the case where the update coordinator received only one repair message. By
Lemma 48, the rst part of the implication is preserved in this case.
By Property 16, store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, such that a0
ps =
assertor T(a0;;v):ol. Hence, the second part of the implication is also preserved.
Therefore, the implication in Property 28 is preserved.
2
We note that all properties established in the rest of this chapter are preserved under
Assumption 11 (the retry counter of the assertor and coordinator is always greater than
0, i.e., rc(a;;v) > 0 and rc(ac;;v) > 0). This assumption ensures that transitions
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Hence, under this assumption, theorems 22, 27, 49 have established that for one inter-
action:
 Once documentation about the interaction is created, it will end up in a provenance
store;
 The viewlinks and causelinks associated with the interaction are accurate in the
provenance store.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown that F-PReP preserves properties Termination, Guar-
anteed Recording, Causelink Accuracy and Viewlink Accuracy. These prop-
erties state that after F-PReP eventually nishes recording interaction records and tak-
ing remedial actions (Termination), these interaction records are guaranteed to be
recorded in provenance stores (Guaranteed Recording) and the links in these inter-
action records are accurate (Causelink Accuracy and Viewlink Accuracy).
Our proof follows a systematic procedure based on mathematical induction. While
done by hand, we believe it is sucient to provide condence that the protocol does
conform to these properties. Previous experience has shown that the ASM formalism is
suitable for mechanical proof derivations, and several algorithms [119, 123, 121], which
are formalised using ASM, have been carried out using Coq [36].
Next chapter will make use of the properties established in this chapter to investigate
the properties of process documentation, especially the retrievability of distributed doc-
umentation.Chapter 5
Graph-based Analysis
This dissertation aims to address the problem of recording process documentation in the
presence of failures while still ensuring its entire retrievability. We have designed and
formalised a recording protocol F-PReP, and have proved that F-PReP has properties
Guaranteed Recording, Causelink Accuracy and Viewlink Accuracy. This
chapter investigates the properties of process documentation that is recorded by using
F-PReP. Specically, we show that the recorded process documentation is complete and
still retrievable in its entirety.
Provenance stores used by an assertor can be classied as two types: the default store
(i.e., the one that an assertor initially used when recording an interaction record) and
alternative stores. When the protocol terminates, there is a nal store that an assertor
knows to have successfully recorded its interaction records. The nal store can be the
default store or an alternative store. All properties established in Chapter 4 are only
concerned with the nal store.
Recall that an assertor sets a timeout when submitting an interaction record to a store.
Due to the impossibility to distinguish store crash from message loss in the event of a
timeout, it may be the case that a provenance store has recorded an interaction record
whilst the assertor sees a timeout event and has to choose an alternative store. Therefore,
the default store and any of the attempted alternative stores may possess duplicate inter-
action records, which means there would be redundant viewlinks or causelinks recorded
in multiple locations (as exemplied in Figures 3.21, 3.22). This however would aect
documentation retrievability.
To investigate this issue, this chapter develops another set of properties regarding the
topological relationship between an assertor's default store and alternative stores. By
translating these properties to a notion of graph, we provide a global view of how dis-
tributed documentation is connected after the whole process completes its execution
in the presence of failures. Such a graphical representation oers a more intuitive de-
scription of the content of provenance stores than the ASM-based formalism since the
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graphical notation helps us to hide details of a provenance store and does not involve the
coordinator. In addition, the graph-based analysis investigates properties regarding the
retrieval of process documentation and facilitates the design of a new traversal function
whist the ASM-based formalism does not deal with these concerns.
This chapter has two contributions:
Firstly, we dene graph notions to represent the topology of distributed documentation.
We also introduce a mapping function to convert an ASM conguration to a graph
and perform an exhaustive analysis on the forms of graph. This analysis builds up
our condence in understanding what is actually recorded in provenance stores in the
presence of failures and more importantly, it facilitates us to demonstrate the properties
of process documentation in provenance stores.
Secondly, we introduce a new query function to retrieve process documentation. The
new function, derived from the exhaustive analysis of graphs, searches any candidate
provenance store and guarantees that any retrieved process documentation is in its
entirety.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 denes a notion of graph and a mapping
function to convert an ASM conguration to a graph. Section 5.2 establishes several
graph properties. In Section 5.3, we exhaustively study various forms of graphs regarding
one interaction that may appear. Then we investigate properties for the whole process
documentation in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 discusses several issues and Section
5.6 concludes this chapter. In the appendix (Section 5.7), we provide proofs for the
properties used for the exhaustive analysis in Section 5.3.
5.1 Denitions
In this section, we introduce a notion of graph to represent the topology of distributed
process documentation spanning across multiple provenance stores. We dene and for-
malise graph elements and then introduce a mapping function to produce a graph from
an ASM conguration.
5.1.1 Graph Denitions
To facilitate our discussion, we dene a term Interaction context.
Denition 50 (Interaction context). An interaction context species the view of
an interaction, consisting of an interaction key , and a viewkind v.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 128
There are two interaction contexts regarding one interaction: the Sender's and the
Receiver's. An assertor records an interaction record to a provenance store about its
interaction context.
The state of a provenance store is reected by a node on the graph and the links recorded
in provenance stores are captured by edges connecting nodes. Since a provenance store
records an interaction record with regard to a specic interaction context, we associate
each node with the interaction context. Therefore, given a node, we can locate an
interaction record in a provenance store.
Denition 51 (Node). A node contains a pointer to a provenance store that was used
to record an interaction record, and also contains the associated interaction context. We
use notation haps;;vi to denote a node.
By Lemma 36, a store has three states regarding an interaction context: h?;vl;;i,
ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi and h?;?;;i. We dene the term Node Kind to reect
the state of a store.
Denition 52 (Node Kind). A node kind indicates the state of a node: LINK, FULL,
FINAL and NULL.
We now dene the four kinds. In the rest of this chapter, given notations a, a0, vl, vl0
and pas, we mean that a 6= ?, a0 6= ?, vl 6= ?, vl0 6= ? and pas 6= ;. Otherwise,
notations ? and ; are explicitly specied.
Denition 53 (Link Node). A LINK node indicates a provenance store which recorded
a viewlink about an interaction context, i.e., for some vl,
node = haps;;vi; such that store T(aps;;v) = h?;vl;;i:
Denition 54 (Full Node). A FULL node indicates a provenance store which recorded
an interaction record about an interaction context, i.e., for some a and vl,
node = haps;;vi; such that store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi:
Denition 55 (Final Node). A FINAL node is a FULL node and the corresponding
assertor knows that the related provenance store recorded its interaction record.
Formally, for some a and vl,
node = haps;;vi; such that
^
8
> <
> :
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
assertor T(a, ;v):ol = aps
assertor T(a, ;v):str = ACKED or OKChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 129
According to the protocol, when assertor T(a;;v):str becomes ACKED or OK, the
assertor has received an acknowledgement from its provenance store. Hence it knows
that the store has successfully recorded its interaction record.
Denition 56 (Null Node). A NULL node indicates a provenance store which did not
record any information about an interaction context, i.e.,
node = haps;;vi; such that store T(aps;;v) = h?;?;;i:
Denition 57 (Edge). An edge is unidirectional. It starts from a source node and ends
at a destination node. There are two kinds of edges: viewlink edge and causelink edge.
Viewlink and causelink edges reect underlying viewlinks and causelinks recorded in
provenance stores.
Denition 58 (Viewlink Edge). A viewlink edge starts from node haps;;vi and ends
at node ha0
ps;0;v0i, such that a0
ps = store T(aps;;v):vl:
We will identify properties regarding the relationship between the two nodes connected
via a viewlink edge in Section 5.2.
In order to dene Causelink Edge, we rstly dene a function getCIDS. This function
retrieves all relationship p-assertions recorded in a provenance store about an interaction
context and then returns a set of triples, each containing a cause interaction context
(h0;v0i) and an associated causelink (a0
ps), obtained from those relationship p-assertions.
We note that getCIDS(aps;;R) returns empty since the receiver (R) of an interaction
never records any relationship p-assertion.
Denition
getCIDS : PID  IK  VK ! P(PID  IK  VK)
getCIDS(aps;;v) =
fha0
ps;0;v0i j ha0
ps;0;v0i 2 cids;8 rel-pa(r;h;vi;cids) 2 store T(aps;;v):pasg
Denition 59 (Causelink Edge). A causelink edge starts from node haps;;vi and
ends at node ha0
ps;0;v0i, such that ha0
ps;0;v0i 2 getCIDS(aps;;v):
We will identify properties regarding the relationship between the nodes connected via
a causelink edge in Section 5.2.
Denition 60 (Graph). A graph, G, represents the topology of distributed process
documentation spanning across interlinked provenance stores. It contains Nodes, Node
Kinds, Viewlink Edges and Causelink Edges.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 130
A node locates an interaction record in a provenance store and the nodekind annotates
what the provenance store actually recorded with regard to an interaction context. An
edge tells us where to nd another interaction record via a viewlink or causelink.
Figure 5.1 formalises the above terms.
NODE = PID  IK  VK (Nodes)
PID : primitive set (PS Identities)
IK : primitive set (Interaction Keys)
VK = fS, Rg (View Kinds)
NK = NODE ! KIND (Node Kinds)
KIND = fLINK;FULL;FINAL;NULLg (Kinds)
VE = NODE  NODE (ViewLink Edges)
CE = NODE  NODE (CauseLink Edges)
GRAPH = P(NODE)  NK  P(VE)  P(CE) (Graphs)
Characteristic Variables:
n 2 NODE, aps 2 PID,  2 IK, v 2 VK, n 2 P(NODE), ve 2 P(VE), ce 2 P(CE), nk 2 NK, g 2 GRAPH
Initial State of Conguration:
gi = hni;nki;vei;ceii
where:
ni = ;, nki = apsv  ?, vei = ;, cei = ;,
Figure 5.1: Graph state space
5.1.2 Mapping Function
We dene a graph mapping function T that translates an ASM conguration to a graph.
Since this chapter is interested in the nal graph reecting the status of provenance
stores after the protocol nishes recording the documentation of a process, this function
is designed to convert a nal ASM conguration to a nal graph.
Denition
T : C ! GRAPH
T(c) :
initialize g;
for each aps;;v, such that store T(aps;;v) 6= h?;?;;i
do
node1   haps;;vi;
g:n := g:n [ fnode1g;
if store T(aps;;v) = h?;vl;;i ^ vl 6= ?
g:nk(node1) := LINK;
elif assertor T(a;;v):ol = aps ^ assertor T(a;;v):str = ACKED or OK
g:nk(node1) := FINAL;
else
g:nk(node1) := FULL;
a0
ps   store T(aps;;v):vl;Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 131
node2   ha0
ps;;vi;
if store T(a0
ps;;v) = h?;?;;i
g:n := g:n [ fnode2g;
g:nk(node2) := NULL;
g:ve := g:ve [ fhnode1;node2ig;
for each ha00
ps;0;v0i 2 getCIDS(aps;;v)
do
node3   ha00
ps;0;v0i;
g:ce := g:ce [ fhnode1;node3ig;
return g;
The projecting function T takes a nal system conguration, c, and produces a graph,
g. The function begins with an empty graph and then looks up each entry of all prove-
nance stores (i.e., for any aps;v and , it checks store T(aps;;v)). If the entry is not
empty, then a node is produced and the node's kind is set. We note that according to
the protocol, if store T(aps;;v) is not empty, it can either be h?;vl;;i or ha;vl;pasi
(Lemma 36). Therefore, the corresponding node kind cannot be NULL and can only be
assigned once according to the denitions of node kind.
The function also adds viewlink and causelink edges to the current graph. If the destina-
tion node (node2) of a viewlink edge does not exist (i.e., store T(a0
ps;;v) = h?;?;;i),
then the node is added and its kind is set to NULL. Otherwise, node2 will be added to
the graph and assigned a nodekind when the function checks the corresponding entry.
We also note that the destination node of a causelink edge is always FINAL in the nal
graph, to be demonstrated in Lemma 69 in Section 5.2. Therefore, node3 does not need
to be added to graph and its kind is not set in this iteration.
5.1.3 Graph Notations
The graph dened in Section 5.1.1 has captured sucient detail that we need in order
to systematically analyse the topology of interlinked documentation. However, to make
our graph representation more intuitive and neat, we further classify nodes into three
categories: Default Nodes, Intermediary Nodes and Alternative Final Nodes.
Provenance stores used by an assertor can be classied into two types: the default store
(i.e., the one that an assertor initially used when recording an interaction record) and
alternative stores. When the protocol terminates, there is a nal store that an assertor
knows to have successfully recorded its interaction records (i.e., the store referred by an
assertor's ownlink when the protocol terminates.). The nal store can be the default
store or an alternative store. When using graph notations, we use a default node to refer
to a default store, an intermediary node to refer to an alternative store which is not theChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 132
nal store, and an alternative nal node to indicate an alternative store that is the nal
store.
In the example of Figure 5.2, the assertor's default store is PS1, which failed to record
the assertor's interaction record IR. Then the assertor used three alternative stores
(PS2, PS3 and PS4) and nally recorded IR in PS4. Therefore, PS4 is the nal store.
In terms of nodes, PS1 is indicated by a default node, PS2 and PS3 are indicated by
intermediary nodes, and PS4 is indicated by an alternative nal node.
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Figure 5.2: An example of links
Denition 61 (Default Nodes). D Nodes(;v) =
f haps;;vi j 9a; aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl g
By Figure 3.11, assertor T(a;;v):dl refers to the default link used by assertor a in the
interaction context h;vi.
To facilitate our discussion, we dene a new set PSSet(a;;v) to capture alternative
provenance stores that are not the nal store. The set psList(a), dened in Figure 3.11,
is the collection of all alternative stores to be used by assertor a1. When the ASM
terminates, assertor T(a;;v):str = OK (Lemma 20).
Denition 62. PSSet(a;;v) =
f aps j aps 2 psList(a) ^ aps 6= assertor T(a;;v):ol ^ assertor T(a;;v):str = OK g
With PSSet, we dene Intermediary Nodes.
Denition 63 (Intermediary Nodes). I Nodes(;v) =
f haps;;vi j 9a; aps 2 PSSet(a;;v) g
Denition 64 (Alternative Final Nodes). A Nodes(;v) =
f haps;;vi j 9a;aps 2 psList(a) ^ aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol ^ assertor T(a;;v):str = OK g
1We can imply that given aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl, aps = 2 psList(a).Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 133
We note that for any  and v, there is one element in D Nodes(;v) and A Nodes(;v),
and an alternative nal node is always FINAL.
We now introduce a set of graph notations in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Graph notations
We use three shapes (triangle, square, circle) to represent nodes (Default Nodes, Inter-
mediary Nodes and Alternative Final Nodes) and use three borders to denote three node
kinds (NULL, LINK, FULL). In addition, we use grey colour to ll a FINAL node. Figure
5.4 gives several examples of nodes represented by the graph notations. A node's shape
and kind are determined by case analysis in the following sections.
We now give an example demonstrating the graph of a process. We assume there is a
process consisting of four interactions, as shown in Figure 5.5. The interaction i3 is the
eect of interactions i1 and i2, while i4 is the eect of i3.
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Figure 5.4: Examples of nodes
If there was no failure when the ve assertors recorded their respective interaction record,
a graph (Figure 5.6) is produced after F-PReP nishes recording. Since each assertor
used its default store to record an interaction record, all the default nodes are FINAL
in the graph, connected by viewlink and causelink edges. If failures happened, then the
graph may vary. One possible graph is given in Figure 5.7. We do not explain why
nodes are connected in this way. We will provide further explanation after establishing
graph properties in the rest of this chapter.
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Figure 5.5: An example of process
Chapter 4 has proved properties to demonstrate that F-PReP meets requirements CauselinkChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 134
Accuracy and Viewlink Accuracy. These properties are only concerned with the
nal store. In order to provide the global topology of distributed documentation, we
investigate a number of properties and graphical representations regarding the topologi-
cal relationship between an assertor's default store and alternative stores in Sections 5.2
and 5.3.
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Figure 5.6: Graph produced after F-PReP recorded process documentation in a
failure-free environment
5.2 Graph Properties
One purpose of this chapter is to investigate the topology of a nal graph gf, which
is exhibited after F-PReP nishes recording process documentation in the presence of
failures. Since a process consists of a set of interactions, this section analyses graph
topology as a result of two assertors in one interaction nishing recording their interac-
tion records. These properties will be used as building blocks when we investigate the
graph properties of a whole process in Section 5.4.
Lemma 65 states the number of FINAL nodes in an interaction context.
Lemma 65. At nal graph gf, given any interaction context h;vi, there is only one
FINAL node haps;;vi, where aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol.
2
Proof
Given an interaction context h;vi, by Guaranteed Recording (Theorem 22),
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 135
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Figure 5.7: One possible graph produced after F-PReP nished recording in the
presence of failures
By Lemma 20, when the ASM terminates, assertor T(a;;v):str = OK.
Therefore, with function T, there is one nal node associated with each interaction
context h;vi on gf.
Given that assertor T(a;;v):ol refers to only one store, there is only one nal node in
each interaction context.
2
Lemma 66 states the relationship between the two nodes connected via a viewlink edge:
these nodes are concerned with the two interaction contexts of the same interaction.
Lemma 66. At nal graph gf, for any nodes n, n0 2 gf:n, such that n = haps;;vi and
n0 = ha0
ps;0;v0i, the following statement holds:
If hn;n0i 2 gf:ve, then
 = 0 ^ v0 = v
2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. According to function T, when a
viewlink edge is added into the graph, the two nodes connected by the viewlink edgeChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 136
share the same interaction key and have opposite viewkinds. Therefore, the statement
holds.
2
Lemma 67 species that the FINAL nodes related to one interaction are connected by
two viewlink edges.
Lemma 67. At nal graph gf, for any nodes n, n0 2 gf:n, such that n = haps;;vi and
n0 = ha0
ps;;vi, the following statement holds:
If gf:nk(n) = FINAL ^ gf:nk(n0) = FINAL, then
hn;n0i 2 gf:ve ^ hn0;ni 2 gf:ve
2
Proof. Given gf:nk(n) = FINAL and gf:nk(n0) = FINAL, by denition of FINAL node,
there exist store T(aps;;v) and store T(a0
ps;;v), such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol,
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):ol.
In Section 4.4, we have established Viewlink Accuracy property (Theorem 49). This
means that when the ASM terminates, store T(aps;;v):vl =
assertor T(a0;;v):ol and store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol. Therefore,
store T(aps;;v):vl = a0
ps and store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = aps.
By function T, when checking store T(aps;;v), a viewlink edge hn;n0i is added into
gf:ve, such that n = haps;;vi and n0 = ha0
ps;;vi. Similarly, when checking
store T(a0
ps;;v), a viewlink edge hn0;ni is added into gf:ve, such that n0 = ha0
ps;;vi
and n = haps;;vi.
From the above reasoning, the statement holds.
2
By Lemmas 65, 66 and 67, gf always contains two FINAL nodes connected via two
viewlink edges for a given interaction i, as shown in the example of Figure 5.8. We
note that Lemmas 65, 66 and 67 do not state the classication of a node. A node's
classication is determined on a case by case basis, which we will discuss in the next
section. In Figure 5.8, we assume both nodes are alternative nal nodes.
Lemmas 68 and 69 specify properties related to causelink edges. Lemma 68 states the
relationship between the nodes connected by a causelink edge.
Lemma 68. At nal graph gf, for any nodes n, n0 2 gf:n, such that n = haps;;vi and
n0 = ha0
ps;0;v0i, the following statements hold:Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 137
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Figure 5.8: Interlinked FINAL nodes
If hn;n0i 2 gf:ce, then
 6= 0 ^ v = S ^ v0 = R
2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning.
Recall function getCIDS(aps;;v), 0 and v0 indicate the interaction context in a cause
interaction of a relationship p-assertion. Since each interaction key is globally unique,
0 is not equal to . A relationship p-assertion is created in function createPA, which
we recall here:
Denition
createPA : A  IK  DATA  REL ! P(PA)
createPA(a;;d;r) :
pas   if r = ?
fi-pa(;d)g;
fi-pa(;d);rel-pa(r;h;Si;cids)g;
where cids = fhcl;0;Ri j 0 2 cause(a;d;r) and cl = assertor T(a;0;R):olg;
return pas;
According to the denition of createPA, the viewkind in the eect interaction of a
relationship p-assertion is the sender (S) while the viewkind in a cause interaction is the
receiver (R). Therefore, v = S and v0 = R.
2
Lemma 69 states that any causelink edge in the nal graph ends at a FINAL node.
Lemma 69. At nal graph gf and for any nodes n, n0 2 gf:n, the following statement
holds:
If hn;n0i 2 gf:ce, then
gf:nk(n0) = FINAL:Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 138
2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. From Lemma 68, we know that if
hn;n0i 2 gf:ce, then n and n0 are in contexts h;Si and h0;Ri, respectively.
By Causelink Accuracy property (Theorem 49), any causelink is accurate when the
ASM terminates, pointing to a provenance store that recorded the interaction record
about cause interaction (store T(a0
ps;0;R) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;0;R):pasi, such that
a0
ps = assertor T(a;0;R):ol). Since assertor T(a;0;R):str = OK when the ASM
terminates, n0 is a FINAL node.
2
Lemma 70 gives the number of causelink edges that may appear in a graph.
Lemma 70. At nal graph gf and for any node n 2 gf:n, jgetCIDS(n)j = jfhn;n0ij
hn;n0i 2 gf:ce;for some n0gj. 2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. By mapping function T, whenever a
node n is added to gf:n, jgetCIDS(n)j causelink edges starting from n are added into
gf:ce. Therefore, the statement holds. 2
With Lemmas 68 and 69, any causelink edge starts from a node in the sender's interaction
context and ends at the FINAL node in the receiver's context of another interaction. We
now give an example of graph describing causelink edges in Figure 5.9. In Figure 5.9,
there is one eect interaction i and three cause interactions j, k and l. Assume n is
the node in the context hi;Si, such that jgetCIDS(n)j = 3. Therefore, there are three
causelink edges in the graph, each pointing to a FINAL node in the corresponding cause
interaction.
We note that Lemmas 68, 69 and 70 do not state the classication of a node nor the
nodekind of the starting node n. This information is determined on a case by case basis,
which we will discuss in the next section.
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Figure 5.9: Nodes connected via causelink edges
Lemma 71 states that the destination node of a viewlink edge or causelink edge is always
in the same graph as those edges.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 139
Lemma 71. At nal graph gf, for any nodes n and n0, the following statement holds:
If hn;n0i 2 gf:ve _ hn;n0i 2 gf:ce, then
n0 2 gf:n:
2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning.
With function T, we consider a new viewlink edge hn;n0i added to gf:ve, such that
n0 = ha0
ps;0;v0i. If store T(a0
ps;0;v0) is h?;?;;i, then n0 is added to gf:n. Otherwise,
n0 is added to gf:n when function T checks store T(a0
ps;0;v0). Therefore, the lemma is
preserved.
We now discuss a new causelink edge hn;n0i added to gf:ce, such that n0 = ha0
ps;0;v0i.
By Causelink Accuracy property (Theorem 49), any causelink is accurate when the
ASM terminates, pointing to a provenance store that recorded the interaction record
about a cause interaction (store T(a0
ps;0;v0) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;0;v0):pasi; such
that a0
ps = assertor T(a;0;v0):ol). Therefore, node n0 is added to gf:n when function
T checks store T(a0
ps;0;v0).
Based on the above analysis, the lemma is preserved.
2
After identifying basic graph properties, we now perform systematic analysis on graph
topologies, which is exhibited after F-PReP terminates for recording interaction records
of the two assertors in one interaction. We will investigate graph properties for the
whole process documentation in Section 5.4.
5.3 Exhaustive Analysis
In this section, we exhaustively analyse cases that aect the shape of a graph. Since
a viewlink edge and a causelink edge connect two nodes concerned with the same and
dierent interactions (Lemmas 66 and 68), respectively, we discuss graphs containing
viewlink edges in Section 5.3.1 and then those related to causelink edges in Section 5.3.2
to separate concerns. The proof for several properties used in this section is provided as
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5.3.1 Viewlink Edges
To facilitate our discussion regarding the use of alternative stores, we begin our discussion
with the case where only an assertor's default store records a duplicate interaction record
(i.e., Denition 62, PSSet(a;;v) = ;). The results are summarised in Figure 5.10 and
will be explained in Section 5.3.1.1.
Next, we take PSSet(a;;v) 6= ; into consideration. We consider that any number
of intermediary provenance stores may also duplicately record an assertor's interaction
record. The results for this case are summarised in Figures 5.12 and 5.13 and will be
explained in Section 5.3.1.2.
5.3.1.1 PSSet(a;;v) = ;
We will have an exhaustive analysis on the topology of graphs generated after the two
assertors in one interaction nish recording their respective interaction record in the
event of failures. In terms of one assertor, there are only the following three cases.
We discuss two situations where an alternative store was/was not used during recording
an interaction record (determined by log T(a;;v):changed). If an alternative store was
used, we further discuss if the default store recorded any duplicate interaction record,
which would result in redundant information and aect graph topology (determined by
store T(aps;;v)).
(1) An assertor successfully recorded its interaction record to its default store. Re-
call that log T(a;;v):changed indicates if an assertor has used any alternative store
to record its interaction record (Lemma 30). We can formally express this case as follows:
When the ASM terminates at nal conguration,
log T(a;;v):changed = FALSE
(2) An assertor used an alternative store to record its interaction record in the case of
failures and the default store did not record the interaction record.
Formally, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration,
^
(
log T(a, ;v):changed = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) 6= ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl:Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 141
(3) An assertor used an alternative store to record its interaction record in the case of
failures but the default store also duplicately recorded the interaction record.
Formally, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration,
^
(
log T(a, ;v):changed = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl:
Given that there are two assertors (the sender and receiver) in one interaction and there
are totally three cases with regard to each assertor, we have nine cases to consider. Since
the role of the sender and receiver is interchangeable in the nine cases, we reduce the
symmetric ones to the following six cases:
(a) Both the sender and receiver successfully recorded their interaction record to their
respective default store.
Formally, for any a,  and v, and for some a0, when the ASM terminates at nal cong-
uration:
^
(
log T(a, ;v):changed = FALSE
log T(a0;;v):changed = FALSE
(b) One assertor successfully recorded its interaction record to its default store; the other
assertor used an alternative store to record its interaction record in the case of failures
and its default store did not record its interaction record.
Formally, for any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
8
> <
> :
log T(a, ;v):changed = FALSE
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
(c) One assertor successfully recorded its interaction record to its default store; the other
assertor used an alternative store to record its interaction record in the case of failures
and its default store also duplicately recorded its interaction record.
Formally, for any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 142
^
8
> <
> :
log T(a, ;v):changed = FALSE
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
(d) Both assertors used an alternative store to record their interaction record in the case
of failures and their default stores did not record their interaction records.
Formally, for any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v):changed = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) 6= ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
(e) Both assertors used an alternative store to record their interaction record in the case
of failures; one's default store did not record its interaction record but the other one's
default store did.
Formally, for any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v):changed = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
(f) Both assertors used an alternative store to record their interaction record in the case
of failures and their default stores also duplicately recorded their interaction records.
Formally, for any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v):changed = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
After identifying all possible cases, we show the corresponding graphs produced by eachChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 143
case. The results are summarised in Figure 5.10. Since all our discussion in this section
is concerned with one interaction, we omit a node's interaction key in our graphs for
simplication. Due to the symmetric nature of these cases, we assume viewkinds v and
v are roles of the receiver and sender of an interaction in our graphs.
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Figure 5.10: Graph summary (PSSet(a;;v) = ;)
Given PSSet(a;;v) = ;, only an assertor's default store may record duplicate inter-
action records. This means there is no intermediary node on graphs. We now discuss
each of the six cases regarding the topology between default nodes and alternative nal
nodes.
Case (a):
For any a,  and v, and for some a0, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
(
log T(a, ;v):changed = FALSE
log T(a0;;v):changed = FALSE
Figure 5.10(a) shows the corresponding graph. By Lemma 30, assertor T(a;;v):ol =
assertor T(a;;v):dl and assertor T(a0;;v):ol = assertor T(a0;;v):dl. Therefore,
there is a default node and no alternative nal node in either interaction context. By
Lemmas 65 and 67, the two nodes are FINAL, connected via two viewlink edges.
Case (b):
For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 144
^
8
> <
> :
log T(a, ;v):changed = FALSE
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
Figure 5.10(b) shows the corresponding graph. By Lemma 30, assertor T(a;;v):ol =
assertor T(a;;v):dl and assertor T(a0;;v):ol 6= assertor T(a0;;v):dl. Therefore,
there is one default node and no alternative nal node in interaction context h;vi and
there is one alternative nal node in the other interaction context h;vi. We now analyse
if there is a default node in interaction context h;vi on the graph.
By Lemma 82 (proved in Section 5.7),
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?
such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl.
Since store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, by Lemma 36, the fact that
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ? implies that store T(a0
ps;;v) = h?;?;;i. This means map-
ping function T (Section 5.1.2) does not add node ha0
ps;;vi when checking
store T(a0
ps;;v). In addition, since store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol and
assertor T(a0;;v):ol 6= assertor T(a0;;v):dl, function T also does not add a default
node for interaction context h;vi when checking store T(aps;;v). Therefore, there is
no default node in interaction context h;vi.
With Lemmas 65 and 67, the default node in context h;vi and alternative nal node
in context h;vi are FINAL, connected via two viewlink edges.
Case (c):
For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
8
> <
> :
log T(a, ;v):changed = FALSE
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
Figure 5.10(c) shows the corresponding graph. By Lemma 30, assertor T(a;;v):ol =
assertor T(a;;v):dl and assertor T(a0;;v):ol 6= assertor T(a0;;v):dl. Therefore,
there is one default node and no alternative nal node in interaction context h;vi
and there is one alternative nal node in the other interaction context h;vi. Given
store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, where a0
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there is a default node (which is FULL) in interaction context h;vi.
By Lemma 80 (proved in Section 5.7), store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol, such
that a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl. This means the default node in interaction context
h;vi is connected with the default node in context h;vi via a viewlink edge.
With Lemmas 65 and 67, we can express the corresponding graph in Figure 5.10(c).
Case (d):
For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v):changed = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) 6= ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
Figure 5.10(d) shows the corresponding graph. By Lemma 30, assertor T(a;;v):ol 6=
assertor T(a;;v):dl and assertor T(a0;;v):ol 6= assertor T(a0;;v):dl. Therefore,
there is an alternative nal node in either interaction context. We now analyse if there
is a default node in either interaction context on the graph.
By Lemma 87 (proved in Section 5.7),
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?
such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl.
Since store T(aps;;v) 6= ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, by Lemma 36, the fact
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0
ps;;v):ol infers that store T(aps;;v) = h?;vl;;i,
such that vl = assertor T(a0
ps;;v):ol. This means that there is a default node (which
is LINK) in interaction context h;vi on the graph.
Since store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, by Lemma 36 and the fact
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?, we can infer that store T(a0
ps;;v) = h?;?;;i. This means
that function T does not add node ha0
ps;;vi when checking store T(a0
ps;;v). In ad-
dition, since store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol and assertor T(a0;;v):ol 6=
assertor T(a0;;v):dl, mapping function T does not add a default node for interaction
context h;vi when checking store T(aps;;v). Therefore, there is no default node in
interaction context h;vi on the graph.
With Lemmas 65 and 67, we can express the corresponding graph in Figure 5.10(d).
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For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v):changed = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
Figure 5.10(e1) shows the corresponding graph. By Lemma 30, assertor T(a;;v):ol 6=
assertor T(a;;v):dl and assertor T(a0;;v):ol 6= assertor T(a0;;v):dl. Therefore,
there is an alternative nal node in either interaction context. We now analyse if there
is a default node in either interaction context on the graph.
By Lemma 88 (proved in Section 5.7), there are two subcases.
Case (e.1):
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?
Given store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, such that aps =
assertor T(a;;v):dl, there is a default node (which is FULL) in interaction context
h;vi.
Since store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, by Lemma 36 and the fact
that store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?, we can infer that store T(a0
ps;;v) = h?;?;;i. This
means function T does not add node ha0
ps;;vi when checking store T(a0
ps;;v). In ad-
dition, since store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol and assertor T(a0;;v):ol 6=
assertor T(a0;;v):dl, function T does not add a default node for interaction context
h;vi when checking store T(aps;;v). Therefore, there is no default node in interaction
context h;vi on the graph.
With Lemmas 65 and 67, we can express the corresponding graph in Figure 5.10(e1).
Case (e.2):
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):dl
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol
Figure 5.10(e2) shows the corresponding graph. Given store T(aps;;v) =
ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl, there is a default
node (which is FULL) in interaction context h;vi.
Since store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, by Lemma 36 and the factChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 147
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol, we can infer store T(a0
ps;;v) = h?;vl;;i,
such that vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol. This means there is a default node (which is LINK)
in interaction context h;vi.
With Lemmas 65 and 67, we can express the corresponding graph in Figure 5.10(e2).
Case (f):
For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl
and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v):changed = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v):changed = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
Figure 5.10(f) shows the corresponding graph. By Lemma 30, assertor T(a;;v):ol 6=
assertor T(a;;v):dl and assertor T(a0;;v):ol 6= assertor T(a0;;v):dl. Therefore,
there is an alternative nal node in either interaction context. We now analyse if there
is a default node in either interaction context on the graph.
Given store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, such that
aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl, there is a default node (which is FULL) in interaction context
h;vi.
Given store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, such that
a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, there is a default node (which is FULL) in interaction
context h;vi.
By Lemma 89 (proved in Section 5.7),
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):dl
There are two viewlink edges each starting from a default node in the graph.
With Lemmas 65 and 67, we can express the corresponding graph in Figure 5.10(f).
5.3.1.2 PSSet(a;;v) 6= ;
After discussing the case where only an assertor's default store may record a dupli-
cate interaction record (i.e., PSSet(a;;v) = ;), we now take PSSet(a;;v) 6= ; into
consideration, where any number of intermediary provenance stores may also record a
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According to the denition of PSSet(a;;v) (Denition 62), for any aps 2 PSSet(a;;v),
aps is not the default store nor the nal store used by assertor a in interaction context
h;vi. Therefore, when assertor a nishes recording its interaction record, the presence
of PSSet(a;;v) 6= ; does not alter the existing topology of a graph as summarised in
Figure 5.10.
If a provenance store referred by the element in PSSet(a;;v) recorded any duplicate
interaction record, an intermediary node and an associated viewlink edge would be
added into the graphs in Figure 5.10. By Lemma 36 and Lemma 91 (proved in Section
5.7), we can infer that given aps 2 PSSet(a;;v) and store T(aps;;v) 6= h?;?;;i, an
intermediary node, haps;;vi, is a FULL node. Lemma 91 also species that a viewlink
edge starting from haps;;vi always ends at the default node of the opposite view in the
same interaction.
Since there may be several intermediary nodes regarding the same interaction context,
to facilitate our presentation, we use a star  to indicate any number of intermediary
nodes (num  0). In the example of Figure 5.11, there are several intermediary nodes
in the sender's interaction context, each connected to the same node in the receiver's
interaction context via a viewlink edge. This can be simplied by using a star  on the
graph.
We augment Figure 5.10 with any number of intermediary nodes and associated viewlink
edges to have a generic representation, as shown in Figure 5.12. We note that Graph
(A) remains the same because no failure occurred and hence no alternative store was
used by each assertor. Since notation  represents any number of nodes (num  0),
Figure 5.12 includes the cases in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.11: Grouping multiple intermediary nodes
We also note that if the destination node of a newly added viewlink edge does not exist,
a NULL node is added to the graph according to the mapping function T. Graph (D)
and Graph (E) in Figure 5.12 show the presence of NULL nodes.
By considering the symmetric cases of Figure 5.12, we have given in Figures 5.12 and
5.13 all possible graphs that can be produced after two assertors in an interaction nish
recording their interaction record in the presence of failures. This summary will be used
when we explore the properties of process documentation in the next section.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 149
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Figure 5.12: Graph summary (PSSet(a;;v) 6= ;)
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Figure 5.13: Graph summary (symmetric cases of Figure 5.12)
5.3.2 Causelink Edges
In this section, we analyse graphs containing causelink edges.
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 have summarised all possible graph topologies with regard to one
interaction. By Lemmas 68 and 69, a causelink edge starts from a node in the sender's
context and ends at the FINAL node in the receiver's context of another interaction.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 150
We amend Figures 5.12 and 5.13 by adding causelink edges to all nodes (except LINK
nodes2), which are in the sender's context3. By Lemma 92 (proved in Section 5.7), all
causelink edges associated with the same cause interaction context h;Ri share the same
destination node.
We now illustrate the amending of Graph (D0) of Figure 5.13. We assume Graph (D0)
is concerned with interaction j. For simplication, we also assume there is only one
relationship p-assertion, which has only one cause interaction i and hence one causelink.
Therefore, all the provenance stores duplicately recording the relationship p-assertion
share a same causelink. The produced graph is shown in Figure 5.14, where there is
only one causelink edge starting from any node (except the LINK node) in the sender's
interaction context hj;Si and ending at a same destination node, which is a FINAL node
in interaction context hi;Ri.
We have demonstrated the case where there is only one relationship p-assertion with
only one cause interaction in an interaction record. We can easily extend the discussion
to the case where there are multiple relationship p-assertions in an interaction record,
each having multiple cause interactions.
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L￿ 5
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M￿ 5
Figure 5.14: Graph (D0) in Figure 5.13 with causelink edges appended
Lemma 65 has stated that there is one FINAL node in each interaction context and
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 have all graph topologies. Therefore, we can come to a general
conclusion: a causelink edge connects any two graphs in Figures 5.12 and 5.13, provided
that the source node is either FULL or FINAL and the connection is compliant with
Lemmas 68, 69 and 70. Figure 5.15 gives an example.
2A LINK node reects a provenance store which does not record any causelink.
3Only the sender of an interaction creates and records relationship p-assertions containing causelinks.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 151
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Figure 5.15: Graphs (B0) and (D0) in Figure 5.13 connected via causelink edges
5.4 Process Documentation Properties
In the previous sections, we discussed possible graph topologies after the two assertors
in one interaction nish recording their interaction record in the presence of failures.
This section investigates the properties of the whole process documentation.
Given that a process consists of a set of interactions, we use the induction on the
interactions of a process to show the documentation of a whole process is guaranteed to
be recorded in provenance stores and any links are accurate. In the inductive step, i.e.,
for each interaction of a process, we reuse the properties established for F-PReP.
5.4.1 Modeling Process
First of all, we extend the ASM to consider the execution of a process [76].
A process is a causally connected set of interactions between actors involved in that
process.
To describe this execution formally, we also dene the following state space [76] for the
execution of the set of actors.
Since an actor behaves upon the receipt of an application message, we model the state of
actor (AS) as data within received application messages, where messages are identied
by interaction keys (IK). We also dene a table AppS mapping actor identities (AID) toChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 152
AS = P(DATA  IK) (Actor States)
AppS = AID ! AS (Application States)
APC = AppSC (Provenance-aware Application States)
Characteristic Variables:
hd;i 2 AS,
as 2 AppS,
apc 2 APC,
c 2 C,
has;ci = apc
Figure 5.16: Extended ASM state space
actor states. The conguration of a provenance-aware application4, modelled by APC,
is dened by the combination of the state of all actors in the system combined with
the conguration (C) of F-PReP5. The execution of actors following Figure 5.17 can
be modeled by rules that express the transition of states when sending and receiving
application messages6.
produce app(as;ar;aps;d) :
//triggered when d is to be sent by as to ar.
! f
   newIdentifier(as;ar);
send(app(d;;aps);as;ar);
g
consume app(as;ar;aps;;d) :
app(d;;aps) 2 k(as;ar)
! f
receive(app(d;;aps);as;ar);
as(ar) := as(ar)  fhd;ig;
// business logic
g
Figure 5.17: Application transitions
For simplication, we use p app and c app to denote transitions produce app and
consume app, and use s app and r app to denote F-PReP's transitions send app and
receive app (Figures 3.23 and 3.24).
With these denitions, the execution of an interaction can be denoted as
as1  !p app as2  !c app as3:
4We term a provenance-aware application as an application that creates and records process docu-
mentation.
5This conguration is dened in the extended system state space in Figure 3.17.
6The application message contains an ownlink (aps), application data (d) and interaction key () in
order to be compatible with the denition in F-PReP.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 153
For simplication, we express the above notation as
as1  !(p app; c app) as3:
Given that a process consists of a set of interactions, the execution of a process7 can be
represented as
as0  !
(p app; c app) asf;
where as0 and asf are the initial state and nal state of the assertors in the process,
respectively.
We note that the sender in the rst interaction of a process does not produce any
relationship p-assertion since the rst interaction is not caused by other interactions.
In a provenance-aware application, application transitions and F-PReP transitions are
coupled together following Denition 72.
Denition 72. Let t be any application or F-PReP transition or a merged transition of
both, for any congurations, has1;c1i and has2;c2i, the following transition is allowed:
has1;c1i  !t has2;c2i
if one of the following conditions hold:
1. if as1  !p app as2, then c1  !s app c2.
2. if as1  !c app as2, then c1  !r app c2.
3. if c1  !t c2, such that t 6= s app and r app, then as1 = as2.
2
When the p app or c app transition is red in the application, the corresponding s app
or r app transition is red as well, which means the application and F-PReP transitions
are merged together. We note that the pseudo-statements shared by the transitions only
execute once.
Therefore, the execution of the application is coupled with the execution of F-PReP
via corresponding rules for sending and receiving messages. Using this denition, Sec-
tions 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 analyse the properties of process documentation recorded after the
provenance-aware application is complete.
7We assume that a process always starts from a transition p app.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 154
5.4.2 Guaranteed Recording, Viewlink Accuracy, Causelink Accuracy
In this section, we demonstrate that process documentation recorded using F-PReP is
guaranteed to be recorded in provenance stores and we use graphical representation to
show that all viewlinks and causelinks in the process documentation are accurate.
￿ GHQRWHV￿PXOWLSOH￿WUDQVLWLRQV￿
GHQRWHV￿D￿SDLU￿RI￿FRXSOLQJ￿VWDWHV￿￿DV￿￿F!￿￿SRLQWLQJ￿IURP￿DV WR￿F
GHQRWHV￿D￿PDSSLQJ￿IURP￿F￿WR￿D JUDSK￿J￿￿XVLQJ￿IXQFWLRQ￿7￿￿VXFK￿WKDW￿J  ￿7￿F￿
GHQRWH￿DQ￿DFWRU￿VWDWH￿￿D￿V\VWHP￿FRQILJXUDWLRQ￿DQG￿D￿JUDSK￿￿UHVSHFWLYHO\ DV￿￿F￿￿J
VBDSS￿￿UBDSS GHQRWH￿WUDQVLWLRQ￿VHQGBDSS DQG￿UHFHLYHBDSS￿￿UHSHFWLYHO\
RWKHUV GHQRWHV￿)￿35H3 WUDQVLWLRQV￿RWKHU￿WKDQ￿VHQGBDSS DQG￿UHFHLYHBDSS
SBDSS￿￿FBDSS GHQRWH￿WUDQVLWLRQ￿SURGXFHBDSS DQG￿FRQVXPHBDSS￿￿UHSHFWLYHO\
Figure 5.18: Transition notations
Our proof is based on the induction on the interactions of a process. To better illustrate
the proof, we use three state transition diagrams shown in Figures 5.19, 5.21, and 5.22.
These gures follow the notations dened in Figure 5.18.
Lemma 73. As depicted in Figure 5.19, for any application state, asj, reachable from
initial state as0, where as0  !
(p app; c app) asj; for all apcj reachable from apc0: apc0
 !
t apcj with apc0 = has0;c0i and apcj = hasj;cji; the following statements hold when
using F-PReP to record process documentation in the presence of failures:
1. [Process Recording Termination] there exists a nal conguration apcf = hasj;cfi,
such that apcj  !
t apcf without application transitions;
2. [Guaranteed Recording] the documentation of the process, as0  !
(p app; c app)
asj, is recorded in provenance stores at cf;
3. if graph gf, produced by T(cf), is not empty, then gf has the following properties:
(3.a) [V iewlink Accuracy] for any node n 2 gf:n, such that n = haps;;vi and
gf:nk(n) = FINAL, then there is only one viewlink edge hn;n0i 2 gf:ve, where
n0 = ha0
ps;;vi and gf:nk(n0) = FINAL, for some a0
ps.
(3.b) [Causelink Accuracy] for any node n 2 gf:n, such that n = haps;;Si and
gf:nk(n) = FINAL, then jgetCIDS(n)j = jfhn;n0ijhn;n0i 2 gf:cegj, where n0 =
ha0
ps;0;Ri and gf:nk(n0) = FINAL and 0 6= , for some a0
ps.
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Figure 5.19: State transition diagram depicting Lemma 73
In Figure 5.19, the application proceeds from an initial state as0 to some nal state asj
after a serial of interactions. Because of system coupling, the provenance-aware applica-
tion also proceeds from an initial state has0;c0i to some state hasj;cji. However, there
may be interaction records remaining to be recorded, thus the provenance-aware appli-
cation nishes recording them without using application transitions (denoted by others
in the gure). Finally, the provenance-aware application reaches nal state hasj;cfi. By
T(cf), we can obtain graph gf, which exhibits Properties (3.a) and (3.b).
Properties (3.a) and (3.b) state the topology of all FINAL nodes in gf. Essentially,
Properties (3.a) and (3.b) dene the backbone of gf, following a pattern as illustrated
in Figure 5.20. In Figure 5.20, we assume each node is an alternative nal node, which
can be other type of node. We also use N to denote jgetCIDS(n)j and only show one
destination node for N causelink edges to simplify the graph. In general, each causelink
edge can have a dierent destination node.
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Figure 5.20: A pattern of FINAL nodes
Proof. Our proof proceeds by induction on the length of the transition sequence from
as0  !
(p app; c app) asj.
In the base case, as0 equals asj, hence no interaction has taken place, and no application
transition occurred, and process documentation is empty, and gf is empty. Therefore,
the lemma holds trivially.
In the inductive case, as shown in Figure 5.21, if as0  !
(p app; c app) asi, then by Deni-
tion 72, we have c0  !
(s app; r app) ci. As inductive hypothesis, we assume that (1) there
exists a nal conguration hasi;cxi, such that hasi;cii  !
t hasi;cxi without applicationChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 156
transitions; (2) process documentation about as0  !
(p app; c app) asi was recorded in a
set of provenance stores at cx; (3) graph gi, produced by T(cx), preserves the following
properties:
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Figure 5.21: State transition diagram depicting the inductive hypothesis for proof of
Lemma 73
 for any node n 2 gi:n, such that n = haps;;vi and gi:nk(n) = FINAL, then there is
only one viewlink edge hn;n0i 2 gi:ve, where n0 = ha0
ps;;vi and gi:nk(n0) = FINAL;
 for any node n 2 gi:n, such that n = haps;;Si and gi:nk(n) = FINAL, there
are jgetCIDS(n)j causelink edges hn;n0i 2 gi:ce, where n0 = ha0
ps;0;Ri and
gi:nk(n0) = FINAL and 0 6= .
We now consider the step asi  !(p app; c app) asj. By Denition 72, cx  !(s app; r app) cj.
This inductive step is depicted in Figure 5.22. We note that this application transition
can occur at any time after conguration hasi;cii. It does not have to wait for the record-
ing of p-assertions to nish. We rstly establish that there exists a nal conguration
hasj;cfi, where process documentation is recorded. Then we establish gf's properties.
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Figure 5.22: State transition diagram depicting the inductive step for proof of Lemma
73
(1) We establish the presence of a nal conguration for the process. By inductive
hypothesis, we know hasi;cxi is the nal conguration for all prior interactions. Since
asi  !(p app; c app) asj is about one interaction, by the ASM's Termination property
(Theorem 15), there exists a nal conguration for the interaction, where documentationChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 157
about this interaction is guaranteed to be recorded in provenance stores. This means
that there are a nite number of transitions from cj to a nal system conguration
cf without using application transitions. Therefore, there exists a nal conguration,
hasj;cfi for the process as0  !
(p app; c app) asj.
(2) By Theorem 22, the sender and receiver's interaction records about interaction
asi  !(p app; c app) asj are guaranteed to be recorded at cf. With inductive hypoth-
esis, we know that documentation about prior interactions, as0  !
(p app; c app) asi, has
been recorded at cx. Therefore, process documentation about as0  !
(p app; c app) asj is
recorded at cf.
(3) In the following properties, we establish the topology of distributed process docu-
mentation. Since hasi;cxi  !
paa hasj;cfi is about one interaction and the interaction
key j is unique in the process, the subgraph g0 with regard to this interaction is produced
independently of the rest of the graph.
(3.a) By Lemma 65, g0 contains two FINAL nodes, n = haps;j;vi and n0 = ha0
ps;j;vi, for
some aps and a0
ps. By Lemma 67, hn;n0i 2 g0:ve and hn0;ni 2 g0:ve. Therefore, with
inductive hypothesis, gf preserves Property (3.a).
(3.b) By Lemma 65, one FINAL node n, haps;j;Si, is produced in the receiver's inter-
action context in g0. Since g0  gf, we have n 2 gf:n. By Lemma 70, jgetCIDS(n)j
causelink edges hn;n0i are added in gf:ce, i.e., jgetCIDS(n)j = jfhn;n0ijhn;n0i 2 gf:cegj.
By Lemmas 68 and 69, for each of the newly added causelink edges, we have n0 =
ha0
ps;i;Ri and gf:nk(n0) = FINAL, such that i 6= j. Therefore, with inductive hypothe-
sis, gf preserves Property (3.b).
2
Essentially, (3.a) states that any two FINAL nodes in the opposite views with regard to
a same interaction are interlinked via viewlink edges; (3.b) states that any FINAL node
in the sender's context in an interaction connects to the FINAL node in the receiver's
context of another interaction. By applying the two conclusions to all FINAL nodes in a
graph, the pattern in Figure 5.20 appears.
This pattern has been exemplied by the graph in Figure 5.6 in Section 5.1.3, which
is produced after F-PReP nishes recording process documentation in a failure-free
environment. Recall that Section 5.3.2 has drawn a conclusion: a causelink edge connects
any two graphs in Figures 5.12 and 5.13, provided that the source node is either FULL
or FINAL, and the connection is compliant with Lemmas 68, 69 and 70. With this
conclusion, we give an example of a graph (Figure 5.23) produced after F-PReP recorded
process documentation in the presence of failures.
We note that there are many redundant nodes (FULL and LINK nodes) on the graph
(Figure 5.23), indicating garbage information (i.e., duplicate or useless documentation)Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 158
recorded in provenance stores. As will be shown in the next section, redundant nodes are
not on the path of retrieving process documentation. Therefore, the garbage information
can be safely removed from stores, which we will discuss in Section 5.5.2.
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Figure 5.23: One possible graph produced after F-PReP nished recording in the
presence of failures
After establishing that process documentation recorded using F-PReP is guaranteed
to be recorded in provenance stores and all viewlinks and causelinks in the process
documentation are accurate, we now demonstrate the entire retrievability of distributed
documentation.
5.4.3 Documentation Retrievability
In this section, we refer to Figures 5.19, 5.21 and 5.22 when illustrating the proof.
5.4.3.1 Original Query Algorithm
A query algorithm has been developed [117] to retrieve process documentation which was
recorded in a failure-free environment. We revise this algorithm in function getProDoc.
Function getProDoc takes a node n and a nal graph gf as input and returns the process
documentation of a data item. We assume the data item is dj, produced in process
as0  !
(p app; c app) asj (Figure 5.19). We assume that this function starts searchingChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 159
from the node in the receiver's interaction context hj;Ri 8. Therefore, a starting node n,
haps;j;Ri, is assumed as the initial input of the function, where aps is the default store
used in interaction context hj;Ri.
Denition
getProDoc : NODE  GRAPH ! P(RECORD)
getProDoc(n;g) :
initialize doc;
doc := doc [ fstore T(n)g;
if (hn;n0i 2 g:ve)
doc := doc [ fstore T(n0)g;
for each hn0;n00i 2 g:ce
doc := doc [ getProDoc(n00;g);
return doc;
Although the original query algorithm [117] does not involve gf, we include it in order to
simplify the presentation of getProDoc. For example, when dealing with causelinks, we
do not need to express low level details such as the content of a relationship p-assertion,
which has been captured by the denition of Causelink Edge.
Function getProDoc recursively retrieves interaction records from both views of each
interaction of the process that led to dj. The destination node of a viewlink edge or
causelink edge indicates the next location to retrieve an interaction record. According
to the denition of a node, notation store T(n) is equivalent to store T(aps;j;R), which
simplies our presentation.
To facilitate our further discussion, we dene a term Directed Causal Path.
Denition 74 (Directed Causal Path). A directed causal path consists of a sequence
of vertices (i.e., nodes), n1, n2, :::, nm, such that for i = 1, 2, :::, m 1 and for some
aps and , the following conditions are satised:
_
(
hni;ni+1i 2 g:ce
hni;ni+1i 2 g:ve ^ ni = haps;;Ri
2
On a directed causal path, any two adjacent nodes are connected via a causelink edge
or viewlink edge, representing links recorded in provenance stores. A causelink edge
connects two nodes that can tell us where to nd interaction records documenting an
application's output data produced from an input data. A viewlink edge hni;ni+1i 2
g:ve, where ni is associated with a receiver's interaction context, connects two nodes that
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can help us to locate the interaction record documenting where a received input data
was from, which was the output data produced by the sender in another interaction.
Therefore, by following the directed causal paths, we can retrieve distributed process
documentation describing how a data product was derived.
We note that by Figure 5.20, a viewlink edge hni+1;nii 2 g:ve, where ni = haps;;Ri,
may exist but is not on the directed causal path. The presence of such a direction sup-
ports functionalities such as verifying two views' knowledge about the same interaction
[76].
Essentially, getProDoc traverses by following any directed causal paths starting from
a root node, say haps;j;Ri. The retrieved process documentation has a form of tree
structure with the root being the interaction record about interaction context hj;Ri,
which is the rst interaction record to be retrieved. In the example of Figure 5.5, let n
be haps;i4;Ri, where aps is the default store used by assertor a5 and gf is the graph on
Figure 5.6. Function getProDoc(n;gf) returns the entire process documentation and its
retrieving path is shown on Figure 5.24. Since all default provenance stores successfully
record interaction records in a failure-free environment, the nodes that getProDoc(n;gf)
visits are the default nodes of each interaction, which are all FINAL.
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Figure 5.24: Retrieving path based on Figure 5.6
5.4.3.2 Retrieval Function Properties
The termination and completion properties of the original query algorithm [117] has not
been formally established. We now establish them based on function getProDoc, which
is crucial to establishing the retrievability of process documentation. We rstly identify
Lemma 75 showing that the graph is acyclic.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 161
Lemma 75 (Directed Acyclic Graph). Process graph has no directed causal path
that starts and ends on the same node. 2
Proof. Our proof proceeds by induction on the length of the transition sequence from
as0  !
(p app; c app) asj, depicted in Figure 5.19. In the base case, as0 equals asj, hence
no interaction has taken place, and gf is empty. Therefore, the lemma holds trivially.
In the inductive case, as shown in Figure 5.21, if as0  !
(p app; c app) asi, then the
inductive hypothesis states that graph gi has no directed causal path that starts and
ends on the same node.
We now consider interaction asi  !(p app; c app) asj (Figure 5.22). Let nj be any of the
two nodes produced regarding interaction j. Since an interaction key is globally unique,
j was not used in process as0  !
(p app; c app) asi and hence nj = 2 gi.
We discuss the two nodes added into gi to form gf.
1. nj = haps;j;Si:
The only permitted directed causal paths starts by following causelink edges from this
node, which lead to nodes in gi.
2. nj = haps;j;Ri:
The only permitted directed causal path starts by following a viewlink edge hnj;n0
ji 2
gf:ve, where n0
j = ha0
ps;j;Si.
Finally, given nj = 2 gi, there is no edge starting from a node in gi and ending at nj
(Lemma 71). Therefore, for any node nj regarding interaction asi  !(p app; c app) asj,
there is no directed causal path that starts and ends on the same nj.
With inductive case, we have shown that gf has no directed causal path that starts and
ends on the same node, which preserves the statement.
2
Lemma 76 (Retrieval Termination). Function getProDoc terminates. 2
Proof. We proceed by the following reasoning. By denition, getProDoc retrieves
interaction records by following directed causal paths from a starting node. With Lemma
75, getProDoc does not innitely retrieves a same node. Since the rst interaction in
the process is not caused by other interactions, the recursion terminates when there is
no further cause interaction. Therefore, function getProDoc terminates.
2
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Denition 77 (Entire Process Documentation). The entire documentation of a
process consists of a set of interaction records about all interaction contexts of the process,
and each interaction record is about a unique interaction context.
Recall that an interaction context describes a view (sender or receiver) of an interaction
and an interaction record is created by the sender or receiver describing its view of the
interaction. Therefore, interaction records about all interaction contexts of a process are
made by both the sender and receiver of each interaction of the whole process. If each
interaction record is about a unique interaction context, then any two interaction records
are not about the same interaction context, which means process documentation has no
redundant interaction record and only contains the necessary information in order to
determine the provenance of a data item.
In the example of Graph (E) in Figure 5.12, all the nodes in the receiver's context
indicate an interaction record documenting the same interaction. So entire process
documentation contains only one interaction record from the receiver's context of that
interaction but the interaction record may be obtained from any node of the receiver's
context.
Lemma 78 (Complete Retrieval). After F-PReP nishes recording process doc-
umentation in a failure-free environment, function getProDoc retrieves entire process
documentation. 2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. Since getProDoc retrieves process
documentation recorded in a failure-free environment, the starting node it begins with
is a default node, which is FINAL. By Lemma 65, there is only one FINAL node in each
interaction context and by Lemma 76, the function terminates.
The following proof is based on the induction on the length of the transition sequence
from as0  !
(p app; c app) asj in Figure 5.19.
In the base case, as0 equals asj, hence no interaction has taken place and process doc-
umentation is empty. Therefore, the lemma holds trivially. In the inductive case, the
inductive hypothesis assumes that after F-PReP nishes recording process documenta-
tion about process as0  !
(p app; c app) asi (Figure 5.21) in a failure-free environment,
getProcDoc(ni;gi) returns entire process documentation about this process.
We now consider interaction asi  !(p app; c app) asj (Figure 5.22). Let nj be the FINAL
node in interaction context hj;Ri. After F-PReP nishes recording documentation for
the process as0  !
(p app; c app) asj, we study getProDoc(nj;gf). The interaction record
in context hj;Ri is rst retrieved. Given hn;n0i 2 gf:ve and Lemma 73 (3.a), n0 is the
FINAL node in context hj;Si. Hence, the function retrieves one interaction record from
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By Lemma 73 (3.b), there are jgetCIDS(n0)j causelink edges, each pointing to a desti-
nation node n00 that indicates the location where the interaction record of the receiver
in the corresponding cause interaction is recorded. Assuming that the interaction key
of a cause interaction is i, by Lemma 73 (3.b), we know that n00 is the FINAL node in
interaction context hi;Ri and n00 2 gi:n. Therefore, according to the inductive case,
getProcDoc(n00, gi) gives entire process documentation for previous interactions other
than asi  !(p app; c app) asj. Since we have retrieved one interaction record from each in-
teraction context of interaction asi  !(p app; c app) asj, getProcDoc(nj;gf) gives entire
process documentation.
Based on the above proof, the implication is preserved.
2
5.4.3.3 New Query Function
The original query function getProDoc is used to retrieve process documentation recorded
when no failure occurred. Hence it begins by searching an assertor's default store.
However, it would retrieve incomplete process documentation if the documentation was
recorded in the presence of failures, as illustrated in Figure 5.25.
Figure 5.25 shows getProDoc's retrieving path based on the graph in Figure 5.23, where
alternative stores were used to record the interaction records. It starts searching from
the default node in interaction context hi4;Ri, which is LINK, referring to a provenance
store which does not have an interaction record but only contains a viewlink for that
context. Therefore, retrieving interaction records from the default store in this case
cannot give entire process documentation.
To address this problem, we introduce a new query function getProDoc New to retrieve
process documentation recorded in the presence of failures.
Denition
getProDoc New : P(PID)  IK  GRAPH ! P(RECORD)
getProDoc New(pslist;j;gf) :
for each aps 2 pslist
do n   haps;j;Ri;
if (hn;n0i 2 gf:ve ^ store T(n):pas 6= ; ^ store T(n0):pas 6= ;)
return getProDoc(n;gf);
return ;;
Function getProDoc New takes as input a list of provenance store identities (e.g., an
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Figure 5.25: Retrieving path based on Figure 5.23, using getProDoc
data item was exchanged, and a nal graph. It then returns the process documentation of
the data item. Since an interaction record may be recorded in an alternative store when
failures occurred, function getProDoc New searches all the candidate stores to look for
the rst interaction record of the process documentation and call function getProDoc.
In order to call getProDoc, a starting node haps;j;Ri9 is required, which must sat-
isfy two conditions. Firstly, there exists another node n0 such that hn;n0i 2 gf:ve.
Secondly, store T(n):pas 6= ; and store T(n0):pas 6= ;, which implies that n and n0
must be FULL or FINAL. By Lemma 36, if store T(n):pas 6= ;, then store T(n) =
ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi and hence the corresponding node is FULL or FINAL.
As opposed to getProDoc, getProDoc New starts searching from any candidate prove-
nance store and returns entire process documentation. In the case of Figure 5.23, it
searches all the alternative stores as well as the default store of assertor a5. Its traversing
path is given in Figure 5.26, where the rst node leading to entire process documentation
is an intermediary node in context hi4;Ri.
Now, we are ready to establish property Documentation Retrievability.
9Like getProDoc, this function is also assumed to retrieve the interaction record about a receiver's
interaction context at the beginning of the search. Similar discussion can be easily extended to the case
of the sender, which we omit.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 165
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Figure 5.26: Retrieving path based on Figure 5.23, using getProDoc New
5.4.3.4 Documentation Retrievability
Property Documentation Retrievability species that process documentation's en-
tire retrievability can be ensured after being recorded in provenance stores.
Lemma 79 (Documentation Retrievability). Process documentation recorded by
using F-PReP is retrievable in its entirety. 2
Proof. To facilitate our description, we refer to Figure 5.22 in our proof, where inter-
action asi  !(p app; c app) asj is represented by interaction key j. By Lemma 78, this
lemma is preserved for documentation recorded when no failure occurred. To demon-
strate that process documentation is retrievable after being recorded in the presence of
failures, we discuss two cases. In Case (1), we assume that the FINAL node nj of inter-
action context hj;Ri can be determined in advance. Since the knowledge about a FINAL
node is global and may not always be available10, we relax this assumption in Case (2),
where we use the new query function getProDoc New to facilitate the proof. Function
getProDoc New does not assume the global knowledge in the sense that it only checks
the content of a provenance store (store T(n):pas 6= ; ^ store T(n0):pas 6= ;).
Case (1):
If a starting FINAL node nj can be determined, this case is the same as retrieving
10Identifying a FINAL node requires assertor's state information as well as provenance store's state
information, according to the de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process documentation recorded in a failure-free environment. The proof for Lemma 78
has shown that function getProDoc(nj;gf) returns the entire process documentation.
Therefore, the statement is preserved in this case.
Case (2):
This case uses getProDoc New to obtain process documentation recorded in the pres-
ence of failures. We study getProDoc New(pslist;j;gf), where pslist contains an as-
serter's default store and all alternative stores used for recording interaction record about
context hj;Ri. Since each store is reected by a node on the graph, function
getProDoc New(pslist;j;gf) checks an assertor's default node, intermediary nodes and
alternative nal node, and nds the rst node that satises the above two conditions
(Section 5.4.3.3) in order to call getProDoc.
The rest of the proof is based on a case analysis of all possible graphs (A to G0) in
Figures 5.12 and 5.13. We show that the starting node satisfying the two conditions
leads to the retrieval of entire process documentation. Since any alternative nal node
in context hj;Ri is always FINAL, as shown in Figures 5.12 and 5.13, it satises the
two conditions and leads to entire process documentation, demonstrated in Case (1).
Therefore, we only discuss the default node and intermediary nodes on each graph.
Graph (A), Graph (B) and Graph (C):
The only node in context hj;Ri is the default node, which is FINAL. It satises the
two above conditions and is passed to getProDoc. With the conclusion from Case (1),
searching from this node leads to entire process documentation.
Graph (D):
The default node in context hj;Ri is LINK, which refers to a provenance store only
maintaining a viewlink for context hj;Ri. Hence the two conditions are not met and
getProDoc New(pslist;j;gf) will check the next node.
All the intermediary nodes in context hj;Ri each have a viewlink edge leading to a NULL
node, therefore, the two conditions are not met and getProDoc New(pslist;j;gf) will
check the next node.
In this case, searching from the alternative nal node gives entire process documentation,
which is returned by calling getProDoc New(pslist;j;gf).
Graph (E):
The default node in context hj;Ri is FULL. It has a viewlink edge leading to a FINAL
node. When searching from this node, getProDoc(n;gf) retrieves one interaction record
from each interaction context of interaction j in the rst iteration. Since the default
node indicates a duplicate interaction record maintained in the corresponding default
store, getProDoc(n;gf) retrieves the same interaction record as from the FINAL node
in context hj;Ri. By property (3.b) in Lemma 73, each causelink edge starting from the
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iteration, all the input nodes for getProDoc are FINAL. Then the conclusion from Case
(1) applies. Based on the above analysis, searching from the default node, which is not
FINAL though, still leads to entire process documentation.
Each intermediary node in context hj;Ri connects to a NULL node via a viewlink edge,
therefore, the two conditions are not met and getProDoc New(pslist;j;gf) will check
the next node.
Graph (F):
The default node and intermediary nodes in context hj;Ri are FULL. Each has a
viewlink edge leading to a LINK node. Therefore, the two conditions are not met and
getProDoc New(pslist;j;gf) will check the next node.
Graph (G):
Similar to the discussion for Graph (E), searching from the default node in context hj;Ri
gives entire process documentation.
Each intermediary node in context hj;Ri is FULL and connects to another FULL node
via a viewlink edge. When searching from an intermediary node, getProDoc(n;gf)
retrieves one interaction record about each view of interaction j in the rst iteration.
Since a FULL node indicates duplicate interaction record maintained in the corresponding
store, getProDoc(n;gf) retrieves the same interaction records as from the FINAL nodes
regarding context hj;Ri and hj;Si. In addition, the recording of duplicate interaction
record also implies that causelink edges from a FULL node are the same as from the
FINAL nodes in context hj;Si. By property (3.b) in Lemma 73, each causelink edge
starting from the FULL node in context hj;Si ends at another FINAL node. Therefore,
all the input nodes for getProDoc are FINAL from the second iteration and the conclusion
in Case (1) applies. Based on the above analysis, searching from any intermediary node,
which is not FINAL though, still gives us entire process documentation.
Graphs (B0) to (G0):
The analysis is similar to the above, which we omit.
After discussing all the possible graphs regarding interaction asi  !(p app; c app) asj, we
have shown that getProDoc New returns entire process documentation by searching
from any node n which satises two conditions: (1) there exists another node n0 such
that hn;n0i 2 gf:ve; (2) store T(n):pas 6= ; and store T(n0):pas 6= ;, which implies that
n and n0 must be FULL or FINAL.
With the conclusion of Case (1) and Case (2), the implication is preserved.
2
Lemma 79 has established that the entire retrievability of process documentation recorded
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5.5 Discussion
In this section, we rst discuss retrieving process documentation without knowing the
termination of the protocol. We then discuss how to remove or reduce garbage informa-
tion reected by LINK and FULL nodes.
5.5.1 Early Retrieval
Due to the asynchronous nature of the protocol, process documentation cannot be re-
trieved in its entirety until the F-PReP terminates for each interaction of the process.
For example, if the coordinator still has outstanding update requests, entire process doc-
umentation cannot be retrieved. Although this is not a problem specic about failures11,
we provide initial thoughts about it.
As the termination of the protocol may not be known to a querying actor, the actor has to
wait a reasonable period of time after the data result is produced. Then it can repeatedly
query candidate provenance stores until it obtains the entire process documentation of
the result. To validate the entirety of retrieved process documentation, the actor can
either use application specic knowledge or rely on mechanisms provided by a provenance
store to verify the completeness. These mechanisms are however beyond the scope of
this thesis.
5.5.2 Dealing with Garbage Information
The traversal function getProDoc New can be used to identify the \primary" records;
the ones that are not traversed are regarded as garbage. In Figure 5.23, LINK and FULL
nodes reect garbage information (a single viewlink and a duplicate interaction record,
respectively) recorded in a respective provenance store. The presence of a LINK node is
due to the coordinator's incomplete knowledge when updating viewlink in a provenance
store, whilst a FULL node appears because of the use of alternative stores.
Garbage information reected by LINK nodes can be safely removed after a querying
actor obtains entire process documentation. In practice, a user can remove all the single
viewlinks recorded in provenance stores. Formally, for any aps,  and v and when the
ASM terminates, if store T(aps;;v) = h?;vl;;i, then the viewlink vl is ready to be
removed.
In terms of FULL nodes, the protocol can be congured to resend messages to a same
provenance store for a certain number of times before using an alternative store. There-
fore, the probability of recording redundant information can be reduced. After a query-
11We also cannot obtain entire process documentation in the absence of failures until the application
(i.e., process) terminates and process documentation ends up in provenance stores.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 169
ing actor obtains entire process documentation by following nodes on the retrieving path,
it can remove redundant information recorded in provenance stores indicated by nodes
not on the retrieving path. However, this requires a robust garbage collection protocol
to ensure the safe removal of redundant information, which is out of the scope of this
thesis.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the properties of process documentation recorded using F-
PReP in the presence of failures. We showed that the documentation of a whole process
is guaranteed to be recorded in provenance stores and any links are accurate. More
importantly, process documentation recorded in multiple interlinked provenance stores
can be retrieved in its entirety.
At the beginning of this chapter, we introduced a graph-based formalism (Section 5.1.1)
and then investigated the topological properties. Since a process consists of a set of in-
teractions, we exhaustively identied several graph properties regarding one interaction
(Sections 5.2 and 5.3). When analysing the properties of process documentation, we per-
formed induction on the interactions of a process to show the documentation of a whole
process is guaranteed to be recorded in provenance stores and any links are accurate.
In the inductive step, i.e., for each interaction of a process, we reused the properties
established in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. In addition, we developed a new query function
for retrieving process documentation recorded in the presence of failures. We estab-
lished that process documentation can be represented as a directed acyclic graph and
the query function eventually terminates for retrieving process documentation. Finally,
we showed that the new query function ensures the retrieved process documentation is
in its entirety.
The appendix in Section 5.7 provides proofs for several properties regarding the topo-
logical relationship between an assertor's default store and alternative stores. These
properties have been used in Section 5.3.
Next chapter will evaluate F-PReP's performance and illustrate how the implementation
of the protocol addresses non-functional requirement Efficient Recording identied
in Chapter 3.
5.7 Appendix: Proof of Topology Properties
Provenance stores used by an assertor have been classied as two types: the default store
(i.e., the one that an assertor initially used when recording an interaction record) and
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knows to have successfully recorded its interaction records. The nal store can be the
default store or an alternative store.
Chapter 4 has established properties to demonstrate that F-PReP meets requirements
Causelink Accuracy and Viewlink Accuracy. These properties are only con-
cerned with the nal store.
Recall that an assertor sets a timeout when submitting an interaction record to a store.
Since it is impossible to distinguish store crash from message loss in the event of a
timeout, it may be the case that a provenance store has recorded an interaction record
while the assertor has a timeout event and has to choose an alternative store. Therefore,
the default store and any of the attempted alternative stores may possess duplicate
interaction records, which means there would be viewlinks or causelinks recorded in
stores.
This appendix provides proofs for several properties regarding the topological relation-
ship between an assertor's default store and alternative stores. These properties have
been used in Section 5.3.
We divide our discussion into two parts. We rstly discuss provenance stores interlinked
via viewlinks (from Lemma 80 to Lemma 91) and then discuss those linked via causelinks
(Lemma 92). Given notations a, vl and pas, we assume that a 6= ?, vl 6= ? and pas 6= ;
for simplication.
Lemma 80 establishes that if each assertor's default store records the assertor's interac-
tion record, then the assertor's viewlink recorded in the default store points to the same
store as referred by the other assertor's ownlink given that the other assertor did not
use an alternative store.
Lemma 80. For any a,  and v, and for some a0 and aps, such that aps
= assertor T(a;;v):dl, then the following implication holds when the ASM terminates
at nal conguration:
If
^
(
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v) = FALSE
then
store(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol:
2
Proof. We proceed by the following reasoning.Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 171
Given that log T(a0;;v) is FALSE, by Lemma 32,
assertor T(a;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol: (5.1)
Also by Lemma 33, coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i. Then by Lemma 38, vlstate T(aps;;v)
is not UPDATED.
Given that store T(aps;;v) records an entry, vlstate T(aps;;v) is either DEFAULT or
UPDATED (Lemma 40). Therefore, vlstate T(aps;;v) can only be DEFAULT. Then
with Lemma 39,
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl: (5.2)
Therefore, with (5.1), (5.2), the statement is preserved.
2
Lemma 81 links the state of tables store T(aps;;v) and vlstate T(aps;;v).
Lemma 81. For any reachable conguration, for any aps, , v and vl, and for some a,
the following implication holds:
If store T(aps;;v) 6= ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, then
vlstate T(aps;;v) 6= DEFAULT:
2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are all empty. We now consider only those transitions that
may have an eect on terms in the equality.
receive record:
After this transition, store T(aps;;v) becomes ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi. There-
fore, the antecedent is false, which preserves the implication.
receive update:
By Lemma 36, store T(aps;;v) has three states before the transition: h?;?;;i and
h?;vl;;i and ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi.
In the case of h?;?;;i:
After this transition, store T(aps;;v) becomes h?;vl;;i and vlstate T(aps;;v) is
changed to UPDATED. Therefore, the statement is preserved.
In the case of h?;vl;;i:
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h?;vl;;i. In addition, vlstate T(aps;;v) becomes UPDATED. Therefore, the statement
is preserved.
2
Lemma 82 states a possible topology of interlinked provenance stores in the case where
one assertor did not use any alternative store while the other assertor did and the other
assertor's default store did not record any duplicate interaction record. The property is
used by Case (b), Section 5.3.1.1.
Lemma 82. For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps =
assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, the following implication holds
when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If
^
8
> <
> :
log T(a, ;v) = FALSE
log T(a0;;v) = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
then
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?
2
Proof. We proceed by the following reasoning. Given log T(a;;v) = FALSE and
aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl, by Lemma 30, aps = assertor T(a;;v):ol. Therefore,
by Theorem 22, store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi and by Theorem 49,
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol.
Given log T(a;;v) = FALSE, by Lemma 33, coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i. Hence by
Lemma 38, vlstate T(a0
ps;;v) 6= UPDATED.
Given store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, by Lemma 81,
vlstate T(a0
ps;;v) 6= DEFAULT.
Therefore, by Lemma 40, store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?.
2
Lemma 83 says that an assertor's viewlink points to the store referred by the other
assertor's default link, which means each assertor knows the other's default store.
Lemma 83. For any reachable conguration, for any a,  and v, and for some a0, the
following implication holds:Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 173
If assertor T(a;;v):str 6= (? _ INIT), then
assertor T(a;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):dl:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the cong-
uration, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the
initial conguration since table is empty. We now consider only those transitions that
may have an eect on terms in the equality.
send app:
After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str is set to INIT. Therefore, the precondition
is false, which preserves the implication.
prepare record:
After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str becomes READY. In addition,
assertor T(a;;v):vl equal to the other assertor's default link in the guard to re this
transition. Therefore, the statement is preserved after the transition.
receive app:
After this transition, assertor T(a;;v):str becomes READY and assertor T(a;;v):vl
is set to the link provided by app(d;;vl), i.e., the sender's default link (by transition
send app). Therefore, the statement is preserved.
timeout ack:
By Lemma 18, assertor T(a;;v):str was SENT before this transition and is set to
ACKED after it. Therefore, the statement remains valid after this transition.
receive ack:
By Lemma 17, assertor T(a;;v):str was SENT before this transition and may be set
to ACKED after it. Therefore, the statement remains valid after this transition.
All the other transitions:
After the other transitions, the precondition remains true and assertor T(a;;v):vl =
assertor T(a0;;v):dl keeps unchanged. Therefore, the statement holds.
2
Similar to Lemma 38, Lemma 84 connects the state of table update T in the coordinator
and the state of a provenance store. It shows how the ASM evolves after the coordinator
starts updating a destination provenance store.
Lemma 84. For any reachable conguration and for any , v and aps, the following
equality holds:
update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ?Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 174
=
_
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
update(;v;ol) 2 k(ac;aps)
update(;v;ol) 2 lost(ac;aps)
vlstate T(aps;;v) = UPDATED
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol
uack(;v) 2 k(aps;ac)
uack(;v) 2 lost(ac;aps)
update T(ac;;v;aps) = UPDATE
update T(ac;;v;aps) = UPDATED
where ol = coord T(ac;;v):ol.
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty and no message is in transit. We now consider only
those transitions that may have an eect on terms in the equality.
receive repair:
After this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps) is set to UPDATE. Therefore, the statement
is preserved.
send update:
After this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps) is set to WAIT and update(;v;ol) is inserted
into k(ac;aps), where ol = coord T(ac;;v):ol. Therefore, the statement is preserved.
timeout uack:
By Lemma 37, the right part of the statement was true before this transition. After this
transition, update T(ac;;v;aps) is set to UPDATE. Therefore, the statement is still
preserved.
receive uack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, uack(;v) is removed
from channel. By Lemma 35, store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol. Therefore, the
right part of the statement was true before the transition and remains true after it,
which preserves the statement.
receive update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update(;v;ol;aps)
is removed from k(ac;aps) and an uack(;v) is inserted in k(aps;ac). In addition,
vlstate T(aps;;v) is set to UPDATED and store T(aps;;v):vl is set to ol, which
is provided by update(;v;ol). Since ol is equal to coord T(ac;;v):ol (Lemma 34),
store T(aps;;v):vl is equal to coord T(ac;;v):ol.
msg loss pstore:Chapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 175
msg loss channel:
The two transitions remove update(;v;ol) or uack(;v) from channels and then place
them in lost(ac;aps). Therefore, the the statement still holds.
2
Lemma 85 demonstrate the state of the coordinator's timer and update table update T.
Lemma 85. For any reachable conguration and for any , v and aps, the following
implication holds:
^
(
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status = ENABLED
timer T(ac;;v;aps):to  0
i
update T(ac;;v;aps) = WAIT:
2
Proof.
We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the conguration,
and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive repair:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After this transition, timer T(ac;;v;aps)
remains in the initial state and update T(ac;;v;aps) is set to UPDATE. Therefore, the
statement is preserved.
send update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition,
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status is set to ENABLED and timer T(ac;;v;aps):to is initialised,
and update T(ac;;v;aps) is set to WAIT. Therefore, the statement is preserved.
timer click(ac;;v;aps):
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, timer T(ac;;v;aps):to
remains greater or equal to 0 and update T(ac;;v;aps) is not aected.
timeout uack:
receive uack:
The statement is preserved by these transitions. After these transitions,
timer T(ac;;v;aps):status is set to DISABLED and timer T(ac;;v;aps):to becomes 0.
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2
Lemma 86 states that if both assertors use alternative stores and request the coordinator
to update the other's viewlink, the coordinator updates only one's default store (e.g.,
receiver b's default store PS2 in Figure 3.10). Then the coordinator keeps sending
update messages to the destination store PS2 until it is updated. However, this update
is only successful if the assertor b is still using its default store. If b also uses alternative
stores, i.e., the coordinator receives a second repair request in the same interaction (Step
10 in Figure 3.10), the protocol takes actions (Step 11 in Figure 3.10) to ensure the
destination store to be updated is correct for both views. Therefore, only one assertor's
default store is updated (i.e., PS2 in Figure 3.10) due to the coordinator's incomplete
knowledge when receiving the rst of the two repair requests.
Lemma 86. For any reachable conguration, for any  and v, and for some a and a0,
the following implication holds:
If coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i, then
^
(
update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ?
update T(ac;;v;a0
ps) = ?
where aps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a;;v):dl. 2
Proof. We proceed by the following reasoning. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are all empty. We now consider only those transitions that
may have an eect on terms in the equality.
receive repair:
To make the precondition become true, the coordinator receives two repair requests.
Due to the symmetric nature of the implication, we assume that the coordinator rstly
receives repair(;v;adps;ol) and then repair(;v;a0
dps;ol0).
After processing repair(;v;adps;ol), coord T(ac;;v) becomes not empty while
coord T(ac;;v) remains h?;?i. In addition, update T(ac;;v;aps) is set to UPDATE
with aps equal to coord T(ac;;v):adps. We note that coord T(ac;;v):adps is provided
by repair(;v;adps;ol). By Lemma 33, adps in repair(;v;adps;ol) equals to
assertor T(a;;v):vl. Therefore, aps = assertor T(a;;v):vl. Then with Lemma 83,
aps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl.
After processing another request repair(;v;a0
dps;ol0), coord T(ac;;v) becomes not empty.
According to transition receive repair, coord T(ac;;v):adps is changed to
coord T(ac;;v):ol, dierent from the one, a0
dps, as provided by repair(;v;a0
dps;ol0).
By Lemma 33, a0
dps in repair(;v;a0
dps;ol) equals to assertor T(a0;;v):vl. Hence with
Lemma 83, a0
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does not aect update T(ac;;v;a0
dps), which remains in the initial state ?, such that
a0
dps = assertor T(a;;v):dl.
Thus, after two transitions receive repair, we have update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ? and
update T(ac;;v;a0
ps) = ?, such that aps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl and a0
ps =
assertor T(a;;v):dl.
send update:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps)
is set to WAIT from UPDATE. Therefore, the statement was preserved before the tran-
sition and remains valid after it.
timeout uack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps)
is set to UPDATE from WAIT (Lemma 85). Therefore, the statement was preserved be-
fore the transition and remains valid after it.
receive uack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. In order to re this transition, uack is in
transit. Therefore, update T(ac;;v;aps) was not ? before this transition (Lemma 84).
After this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps) is either not changed or set to UPDATED.
Hence, the statement was preserved before the transition and remains valid after it.
2
Lemma 87 states a possible topology of interlinked provenance stores in the case where
both assertors in an interaction used alternative stores and their respective default store
did not record any duplicate interaction record. The property is used by Case (d),
Section 5.3.1.1.
Lemma 87. For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps =
assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, the following implication holds
when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v) = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) 6= ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v) = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
then
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?
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Proof. We proceed by the following reasoning. Since assertor T(a;;v):str and
assertor T(a0;;v):str are both OK when the ASM terminates (Lemma 20), by Lemma
33, coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i and coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i. Therefore, by Lemma 86,
we have
^
(
update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ?
update T(ac;;v;a0
ps) = ?
such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl.
Given update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ?, by Lemma 84, when the ASM terminates,
store T(aps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol: (5.3)
Since coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i, by Lemma 43,
coord T(ac;;v):ol = assertor T(a0;;v):ol: (5.4)
With (5.3) and (5.4),
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol: (5.5)
Given update T(ac;;v;a0
ps) = ?, by Lemma 84, vlstate T(a0
ps;;v) 6= UPDATED.
Since store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi, by Lemma 81,
vlstate T(a0
ps;;v) 6= DEFAULT. Therefore, store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ? (Lemma 40).
Based on the above proof, the statement is preserved.
2
Lemma 88 states a possible topology of interlinked provenance stores in the case where
both assertors in an interaction used alternative stores but one's default store recorded a
duplicate interaction record and the other's default store did not. The property is used
by Case (e), Section 5.3.1.1.
Lemma 88. For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps =
assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, the following implication holds
when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v) = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v) = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) 6= ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasiChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 179
then
_
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
V
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?
V
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):dl
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol
2
Proof. We proceed by the following reasoning. Since assertor T(a;;v):str and
assertor T(a0;;v):str are both OK when the ASM terminates (Lemma 20), by Lemma
33, coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i and coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i. Therefore, by Lemma 86,
we discuss two cases:
Case (1):
^
(
update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ?
update T(ac;;v;a0
ps) = ?
such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl. In this case, we
can use the same proof as in Lemma 87 to demonstrate that:
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = ?
Therefore, the statement is preserved.
Case(2):
^
(
update T(ac;;v;aps) = ?
update T(ac;;v;a0
ps) 6= ?
such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl.
Given update T(ac;;v;a0
ps) 6= ?, by Lemma 84,
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = coord T(ac;;v):ol: (5.6)
Since coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i, by Lemma 43,
coord T(ac;;v):ol = assertor T(a;;v):ol: (5.7)
With (5.6) and (5.7),
store T(a0
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Given update T(ac;;v;aps) = ?, by Lemma 84, vlstate T(aps;;v) 6= UPDATED.
Since store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi, such that vl 6= ?, by Lemma
40, vlstate T(aps;;v) = DEFAULT. Therefore, by Lemma 39 and Lemma 83,
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):dl. Now we have
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):dl
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):ol
Therefore, the statement is preserved.
2
Lemma 89 states a possible topology of interlinked provenance stores in the case where
both assertors in an interaction used alternative stores and their respective default store
recorded a duplicate interaction record. The property is used by Case (f), Section 5.3.1.1.
Lemma 89. For any a,  and v, and for some a0, aps and a0
ps, such that aps =
assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl, the following implication holds
when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If
^
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
log T(a, ;v) = TRUE
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
log T(a0;;v) = TRUE
store T(a0
ps;;v) = ha0;vl0;assertor T(a0;;v):pasi
then
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
ps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):dl
2
Proof. We proceed by the following reasoning. Since assertor T(a;;v):str and
assertor T(a0;;v):str are both OK when the ASM terminates (Lemma 20), by Lemma
33, coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i and coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i. Therefore, by Lemma 86,
we have:
^
(
update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ?
update T(ac;;v;a0
ps) = ?
such that aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl and a0
ps = assertor T(a0;;v):dl. Following the
similar proof for Case (2) of Lemma 88, we can derive that
^
(
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):ol
store T(a0
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Therefore, the statement is preserved.
2
The above analysis discusses the topology of two assertors' default stores and nal stores
in terms of how they are interlinked via viewlinks when the ASM terminates. Since
any alternative store used by an assertor may also record duplicate interaction records
with viewlinks pointing to another store, we now investigate the topology regarding
alternative stores.
Lemma 90 states that only the provenance store (aps) referred by an asserter's default
link or ownlink in the interaction context h;vi may lead to update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ?.
Lemma 90. For any  and v, and for some a, the following statement holds when the
ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If update T(ac;;v;aps) 6= ?, then
aps = assertor T(a;;v):dl or assertor T(a;;v):ol:
2
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of transitions that lead to the congura-
tion, and by case analysis on the kind of transitions. The statement holds in the initial
conguration since tables are empty. We now consider only those transitions that may
have an eect on terms in the implication.
receive repair:
After this transition, coord T(ac;;v) is no longer h?;?i and update T(ac;;v;aps) is
set to UPDATE. We discuss two cases in order to determine aps.
Case (1) coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) = h?;?i:
In this case, aps is set to coord T(ac;;v):adps, which is provided by the adps from
message repair(;v;adps;ol). By Lemma 33, adps = assertor T(a;;v):vl. Therefore,
aps = assertor T(a;;v):vl:
Case (2) coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i ^ coord T(ac;;v) 6= h?;?i:
In this case, aps is set to coord T(ac;;v):adps, which is provided by coord T(ac;;v):ol
(Lemma 44). By Lemma 43,
coord T(ac;;v):ol = assertor T(a;;v):ol:
Therefore, we have
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Based on the above analysis, the statement is preserved.
send update:
After this transition, the antecedent remains true. Therefore, the statement is still
preserved.
timeout uack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. After this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps)
is set to UPDATE from WAIT (Lemma 85). Therefore, the statement was preserved be-
fore the transition and remains valid after it.
receive uack:
The statement is preserved by this transition. Before this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps)
was not ? (Lemma 84). After this transition, update T(ac;;v;aps) is either not changed
or set to UPDATED. Therefore, the statement was preserved before the transition and
remains valid after it.
2
Lemma 91 states that if a provenance store referred by the element in PSSet(a;;v)
(dened in Section 5.1.3) has recorded a viewlink, then the store possesses the whole
interaction record with a viewlink pointing to the other assertor's default store. This
property is used in Section 5.3.1.2.
Lemma 91. For any reachable conguration, for any aps 2 PSSet(a;;v), any  and
v, and for some a, a0, the following implication holds:
If store T(aps;;v):vl 6= ?, then
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi
where vl = assertor T(a0;;v):dl: 2
Proof. We proceed with the following reasoning. Given aps 2 PSSet(a;;v), we have
aps 6= assertor T(a;;v):dl and aps 6= assertor T(a;;v):ol. Then by Lemma 90,
update T(ac;;v;aps) = ?: Therefore, we can infer that vlstate T(aps;;v) 6= UPDATED
(Lemma 84). Given store T(aps;;v):vl 6= ? and vlstate T(aps;;v) 6= UPDATED, by
Lemma 40, vlstate T(aps;;v) = DEFAULT. Therefore, by Lemma 81,
store T(aps;;v) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;;v):pasi:
By Lemma 39,
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a;;v):vl (5.9)
When the ASM terminates, assertor T(a;;v):str is OK (Lemma 20). Therefore, withChapter 5 Graph-based Analysis 183
(5.9) and Lemma 83,
store T(aps;;v):vl = assertor T(a0;;v):dl:
Based on the above proof, the statement is preserved.
2
We have discussed provenance stores interlinked via viewlinks (from Lemma 80 to
Lemma 91). Now we discuss those linked via causelinks.
Causelink Accuracy property (Property 23) has stated that any
causelinks recorded in the provenance store that is referred by an assertor's ownlink are
accurate, i.e., pointing to the provenance store referred by the other assertor's ownlink.
We now extend this conclusion to a general case.
Lemma 92 shows that an assertor's causelinks duplicately stored in any provenance store
are always accurate, pointing to the store referred by the other assertor's ownlink. This
implies a topology of provenance stores interlinked by causelinks. This property is used
in Section 5.3.2.
Lemma 92. For any aps,  and vl, and for some a, the following implication holds
when the ASM terminates at nal conguration:
If rel-pa(rel;h;Si;cids) 2 store T(aps;;S):pas, then
for any c 2 cids, let hcl0;0;Ri = c,
cl0 = assertor T(a;0;R):ol ^
store T(cl0;0;R) = ha;vl;assertor T(a;0;R):pasi
2
Proof. We proceed by the following reasoning. Lemma 20 shows that when the ASM
terminates, assertor T(a;;S):str is OK. Therefore, all causelinks in
assertor T(a;;S):pas are accurate before being recorded in a provenance store (Lemma
26).
Given rel-pa(rel;h;Si;cids) 2 store T(aps;;S):pas, i.e., store T(aps;;S):pas 6= ;,
by Lemma 36, store T(aps;;S):pas = assertor T(a;;S):pas. This shows that all
causelinks recorded in store T(aps;;S):pas are also accurate. Therefore, this implica-
tion is preserved.
2Chapter 6
Implementation and Evaluation
F-PReP is a generic protocol that does not specify implementation details. In order
to put the protocol into practice, this chapter describes a system architecture that
implements F-PReP while considering practical issues such as communication, storage
and performance impact on a provenance-aware application's execution.
Our performance evaluation is conducted at several levels. Firstly, we measure the
throughput of the provenance store and the coordinator. We investigate how the con-
tention for the coordinator aects an actor's recording performance when the number
of recording actors increases. We demonstrate that a single coordinator does not result
in a performance bottleneck. Secondly, we benchmark the recording performance of F-
PReP. The results show that its remedial actions introduce small overhead (below 10%).
Thirdly, we investigate the performance impact on the execution time of a scientic ap-
plication. We nd that PReP and F-PReP have similar impact on application execution
when there is no failure. In tests with failures, the recording overhead of F-PReP varies
depending on congurations.
The contributions of this chapter are twofold:
We describe F-PReServ, an implementation of F-PReP with architectural support for
practical issues such as communication, storage and performance. The implementation
of F-PReServ supports requirement Efficient Recording identied in Chapter 1.
Its features include a novel way of creating process documentation, basic ow control
management for recording documentation, and a local store for temporarily maintaining
documentation to avoid severe performance degradation in the presence of failures. We
also discuss various approaches that are complementary to our implementation.
Another contribution is the extensive evaluation of F-PReServ's performance. The ex-
perimental results show that F-PReServ introduces reasonable overhead when compared
to PReServ and has some performance impact on an application's execution. We believe
these results are still acceptable given that the process documentation is guaranteed to
184Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 185
be recorded in the presence of failures and still retrievable in its entirety from multiple
provenance stores. Lessons are learned and recommendations are given on achieving
good performance in the case of failures.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 presents the design and
implementation of F-PReServ in terms of its three components: Client Side Library,
Provenance Store Service and Coordinator Service. Section 6.2 describes our evalua-
tion environment and methodology, followed by a series of performance experiments in
controlled environments and in a real scientic application. Based on lessons learned
from the experimental results, Section 6.3 provides several recommendations on the de-
velopment of next version F-PReServ and discusses relevant technologies that can be
integrated with F-PReServ. Section 6.4 briey reviews related work. Finally, Section
6.5 summarises and concludes this chapter.
6.1 Implementation
In this section, we rst outline the technologies used by F-PReServ and then introduce
F-PReServ's components: an assertor side library (F-PSL), a Provenance Store Service
and a Coordinator Service (Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1: F-PReServ components
One of the main ways to enable SOAs is to build interoperable applications out of Web
Services, where Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) species a platform-independent
standard of exchanging messages between heterogeneous services in SOAs. SOAP mes-
sages are typically transmitted over Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) to facilitate
easy communication through network proxies and rewalls. PReServ [76, 79], an im-
plementation of PReP, adopts these technologies. In PReServ, provenance stores are
described as Web Services and implemented as a Java Servlet deployed in the Apache
Tomcat web container [1] with protocol messages exchanged in the form of SOAP over
HTTP. To be compatible with PReServ, F-PReServ also adopts these technologies. In
addition to extending PReServ's provenance store service, F-PReServ introduces a co-
ordinator service, implemented as a Java Servlet. The extension of the provenance storeChapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 186
service and implementation of coordinator service also feature Ease of Installation [76],
so that developers can easily deploy multiple provenance stores and coordinators to test
their applications and to enable scalable recording of process documentation in SOAs.
F-PSL extends a Provenance Support Library (PSL), which is developed using Java
by the University of Southampton. PSL provides users with a set of Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (API) for creating and recording interaction records as well as for
querying a Provenance Store. The selection of Java allows for the software to run on
any platform that has a Java Virtual Machine without recompilation. The reason to
extend PSL rather than the counterpart client side library in PReServ (termed PReServ-
Client) is that PSL encodes SOAP messages using Apache Axis, which is a popular Web
service engine used by many applications such as Globus Toolkit 4 (GT4)1. Therefore,
F-PSL can be integrated in a wide range of Grid applications to reliably record process
documentation.
We now detail F-PReServ's components in Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3.
6.1.1 F-PSL
F-PSL encompasses ve modules (Figure 6.2): Client API, Thread and Queue Man-
agement (TQM), Recording Management (RM), Local Persistence Management (LPM)
and a Conguration le.
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Figure 6.2: F-PSL overview
Client API
Making an application provenance-aware inevitably aects the application's execution
1GT4, an open source software toolkit employing Web Services to construct Grid systems.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 187
as it takes time to create and record interaction records (IRs). One novelty of the Client
API in F-PSL is the change in the way that IRs are generated, so that the impact on
application's performance can be minimised. This improvement supports requirement
Efficient Recording.
We illustrate this change in Figure 6.3, where we compare three approaches: PSL,
PReServ-Client and F-PSL. The dierence between these approaches is when to cre-
ate and record IRs. In PSL2, the creation and recording are all synchronous to an
application's execution, resulting in performance penalty. In PReServ-Client, although
application execution and IR creation are still synchronous, the recording of IR is made
asynchronous, leading to performance enhancement. In the case of F-PSL, the Client
API enables developers to only generate requests containing minimum information in
order to create an IR. IRs are then asynchronously created and recorded by separate
threads managed by TQM, further increasing recording performance.
We note that Figure 6.3 does not intend to give specic timing measurements regarding
each approach. But we did observe a signicant increase in performance (20-30%) when
comparing F-PSL to PSL in our tests3.
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Figure 6.3: Comparing approaches to the creating and recording of IR
We now outline in Figure 6.4 how an application's source code is modied in order
2PSL v1.3 was used in the comparison.
3In the tests, we modied PSL so it can also record IRs asynchronously, as PReServ-Client does.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 188
to use the Client API. In the gure, we assume the example has a request-response
communication model, which means that there are two interactions and an assertor is
the sender or receiver in a respective interaction. Each asserter uses a same provenance
store to record two IRs about the two interactions and the store's address is sent to the
other assertor in the request or response message along with the interaction key created
by the sender of the message (Steps 1, 4). After knowing the viewlink, an assertor
generates requests to create IRs, which are placed in the Request Queue (Figure 6.2). We
note that the assertor's ASM rules in Figures 3.12 and 3.13 are high-level specication,
which do not model the approach adopted by F-PSL in terms of generating requests to
create IRs.
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Figure 6.4: A Request-response example
In addition to the creation of IRs, Client API also implements the extended retrieval
function introduced in Section 5.4.3.4.
Thread and Queue Management (TQM)
F-PSL enables the concurrent creation and recording of IRs through multithreading, as
illustrated in Figure 6.3. An application's requests for creating IRs (Step (1) in Figure
6.2) are queued to be processed by a thread, which creates IRs later. To save on the
cost of network connection, multiple IRs can be wrapped in a single batch, which is
also queued (Step (2) in Figure 6.2) before being handled to RM by a recording thread
(Step (3) in Figure 6.2). The use of multiple-threading and batches of messages supports
requirement Efficient Recording.
Another enhancement over PSL and PReServ-Client is that F-PSL provides basic ow
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messages enqueued. This may however aect an application's performance, since the
application is postponed occasionally to reduce the speed of producing requests to create
IRs when queues become full frequently. We will demonstrate in Section 6.2.5 the impact
of ow control mechanism on an application's execution.
Recording Management (RM)
RM records IRs into a provenance store and takes remedial actions in the presence of
failures. Its behaviour is specied by the ASM rules in Figure 3.14. We now briey
introduce the implementation of these rules.
pre check:
This rule species how to check and update causelinks before recording an IR. The
rule involves three tables. Table queue T(a) models the Recording Queue in TQM.
Table assertor T(a;;v) reects an assertor's knowledge during the recording of an IR,
which is solely for the purpose of proof and hence does not need to be implemented.
Table log T(a;;v) maintains history information regarding the use of alternative stores,
which is crucial to xing inaccurate causelinks. Therefore, RM needs to maintain the log
information when an alternative store is used and check the information before recording
any relationship p-assertion.
send record:
timer click:
timeout ack:
These rules specify the communication with a provenance store. Should an acknowl-
edgement fail to be received before a timeout, the same IR is resent to an alternative
store. Although an alternative store is always used in the formalisation, the retransmis-
sion policy can be congured in the conguration le provided by F-PSL. For example,
an IR can be resent to the same provenance store for certain times before using an
alternative store.
We note that the formalisation of a timeout is designed to be an abstract way of detecting
a potential failure in order to trigger the remedial actions. In practice, the triggering
condition is not necessarily limited to the expiry of a timeout. For example, it can be
a failure to connect to a provenance store and can also be the receipt of a response
message with a fault code indicating any exception thrown in the provenance store
service, e.g., storage exception. The occurrence of these events does not guarantee
successful recording of IRs in a provenance store, therefore remedial actions need to be
taken. In the current implementation of F-PSL, remedial actions are taken in response
to an exception thrown on the client side regarding the submission of a batch of IRs to
a provenance store, which may be due to a connection failure or the expiry of a timeout.
In future work, we will revise the denition of an acknowledgement message to include
fault information reecting the exceptions that occurred on the provenance store's side.
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Once an acknowledgement is received from a provenance store, RM removes the ac-
knowledged IR from the recording queue.
post check:
RM communicates with the coordinator service if an alternative store was used in an
interaction context. To reduce network connection overhead, multiple repair requests
are accumulated before being sent to the coordinator in a single batch.
Local Persistence Management (LPM)
Another novelty of F-PSL over PSL and ReServ-Client is that it introduces a local store
for temporarily maintaining IRs. Recall that F-PSL provides ow control mechanism,
setting a limit on the capacity of the request and recording queues to prevent running
out of a client's memory. If the threshold is reached, then the application's execution
has to be suspended until there is space in queues to accommodate additional requests
or IR messages. In order not to degrade the application's performance signicantly,
outstanding IR messages in the recording queue can be maintained in the local store
and resubmitted later (Step (4) in Figure 6.2).
We employ Oracles Berkeley DB Java Edition database (BDB) as the local le store for
the following reasons. Firstly, BDB is an embedded database without the complexity
of installation as a separate service or application. The only requirement is that BDB
must be provided with a directory where it can write its les to. Secondly, BDB is an
append-only database and thus is optimised for write performance. When employing the
local le store, another thread is provided to resubmit IRs from BDB to a provenance
store.
Conguration File
The conguration le allows developers to customise F-PSL's behaviour. The following
properties are specic to the new functionalities introduced by F-PSL.
ALT STORE LIST A list of alternative provenance store addresses
TIMEOUT The deadline for receiving an acknowledgement from a store
RETRY COUNTS The max number of message retransmissions to stores
USE ALT STORE Boolean value indicating redelivering a message to an alt.
store or a same store
COORD URL The address of the coordinator service
REQ QUEUE SIZE The capacity of the request queue
REC QUEUE SIZE The capacity of the recording queue
REC BATCH SIZE The number of interaction records that are batched together
for delivery to a provenance store
REP BATCH SIZE The number of repair requests that are batched together for
delivery to the coordinator
LOCAL STORE DIR The path to the directory of the local store
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6.1.2 Provenance Store Service
Figure 6.5 gives the architecture of provenance store service (PS). F-PReServ extends
PReServ's implementation of PS (termed PReServ-PS) in terms of the following aspects:
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Figure 6.5: Overview of provenance store service
(1) Disk Cache. PS persistently writes received IRs to BDB (Step (1) in Figure 6.5)
before providing an acknowledgement (Step (2) in Figure 6.5). Therefore, the data is
guaranteed to be available when the PS comes back up after a crash. By contrast,
PReServ-PS, though caching IR messages into BDB before replying an acknowledge-
ment, does not write through the messages to disk on ush, thus having a risk of losing
IRs in the event of system crash. We will demonstrate this in Section 6.2.4.
In order to reduce the cost of writing through data to disk, F-PReServ does not record
IRs directly in its backend storage but processes the cached items at a later stage after
providing an acknowledgement (Step (3) in Figure 6.5). This asynchronous strategy sup-
ports requirement Efficient Recording because it delays actual message processing
and hence reduces response time to the corresponding assertor.
(2) Update Plug-In. PS has been designed to facilitate convenient integration of new fea-
tures through the use of plug-ins [76]. A new plug-in, Update Plug-In, is implemented as
a Java Servlet to receive update requests from the coordinator and update the requested
view links. In order to balance the tradeo between reliability and performance, PS
also caches incoming update messages into disk (Step (4) in Figure 6.5) before returning
an acknowledgement to the coordinator (Step (5) in Figure 6.5) and at a later stage
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Regarding the implementation of the two ASM rules in Figure 3.15, we note that table
vlstate T(aps;;v) reects the store's state and is solely for the proof in Chapter 4,
hence it does not need to be implemented. The backend database was designed and
implemented in PReServ-PS. It uses an interaction context (an interaction key and a
viewkind) to index an interaction record, containing the assertor's identity, a viewlink
and a set of p-assertions documenting the interaction which are created by the assertor.
6.1.3 Coordinator Service
Figure 6.6 shows the architecture of the Coordinator Service.
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Figure 6.6: Overview of coordinator service
The coordinator persistently stores received requests in a local le store (Step (1) in
Figure 6.6). At a later stage, it then processes the cached requests by storing them in
a backend store (Step (2) in Figure 6.6) and performing update operations (Step (3)
in Figure 6.6). An assertor continues its execution after receiving a response indicating
its repair request has been cached in the coordinator. BDB is also employed as the le
store.
Since the coordinator service is required to be highly available, multiple coordinator
services can be clustered in a business critical environment, which we will discuss in
Section 6.3.3.
We also provide basic administrative functionality to the coordinator service. An ad-
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querying the backend data store.
In SOAs, the process of executing a large-scale application may span dierent organi-
sations. Multiple coordinators can be utilised in the whole process. When using more
than one, any two assertors exchanging an application message must share the same one
in order to ensure requirement Viewlink Accuracy. The identier of a coordinator
can be built in assertors or exchanged to other assertors in the application message.
The behaviour of UM has been detailed in Figure 3.6.5 and we outline its implementa-
tion.
receive repair:
Contents in tables coord T and updateT are maintained in the backend database. Only
minimum information is maintained in the backend database for each repair request: the
identity of the destination store that needs to be updated, the identity of the store that
successfully recorded the requesting assertor's interaction record for a given interaction
and the update state (UPDATE and UPDATED). We use the associated interaction
context (an interaction key and a viewkind) to index the above information in database.
The Update Management (UM) component then performs update operations based on
the information in the backend database.
send update:
timer click:
timeout uack:
These rules specify the sending of an update message to a provenance store. In the cur-
rent implementation, a message is resent to the same provenance store upon a commu-
nication exception thrown on the coordinator's side, which may be due to a connection
failure to a provenance store or the expiry of a timeout for receiving an uack message.
receive uack:
Once an acknowledgement is received, UM changes the updating status of the corre-
sponding interaction context to UPDATED in the backend database (Step (3) in Figure
6.6). However, it may not be able to delete the information regarding the interaction
context from the database for the following reason.
The request information maintained in the database is essential to ensuring successful
update of viewlinks given the case where two assertors may each issue a repair request
about the same interaction. If the coordinator does not record the rst assertor's request
or it deletes the rst assertor's request information before receiving the other assertor's
request, then it would not send update messages to the correct destination stores. There-
fore, UM does not remove request information from backend database until receiving
two requests each from an assertor of an interaction. If only one assertor of an interac-
tion sends a repair message, this information is kept in the database for a long period ofChapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 194
time4 before it can be removed.
6.2 Performance Evaluation
After presenting the design and implementation of F-PReServ, this section evaluates the
performance of F-PReServ and its impact on an application's execution time.
Our experiments were run on the Iridis Computing Cluster at the University of Southamp-
ton. Iridis contains several sets of nodes (i.e. computers). Nodes used in the experiments
each have two Single Core AMD Opteron processors running at 2.2 GHz and 2 GB of
RAM. The Provenance Store Service and Coordinator Service were run on nodes each
with 4 Dual Core AMD Opteron processors running at 2.4 Ghz and 2 GB of RAM.
In the experiments with failures, one coordinator service was employed. All nodes are
connected by Gigabit Ethernet. All applications used in the evaluation were written in
Java and were run using the Java 1.5.0 05 64-bit Server Virtual Machine.
Our evaluation was conducted at three levels. First of all, we measured the throughput
of the provenance store service and coordinator service. We also investigated how the
contention for the coordinator service aects an actor's recording performance when the
number of recording actors increases. Then, we benchmarked the recording performance
of F-PSL without considering contention. Finally, we investigated F-PReServ's impact
on the execution time of a scientic application. In each level, we performed two ex-
periments: failure-free experiment and experiment with failures. A comparison with
PReServ was made in all the failure-free experiments.
There are numerous factors that can aect the system performance [144, 83], such as
disk speed, processor speed, system memory, networks, Java Virtual Machine's heap
size, Tomcat web container's thread pool size as well as the capacity of queues in F-PSL.
Given the available hardware and software resources for the experiments, we modied
those congurations that may potentially aect our results, tuned the system until we
achieved the near-best results, which are presented here.
6.2.1 Injecting Failures
Before advancing to the experiments, this section introduces the methodology we adopted
to inject failures.
Given the failure assumptions in Section 3.2, provenance store crashes and communica-
tion channel omission failures need to be considered in order to measure a provenance-
aware application's performance in the presence of failures. However, these failures are
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non-deterministic in nature and typically very hard to predict, therefore it is infeasible
to perform experiments with real failures. Hardware and software based fault-injection
tools for Web-Service applications have been developed [86, 108, 109]. In addition to
the administrative complexity, these tools inevitably introduce operating overhead such
as decoding SOAP messages in order to inject faults, which may not be negligible in a
high performance cluster environment and hence may aect our results.
Instead, we decided to develop a generator on a client side to inject random failure
events when submitting or resubmitting a message (i.e., a batch of interaction records)
to a provenance store. A failure event results in an exception caught by F-PSL and
consequently the remedial actions taken by F-PSL. The generator generates a failure
event based on a failure rate, i.e., the number of failure events that occur out of a
total number of messages sent to a provenance store. The generator can emit a failure
event immediately to simulate an instant connection failure or can postpone generating
a failure event for a pre-specied timing interval to mimics the latency of detecting a
potential failure. For example, the failure to receive an acknowledgement is not known
until a timeout is expired.
The advantages of adopting such a generator are as follows:
Firstly, the client-side generator is easy to implement. Provenance store crashes and
omission failures only matter when an assertor is sending messages to a store. These
failures, if not masked by HTTP transporting SOAP messages, lead to exceptions thrown
on the client side, and to the remedial actions taken by F-PSL, which may further aect
an application's execution. Our aim is to measure the impact of F-PReServ on the
application's performance, therefore it is reasonable to generate exceptions on the client
side without concerning real failures or using fault-injection tools to simulate service
crashes or message omissions.
Secondly, the generator enables us to fully control the number of failure events that occur
in the system. This helps us understand the correlation between system performance
and failure rate.
Thirdly, since the length of a delay to produce a failure event is congurable, we can
investigate dierent cases by increasing the delay interval's value from zero. The ex-
periment in the best case, i.e., failure events are produced immediately without latency,
implies the most messages sent to a provenance store and the coordinator in a given
time frame. This leads to the heaviest load on the coordinator service and provenance
store service for a given failure rate, which is useful in the throughput experiments in
Section 6.2.3. In addition, by increasing the interval, we can also observe a general
pattern in terms of how the latency of detecting a failure event may aect application
performance and accordingly, we can provide recommendations to developers regarding
how to improve the performance of their provenance-aware application, as illustrated in
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We note that there is no generator on the coordinator's side in our experiments. Ac-
cording to Figure 6.6, the application continues execution after the coordinator caches
repair requests. At a later stage, the coordinator processes the requests to update prove-
nance stores. Hence, the failures that may occur during the communication between the
coordinator and provenance stores do not aect the application's performance, which is
the reason why we did not generate failure events on the coordinator's side.
6.2.2 Throughput Experiments
In the throughput experiments, we simulate a large number of concurrent clients commu-
nicating with the provenance store service and coordinator service to determine the sat-
uration point of the service, i.e., at what point the service capabilities are fully stressed.
Our approach to simulating concurrent clients is as follows. On each node of the cluster,
we created up to 16 threads (i.e., clients) sending messages to a service at the same time.
An MPI based test harness was used in the experiments to guarantee that all clients
were run in parallel. Given that an experiment is allowed to use up to 32 nodes in the
Iridis environment, we can have 512 active clients sending messages to a provenance
store service or coordinator service. More specically, active clients send a request, wait
for the response, and immediately create a new request upon response reception and
resend the new request.
Throughput of Provenance Store Service In Section 6.1.2, a disk cache mechanism
was introduced as the default setup of a provenance store in F-PReServ. This means the
store forces every received interaction record (record) message into disk before providing
an acknowledgement in order to maintain the durability of these messages. However,
this mechanism may sacrice a provenance store's throughput (i.e. the number of record
messages accepted in a period of time).
We performed two failure-free tests with and without disk cache enabled, respectively.
All record messages, each in a single batch, were directly created and submitted to a
provenance store without using threading.
Figure 6.7 shows the results. In both setups, the provenance store's throughput levels
o, where about 212,200 and 176,000 10k record messages are accepted in a 10 minute
period in the setup without disk cache and with disk cache, respectively. This means a
store's throughput decreases by 20% due to enabling disk cache.
Throughput of Coordinator Service We also measured the coordinator's throughput
(i.e. the number of repair requests accepted in a period of time) with up to 512 clients
simultaneously sending repair messages to an update coordinator. To save on the cost
of network connection, 100 repair requests were sent to a coordinator in a single batch.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 197
Figure 6.8 shows that a coordinator can accept up to around 30,000*100 repair requests
in a 10 minute period. This means there were at least 30,000*100 failure events in 10
minutes, which is unlikely to appear in applications.
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Figure 6.7: Provenance store throughput
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Figure 6.8: Coordinator throughput
6.2.3 Throughput Experiments with Failures
The experiments in this section consider the following two issues.
Firstly, given that one coordinator may become a performance bottleneck, we need to
investigate the impact of contention for a coordinator on a client's recording perfor-
mance5.
5The impact of contention for a provenance store has been studied in [76].Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 198
In addition, as introduced in Section 6.1.1, F-PSL provides a conguration le enabling
users to specify how to retransmit record messages, i.e., resending to a same store or an
alternative store, where there exists a tradeo. Retransmitting messages to the same
provenance store can tolerate transient failures, such as message losses. However, if a
provenance store has crashed and is to be recovered after a long period of time, resending
messages to the same store is not a good solution. On the other hand, the use of an
alternative store ends up with an assertor's causelinks or another assertor's viewlink
incorrect. This introduces additional cost for updating links. Therefore, it is worth
comparing the tradeo between using the same and alternative store for redelivery.
We conducted two experiments where a single client and 128 clients kept recording 10k
record messages into one provenance store in a 10 minute period. Various failure rates
(5%, 10%, 16%, 20%, 25%, 33% and 50%) were considered6. A second provenance
store was employed as the alternative store7. One coordinator service was deployed
in the experiments and 100 repair requests were sent in a single batch. Since the more
failure events the more repair requests, failure events were immediately generated without
considering latency to maximise the number of repair requests that could be sent to the
coordinator within 10 minutes.
Figure 6.9 shows the result in the experiment with a single client. The result was
averaged from ve runs of the experiment. We have two observations.
(1) When using the alternative store in each retransmission, up to around 20,000 repair
requests are produced (because around 40,000 record messages are recorded when failure
rate is 50%). This means the coordinator, in the worst case, receives 200 batches, each
containing 100 repair requests, from a single client within 10 minutes. According to
coordinator's throughput experiment in Section 6.2.2 and the fact that the 200 repair
batches are received by the coordinator from a single client all across 10 minutes, we
imply that with about 100 clients, each having its own provenance store and alternative
stores, the impact of contention for a coordinator on a client's recording performance
would be very small.
(2) Resending messages to the same provenance store can record more record messages
than to an alternative store, assuming that only transient failures are present. This
implies a bottleneck on the client side since the use of an alternative store requires extra
actions on the client side to update links, limiting the number of record messages that
can be sent within 10 minutes.
Figure 6.10 shows the result when 128 clients record record messages into one prove-
nance store in the presence of failures. This experiment considers the contention for
6We did not consider failure rates beyond 50% because that implies severe communication problems
and an application's performance would be signicantly degraded, to be demonstrated in Section 6.2.5.3.
In that case, the local le store can be used to temporarily maintain interaction records.
7When two provenance stores are used, the measured throughput in this section is actually the total
number of messages sent from all clients to all provenance stores within 10 minutes.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 199
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Figure 6.9: Throughput experiment (single client)
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Figure 6.10: Throughput experiment (128 clients)
a provenance store as well as potential contention for a coordinator. We also have
two observations. Firstly, communicating with the coordinator does not aect total
throughput. This implies that the contention for a coordinator is negligible (It can be
calculated that up to about 750 repair batches are sent to the coordinator from 128
clients in 10 minutes.). Secondly, using an alternative store, in general, results in more
record messages recorded than using a same store to do so. This implies a bottleneck on
the provenance store since a heavily loaded provenance store aects client's performance
while the use of an alternative store helps to balance the load (especially when failure
rate is 25%), though introducing additional cost of updating links.
From these experiments, we have two conclusions. Firstly, the coordinator is scalable
and the impact of its contention on a client's recording performance is very small orChapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 200
negligible. Since our implementation supports the use of multiple coordinators, we
believe the coordinator service does not aect an application's recording performance.
Secondly, to achieve a better recording performance, an alternative store can be employed
after a message fails to be resent to a same store for certain times.
6.2.4 Benchmark Experiments
We now investigate the recording performance of a single client without considering
contentions. All the benchmark experiments were run with one client recording record
messages into one provenance store. All record messages were directly created and
submitted to a provenance store without using multithreading.
Failure-free Experiment The experiment compares F-PReServ to PReServ in a failure-
free environment. We measured the time to record 10,000 10k record messages. To
minimise the impact of network connection overhead, 100 record messages were shipped
in a single batch. Measurements were taken after recording each batch. Figure 6.11
summarises the record time. The graph displays an average from ten trials. From the
gure, we have two observations:
(1) The provenance store without using disk cache, i.e., in the setup using PReServ,
periodically ushes 900 record messages into disk. This means if the provenance store
crashes, up to 900 10k record messages may be lost.
(2) The average time to record 100 10k record messages is 198.8ms and 174.4ms us-
ing F-PReServ and PReServ, respectively. Therefore, F-PReServ has an overhead of
13.8% compared to PReServ due to the use of disk cache mechanism. We note that
in an application, the impact of F-PReServ on the application's performance is similar
to that of PReServ in a failure-free environment, as illustrated later in the application
experiment (Section 6.2.5.1). This similarity benets from the use of multithreading to
asynchronously create and record messages.
Experiment with Failures In Section 6.2.3, we measured a client's recording perfor-
mance in the presence of failures in terms of throughput. However, we did not consider
the overhead of updating causelinks. Updating causelinks matters only when a relation-
ship p-assertion is to be recorded. In this experiment, we approximated the maximum
overhead of taking remedial actions by measuring the record time of relationship p-
assertions.
In F-PSL, the more causes a relationship p-assertion has, the longer it takes to check and
update causelinks. Therefore, we increased the number of causes from 10 to 100. Given
a number of causes, several tests were conducted with various failure rates (5%, 25% and
50%). For each failure rate, the p-assertions about cause interactions of a relationshipChapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 201
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Figure 6.11: Time to record 100 10k interaction records
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Figure 6.12: Overhead of taking remedial actions
p-assertion were recorded prior to measuring the recording time for the relationship p-
assertion itself. In order to measure the actual cost of remedial actions by means of
record time, failure events were immediately generated without considering latency. We
deployed another store as an alternative store, which was used in the retransmission of
a relationship p-assertion. Repair requests were sent to a coordinator in batch sizes of
100.
Figure 6.12 summarises the results in terms of overhead. The measurements were taken
after recording 100 relationship p-assertions. We can observe a maximum overhead of
10% for taking remedial actions, when compared to the record time when no failure
occurred. Broadly speaking, the overhead increases linearly with the increase in failure
rate. We note that since it takes much longer time to record a relationship p-assertionChapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 202
with larger number of causes, the overhead of taking remedial actions becomes relatively
small in the settings with more causes. Therefore, we observe the smallest overhead
in the setting with 100 causes. The result also shows a bounded overhead of taking
remedial actions. This means that given a failure rate, the overhead does not increase
as the number of causes of a relationship p-assertion increases.
6.2.5 Application Experiment
This experiment aims to investigate F-PReServ's recording performance in a scientic
application, the Amino Acid Compressibility Experiment (ACE) [81]. ACE attempts
to nd possible new relationships between amino acids by investigating the information
theoretic properties (e.g., information eciency) of their computational representations.
ACE is chosen because of its general properties representing a range of provenance-
aware applications in SOAs. First, it can be used to answer a range of provenance
queries, as summarised in [81]. Second, it is high performance and ne-grained. There
is no network connection in the original application before being made provenance-
aware; a large volume of interaction records needs to be recorded within a short time
(process documentation of 20 Gigabytes recorded within 30 minutes). These all imply
that recording process documentation may be dicult. Therefore, the evaluation results
obtained from this dicult application are representative to a large set of applications
with less demanding requirements.
6.2.5.1 The ACE Application
The Amino Acid Compressibility Experiment (ACE), designed by Dr. Klaus-Peter Za-
uner and Dr.Stefan Artmann, attempts to nd possible new relationships between amino
acids, the basic building blocks of life, by investigating the information theoretic prop-
erties of their computational representations. ACE starts from a basic assumption that
proteins are information ecient, i.e. they use the least number of amino acids possible
to obtain their function. Hence, evolution results in the best and most ecient use of
information. Based on this assumption, ACE tests whether particular substitutions of
one amino acid for another would result in higher information eciency. The intuition
is that high information eciency values is key to creating functioning proteins.
ACE was implemented in Tool Command Language (TCL) by Dr. Klaus-Peter Zauner
and Dr.Stefan Artmann, and has been rewritten in Java [76]. In our experiment, we
modied the Jave edition of the application by generating Cluster-compatible job de-
scriptions to execute ACE on Iridis, and using F-PSL to produce and record process
documentation, as illustrated in Section 6.1.1.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 203
Figure 6.13 shows the deployment workow of the ACE application. Selected sequences
are collated locally (i.e. on the bioinformaticians computer) into several sample se-
quences. The samples must be of sucient size so that the statistical methods used by
the compression algorithms in the later portion of the workow can work appropriately.
The Jobs Creator then generates a series of jobs to be submitted to the Iridis cluster
and executed. The executables used by the jobs are pre-staged on Iridis (i.e. they are
already available on Iridis). Each job analyses several collated samples according to a
set of group codings. In order to produce information eciency values, each sample is
rstly encoded with a given group coding (Encode by Groups). The recoded sequence is
then compressed with compression algorithms, e.g., gzip, bzip2 or ppmz, to obtain the
length of the compressed sequence (Compress). Meanwhile, the Shannon Entropy of the
encoded sample is computed (Compute Entropy), which provides a standard of compar-
ison for the encoded sample. The Shannon Entropy removes the inuence of two factors
from the compression: the particular data encoding used to represent the sample, and
the non-uniform frequency of groups. With the compressed sample size and Shannon
Entropy, the information eciency is able to be calculated (Calculate Eciency).
Information eciency values can be compared since their calculation takes into account
the size of the sequence used, and the compression method and group coding employed.
Once the information eciency values for dierent groups are calculated, they can be
plotted to nd those codings that maximise eciency and thus are good candidates for
further substitution investigation.
6.2.5.2 Experimental Setup
The collate sample portion of the ACE workow is typically run once and a number of
jobs are generated to process these samples with dierent groups. In our experimental
setup, one run of ACE consisted of 20 jobs, which are run on the cluster at the same
time. Each job analysed 900 unique groups on 5 dierent 100K collated samples, thus,
a job generates 4500 information eciency values, involving 54,000 interactions in total
between seven assertors8. Given that one interaction is documented by two interaction
records (record), one job hence produces 108,000 record messages, each containing 10Kb
p-assertions on average.
To minimise network connection overhead, record and repair messages were sent in
batches of 100. Multi-threading for creating and recording record messages was used
in all tests and all the assertors share one request queue and one recording queue. Vari-
ous failure rates (5%, 10%, 16%, 20%, 25%, 33% and 50%) were considered. The impact
8Local methods are instrumented using F-PSL as recording assertors. Assertors exchange application
messages by means of method calls without network connections. They record interaction records
documenting the messages they receive and send to contribute to the process documentation of an
information eciency value.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 204
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Figure 6.13: ACE deployment workow [76]
of the latency to detect a failure event on an application's performance was also inves-
tigated. We studied three latency intervals, 0s, 1s and 2s to obtain a general pattern of
the impact. The interval 0s provides an extreme case, where a failure event occurs im-
mediately. Reason for not choosing higher values is that if we can conclude the pattern
with these values, then we do not need to discuss higher ones.
Due to the limited resources a user is eligible to use on Iridis, we employed ve provenance
stores to record process documentation. These provenance stores were the default and
alternative stores known by each assertor. When taking remedial actions, an alternative
store was randomly selected.
6.2.5.3 Results
Since the time to collate samples is constant and small as opposed to the job runtime,
the application runtime is approximated as the average runtime of all jobs [76]. We
average application runtime from three runs of ACE. The runtime of an application
without recording process documentation is 22:24 (in the format mm:ss). When no fail-
ure occurs, the application runtime using PReServ and F-PReServ are 24:58 and 25:07,
respectively. Therefore, the recording overheads of PReServ and F-PReServ are similarChapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 205
(about 12%). This similarity benets from the use of multithreading to asynchronously
record documentation.
The asynchronous approach allows an application's record messages to be queued before
being shipped to a provenance store. F-PReServ has provided a ow control mechanism
in the request and recording queues to avoid exhausting memory. For example, record
messages cannot be queued until there is space in the recording queue. This may however
aect the application's performance, since the application is postponed occasionally in
order to reduce the speed of issuing requests to create record messages when queues
become full frequently.
Our results in Figures 6.14 and 6.15 demonstrate the correlations among application
performance, failure rate, latency of producing failure events and queue utilisation. In
Figure 6.14, the recording overhead slightly increases as the failure rate is below 25% in
all latency setups. However, it is sharply increased when failure rate is beyond certain
points, such as 25% and 33%. Figure 6.15 shows how often a recording queue is in a full
capacity when a new batch of record messages is to be enqueued. It clearly reveals that
the sharp increase in the recording overhead in Figure 6.14 results from the ow control
mechanism.
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Figure 6.14: Recording overhead of F-PReServ
From this application experiment, we can draw several general conclusions:
(1) Both PReServ and F-PReServ have similar recording overhead when there is no
failure (around 12% in ACE);
(2) If the application is not slowed down due to limit on queue capacity, F-PReServ in-
troduces acceptable recording overhead in the presence of failures (around 18% in ACE);
(3) The latency of generating a failure event (i.e., the delay in detecting a failure) can
aect an application's performance. If the latency is caused by the timeout for waiting
for an acknowledgement from a provenance store, then there is a trade-o: a smallerChapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 206
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Figure 6.15: The frequency of a recording queue in full capacity
timeout would enable F-PReServ to take remedial actions more quickly in the presence
of failures, which can avoid slowing down the application's execution but may result in
redundant information recorded in the original store which erroneously was considered
to have failed;
(4) By monitoring the utilisation of queues, we can detect if an application's perfor-
mance has been severely degraded and then take actions to improve the performance.
For example, the local le store introduced in F-PSL can be automatically employed
for temporarily maintaining interaction records9, when the frequency of the queue in
maximum capacity reaches a certain threshold, say, 40%.
An ACE job does not involve network connection apart from communicating with prove-
nance stores, the coordinator. This implies that recording process documentation is
dicult and hence the above results are representative to a wide range of applications
in SOAs which are normally Internet-based with less performance requirement.
Query After each run of ACE, we queried the provenance stores to further verify the
quality of documentation recorded by F-PReServ. In order to compare results, we also
reran ACE using PReServ to record process documentation in the presence of failures.
The query results show that:
(1) F-PReServ records an equal number of interaction records in provenance stores and
produced in ACE, whilst PReServ fails to record complete process documentation (Fig-
ure 6.16);
(2) F-PReServ does not produce isolated documentation islands and dangling links in
the documentation retrieval path, whilst PReServ produces disconnected process docu-
mentation and dangling links (Figure 6.17);
9We note that the use of local le store also has performance penalty as it involves disk I/O and
thread management, which causes 42% overhead in ACE experiment.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 207
(3) Distributed documentation of the process that led to a data product (i.e., an infor-
mation eciency value) can always be retrieved in its entirety after being recorded using
F-PReServ, whilst PReServ cannot as process documentation is disconnected;
(4) The retrieved process documentation can answer all the use case questions sum-
marised in [76];
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Figure 6.16: Number of interaction records in PS
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Figure 6.17: Isolated islands and dangling links resulted from using PReServ
6.3 Discussion
Having learned lessons from the experimental results, this section provides several rec-
ommendations on the next version of F-PReServ on achieving good performance in the
case of failures. In addition, we discuss relevant technologies that can be integrated withChapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 208
F-PReServ.
6.3.1 F-PSL
6.3.1.1 Including Fault Codes in Acknowledgement
The experimental results in Section 6.2.5.3 show that the latency of detecting a potential
failure may aect an application's performance. In the current implementation, the
receipt of an acknowledgement marks the successful recording of interaction records
(IRs) in a provenance store. If exceptions are thrown in the provenance stores during
the processing of received IRs, then no acknowledgement is provided. The occurrence
of some exceptions on provenance stores does not guarantee the successful recording
of IRs, therefore the related assertor still needs to take remedial actions. Due to lack
of acknowledgement, the assertor has to wait until a timeout is expired, which implies
a latency before remedial actions are taken. Consequently, the application's execution
may be aected when queues reach full capacity, as illustrated in Figure 6.14.
In next version F-PReServ, we will modify the acknowledgement message by dening
fault codes. Therefore, the provenance store can inform the assertor with a response
message in the event of exceptions, and the corresponding assertor can interpret the
fault codes in the response message and takes remedial actions as soon as possible.
6.3.1.2 Developing Intelligent Policies
In addition to F-PSL's conguration le, intelligent policies can be developed to help
maintain good recording performance in future work.
(1) A timeout should be appropriately set in order to balance the tradeo between
the speed and accuracy of detecting failures to receive an acknowledgement from a
provenance store. An adaptive algorithm can be developed to predict a timeout based
on the size of messages to be delivered and previous failure events.
(2) As shown in the experiments, using the original and alternative store when resend-
ing messages can achieve a better performance by balancing the tradeo between the
cost of taking remedial actions, the workload of provenance stores, and the impact on
application's execution. A policy can be introduced to select an alternative store after
messages fail to be resent to a same provenance store for a number of times and to adjust
the appropriate interval between retransmissions.
(3) In the current implementation, an alternative store is randomly chosen. However, a
heartbeat service can be introduced to periodically test the candidate alternative stores
during the execution of an application and choose the most suitable one in terms of
service availability and speed of response.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 209
(4) If an application's performance has been severely degraded due to recording process
documentation in the presence of failures, process documentation can be temporarily
maintained in the local le store. Hence, another policy can be considered to automati-
cally employ the local store at appropriate time.
6.3.1.3 Integrating Enterprise Messaging Services
In enterprise applications, messaging services such as IBM WebSphere MQ, Tibco Enter-
prise JMS, or SonicMQ are often used to guarantee message delivery. When integrated
with F-PReServ, enterprise messaging services can reliably transport SOAP messages
provided by F-PSL.
As introduced in Section 2.6.3, a messaging service typically requires the conguration
of a broker [4, 42], residing in the middle of a client application and a provenance store
service. In the event of provenance store crashes, process documentation is temporarily
maintained in the broker until the store comes back online. Policies can be set up for
the broker to choose alternative stores. Since F-PReP provides a general and exible
approach to recording process documentation in the presence of failures, we can cus-
tomise a broker's behaviour by providing actions such as sending repair requests to the
coordinator service based on rules in Figure 3.14.
6.3.2 Provenance Store Service
6.3.2.1 Clustering Provenance Store Services
Provenance store services can be organised as a cluster sharing a same provenance store
URL and one persistent data store. If one provenance store fails, another one takes over
the pending work of the failed store so as to provide uninterrupted service to the failed
store's clients as if no failure occurs.
Since our provenance store service has been implemented as a web service deployed in a
web container, it is natural to adopt this approach as many application servers10 provide
high-available services through clustered web servers and databases.
Though can be complementary to our approach, clustering provenance services has the
following problems. Firstly, the potentially signicant cost of replicating information
could limit its application, given the documentation produced in a process can be in
large quantity, e.g., on the order of terabytes. Secondly, it does not deal with discon-
nected process documentation that could happen in the presence of failures unless each
10For example, Apache Tomcat, IBM WebSphere Application Server Network Deployment v6.1, Web-
Sphere MQ Cluster, DB2 Enterprise Server Edition and Sun Cluster on Solaris.Chapter 6 Implementation and Evaluation 210
provenance store in the system has its own clustered services. However, in open dis-
tributed environments like SOAs, where a large number of provenance stores could be
present, it is unrealistic to assume each is facilitated with replicated backups.
6.3.2.2 Availability of Process Documentation
According to Figure 6.5, the provenance store caches received messages and at a later
stage stores them in a backend database. This means that it may take a while before
process documentation is ready to be retrieved. To accelerate this process, we can utilise
multithreading in Step (3), Figure 6.5 to increase the processing rate. Therefore, process
documentation will be available for retrieval more quickly.
6.3.3 Coordinator Service
6.3.3.1 Clustering Coordinator Services
In Section 3.2, we assume the Update Coordinator does not fail. To implement this
assumption, the coordinator service can be clustered for the following reasons. Firstly,
failures, though occasionally occur during recording process documentation, are still not
common. Messages can be retransmitted to the same provenance store for several times
before using an alternative one. Therefore, the coordinator is not involved in every
interaction and the number of connections to a coordinator can be small. Secondly, only
a minimum amount of information maintained by the coordinator, thus reducing the
overhead for replication.
In practice, a few public coordinator services can be deployed in application servers
with clustering functionality and maintained by several organisations to support all
provenance-aware applications in the world.
6.3.3.2 Security Issues
Security issues pertaining to PReServ have been investigated in [77, 156]. In this section,
we briey discuss those related to the Update Coordinator. Authentication, Authorisa-
tion and Encryption are three fundamental aspects that need to considered.
 Authentication and Authorisation ensure that only veried users can communicate
with a service to perform allowed operations. Firstly, only veried assertors or
administrators can establish a connection with a coordinator service to send repair
requests or to monitor the coordinator's status. Secondly, only veried coordinator
services can update links in a provenance store. These notions are conceptually
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 Encryption protects repair, update and uack messages from being tampered with
during delivery over a connection. Transmission of messages can be secured using
the Transport Layer Security (TLS) or its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
with HTTP.
6.4 Related Work
There is not much work on performance study related to provenance. Performance
evaluations of PReServ are presented in [78, 76]. A detailed comparison on recording
performance between Karma and PReServ is seen in [151], which shows that the per-
formance of PReServ was similar to, or outperformed, Karma. Extensive performance
evaluations have been made on techniques to reduce the amount of storage required
for process documentation [32]. There has been a performance study on PASS [129],
an automatic provenance collection and maintenance storage system at the operating
system level. None of these evaluations considers failures.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced F-PReServ, an implementation of F-PReP with ar-
chitectural support for practical issues such as communication, storage and performance.
The implementation of F-PReServ supports requirement Efficient Recording identi-
ed in Chapter 1. We detailed the design philosophy of F-PReServ's three components:
F-PSL, Provenance Store Service and Coordinator Service. Its features include a novel
way of creating process documentation, basic ow control management for recording
documentation, and a local store for temporarily maintaining documentation to avoid
severe performance degradation in the presence of failures. We also discuss various
approaches that are complementary to our implementation.
Another contribution of this chapter is the extensive evaluation of F-PReServ's perfor-
mance. The experimental results showed that F-PReServ introduces reasonable over-
head when compared to PReServ and has some performance impact on an application's
execution. We believe these results are still acceptable given that the process documen-
tation is guaranteed to be recorded in the presence of failures (Figure 6.16) and still
retrievable in its entirety from multiple provenance stores.
Here we summarise our evaluation results:
(1) The use of disk cache in F-PReServ limits a provenance store's throughput by 20%
compared with PReServ (Figure 6.7). However, PReServ may lose interaction records
in the event of store crashes (Figure 6.11).
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recording performance is very small or negligible (Figures 6.9 and 6.10).
(3) Remedial actions taken by F-PSL introduce small overhead (below 10%, Figure 6.12).
In addition, given a failure rate, the overhead does not increase as the number of causes
of a relationship p-assertion increases (Figure 6.12).
(4) F-PReServ has an overhead of 13.8% compared to PReServ when recording messages
directly to a provenance store (Figure 6.11). However, the impact of F-PReServ on an
application's performance is similar to that of PReServ in a failure-free environment,
beneting from the use of multithreading to asynchronously create and record messages
(both having around 12% overhead compared to ACE's performance without recording
process documentation, Figure 6.14).
(5) If the application is not slowed down due to the limit on a queue's capacity, F-
PReServ introduces acceptable recording overhead in the presence of failures (around
18% in ACE, Figure 6.14).
(6) The latency of generating a failure event (i.e., the delay in detecting a failure) can
aect an application's performance (Figure 6.14).
(7) By monitoring the utilisation of queues (Figure 6.15), we can detect if an appli-
cation's performance has been severely degraded and then take actions to improve the
performance. For example, the local le store introduced in F-PSL can be automatically
employed for temporarily maintaining interaction records.
The scientic application ACE used in our evaluation is high performance and ne-
grained, which implies that recording process documentation is dicult. Hence the
above results (4), (5), (6) and (7) are representative to a wide range of applications in
SOAs which are normally Internet-based with less performance requirement.
Finally, based on the above experimental results, we projected the next version of F-
PReServ by recommending the improvements on its implementation to achieve better
performance (Section 6.3).Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
Scientic and engineering communities have presented unprecedented requirements for
knowing the provenance of their data products, i.e., where they originated from, how
they were produced and what has happened to them since creation. Without such
important knowledge, scientists and engineers cannot reproduce, analyse or validate
experiments and processes.
A number of provenance systems have been developed to record provenance information
(i.e., process documentation) for SOA-based scientic and engineering applications. In
order to support scalable recording, multiple provenance stores are employed to maintain
distributed process documentation.
According to our survey, PASOA has a number of advantages over the other provenance
systems: rst, it models process documentation in a domain and technology indepen-
dent approach; second, it species a generic recording protocol PReP, which can be
implemented in dierent languages; third, it supports multi-site recording to obtain
sucient provenance data in highly decentralised applications; fourth, it introduces a
linking mechanism to form a chain of pointers, connecting any number of provenance
stores to record process documentation. These advantages have been demonstrated in a
variety of applications. Therefore, this dissertation has adopted PASOA's approach to
modelling process documentation and extended PReP to inherit these advantages.
None of the current provenance systems, however, adequately addresses the problem of
reliably recording process documentation in SOA-like large scale environments such as
the Grid, where failures (specically, communication failures and the crash of provenance
stores) often occur. The presence of these failures leads to poor quality (incomplete and
disconnected) process documentation recorded in provenance stores. Consequently, it
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is not acceptable in the domains that rely on process documentation to determine the
provenance of their data products.
This dissertation has addressed the following thesis statement:
In SOA-based applications, the problem of recording process documentation in the pres-
ence of failures (provenance store crashes and communication failures) while still ensur-
ing its entire retrievability is solved via a generic and ecient coordinator-based protocol
to guarantee successful recording of complete documentation and to preserve accurate
links that connect multiple provenance stores.
To establish this thesis, we rstly presented F-PReP (Chapter 3), a coordinator-based
protocol to record interaction records (which are the elements of process documenta-
tion) in the presence of failures. Then we formalised the protocol and proved that it
has properties Guaranteed Recording, Causelink Accuracy, Viewlink Accu-
racy (Chapter 4). After that, we investigated the properties of process documentation
(Chapter 5) recorded in provenance stores by using F-PReP. We dened graph notations
to intuitively demonstrate that the documentation of a whole process is guaranteed to
be recorded and all viewlinks and causelinks are accurate, and more importantly, pro-
cess documentation recorded in multiple interlinked provenance stores is still retrievable
in its entirety. Finally, we introduced the implementation of F-PReP and conducted
evaluations to show that F-PReP is ecient and has acceptable recording overhead on
an application's execution (Chapter 6).
We now revisit the core contributions of this dissertation.
 We presented and formalised a generic coordinator-based recording protocol F-
PReP that provides basic fault-tolerant mechanisms such as timeouts, retrans-
mission of messages and alternative provenance stores to cope with failures. The
coordinator plays a crucial role in updating viewlinks to enable documentation
retrievability. Three functional requirements were identied for the protocol to
record complete and retrievable distributed documentation in the presence of fail-
ures. The protocol's correctness was formally proved against each requirement
using mathematical inductions.
 We graphically represented the topology of distributed process documentation
spanning across interlinked provenance stores. We performed an exhaustive analy-
sis on the forms of graphs, considering all possible topologies after documentation
was recorded in the presence of failures. This exhaustive analysis helped us to
demonstrate the entire retrievability of distributed process documentation.
 A system architecture F-PReServ was described, which employs F-PReP and sup-
ports practical issues such as communication, storage and performance. Its fea-
tures include a novel way of creating process documentation, a new retrieval func-
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local store for temporarily maintaining documentation) for achieving good per-
formance while ensuring the reliability of recording process documentation in the
presence of failures.
 An extensive evaluation of F-PReServ was performed, which reveals that it intro-
duces acceptable recording overhead to a provenance-aware application's execu-
tion. The evaluation was conducted at several levels. First of all, we measured
the throughput of the provenance store and coordinator. We demonstrated that a
single coordinator does not result in a performance bottleneck. Then, we bench-
marked the recording performance of F-PReServ and showed that remedial actions
introduce small overhead. In addition, we investigated the performance impact on
the execution time of a scientic application.
7.2 Future Work
Sections 5.5 and 6.3 have identied a number of issues for future developments and
extensions. In addition to them, this section discusses several issues on future work.
7.2.1 Garbage Collection of Redundant Process Documentation
Chapter 5 has dened the notion of reachable process documentation, by following refer-
ences to primary nodes. Any process documentation that is not reachable is regarded as
garbage. Reclaiming garbage could be benecial in terms of storage eciency. Chapter
5 denition could be the basis for an algorithm for automatically reclaiming garbage.
While chapter 5 denes reachability, the automatic garbage collector needs to identify
all possible roots. The investigation will have to identify these, and provide tractable
means to determine them at runtime.
A simple approach is a stop-and-copy algorithm [94], but it typically requires partitioning
disk space in two (from-space/to-space) which may not always be realistic. A stopping
collector may not be realistic for applications that run 24/7, and an incremental approach
may be desirable. A stopping algorithm however may be practical in systems, where
operations terminate at the end of the day. A consolidation/compacting phase that
copies provenance in a long-term archiving repository could rely on our reachability
analysis.
7.2.2 Application Failures
An important research direction is to investigate the impact of application failures on
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failure-free application executions. However, assertors may crash before submitting all
of their interaction records to provenance stores, thus losing part of them.
When considering application failures, the application should rely on its own fault-
tolerant mechanisms1. For example, a process can be simply replayed in the case of
application failures and our protocol ensures that process documentation is eventually
recorded following the successful completion of the process. A user is more interested in
the provenance information documenting the successfully completed process irrespective
of how many times the process is replayed. However, there may be redundant documen-
tation recorded in a provenance store due to repeating partial or whole process. Such
redundant information can be garbage collected similarly to our discussion in Section
6.3.
7.2.3 Recording Failure Information in Process Documentation
Process documentation can capture faults or failures that occurred during the execution
of a process. Such information can be used for failure diagnosis and analysis.
A few provenance systems have considered faults or failure information. For example,
PASOA was used in a workow application [167] to record instances of service invocations
at run time including information such as start time/end time of invocations, memory
usage and events indicating invocation failure/success etc. Recorded information is then
used by scientists to evaluate experimental results. Kepler workow system records
process provenance, i.e., data related to the execution of the workow, or intermediate
data products that were processed when an error occurred [38]. By mining and analysing
process provenance, users may gure out exactly what was happening at the time of an
error.
Further investigation can be conducted to decide what failure information should be
included as part of process documentation. Do we need to document execution excep-
tions? Do we need to record retried service invocations? Do we need to treat retried
invocations as separate interactions? Do we need to capture the relationship between
retried invocations? How do we make use of recorded fault information?
7.2.4 A Generic Link Update Mechanism
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, three provenance challenges2, a community eort to
understand and compare systems addressing provenance, have been organised in 2006,
2007 and 2009, attracting more than 20 institutions to participate. These challenges have
identied interoperability between dierent provenance systems as a key issue. Eorts
1A number of fault-tolerant mechanisms have been surveyed in Section 2.5.
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have been made to integrate provenance information derived from dierent provenance
systems and represented using dierent models. A common data model, Open Prove-
nance Model (OPM) [125], has been proposed and revised to promote interoperability
among the existing provenance systems.
These research activities clearly signal that process documentation will be generated
from dierent systems and integrated together under a uniform model. In this sense,
the ability to retrieve distributed process documentation from provenance repositories
owned by dierent provenance systems will become essential too. We expect the linking
mechanism in PASOA to be extended as a general approach to connecting provenance
repositories of dierent systems. In addition, a coordinator-based link update algorithm
can be separated from F-PReP to ensure a correct pointer chain connecting provenance
repositories when a dierent repository is used by a participating provenance system in
the presence of failures.
7.2.5 Cloud Computing
Cloud Computing is an emerging technology that attracts more and more attention
nowadays. Cloud computing implies a service-oriented architecture, reduced information
technology overhead for the end-user, great exibility, reduced total cost of ownership,
on-demand services and many other advantages [161]. It has been supported by a number
of industry leaders such as Amazon, Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and IBM.
Cloud Computing evolves from Grid Computing with on-demand resource provisioning
[59]. It relies on the Grids as its backbone and infrastructure support whilst delivering
services (infrastructure, platform and software) on demand. With Cloud Computing,
services are sold to users, which only pay the services they use like they pay for a public
utility (e.g., electricity and gas). Therefore, users can scale up their applications to
massive capacities in an instant without having to invest in new infrastructure, train
new personnel, or license new software.
Clouds are providing new challenges for provenance [59]. As surveyed in Chapter 2,
a number of provenance systems have been developed for Grid applications. However,
provenance is still an unexplored area in Cloud environments, where we need to deal
with even more challenging issues such as tracking data production across dierent
clouds (with dierent platform visibility and access policies) and secure access of process
documentation when provenance services (software or storage support) are sold to users
which may not have control on their provenance information.
In terms of reliably recording process documentation, Cloud users would appreciate
our solution. Firstly, a growing frequency of faults would be seen as Cloud computing
delivers heterogenous Internet-based services. Consequently, Cloud services must be
designed under assumption that they will experience frequent and often unpredictableChapter 7 Conclusion and Future Work 218
failures [17]. On the other hand, the Cloud is designed to be highly available as resources
are created or allocated on demand. This means a large number of alternative provenance
store services could be present, which supports one of our assumptions for F-PReP.
Therefore, our solution will still apply.
The issues discussed in Sections 7.2.2, 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 are also interesting topics for future
research in a Cloud Context.
7.2.6 Concluding Remarks
This dissertation has shown that the problem of recording retrievable process documen-
tation in the presence of failures can be solved via a generic and ecient coordinator-
based protocol to guarantee successful recording of complete process documentation
and to preserve accurate links that connect multiple provenance stores for SOA-based
applications.
Although we have emphasised SOA-based applications, we believe that same approach
can be applied to any system whether business, engineering or scientic. By providing
the reliability and retrievability of process documentation, the provenance of all the
things that we deal with in our daily lives can be made available. Therefore, we will
have greater condence and knowledge about the world.Bibliography
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